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Under the banner of a New International Economic Order (NIEO), in the 1970s a 
coalition of developing countries forced the U.S. and other rich nations to revisit the 
terms of the post-World War II economic settlement through comprehensive global 
negotiations. This dissertation argues that this economic showdown reshaped U.S. 
foreign policy and made global inequality a major threat to American national security. 
Using newly available sources from presidential libraries, the personal papers of cabinet 
members and ambassadors, and interviews with former National Security Council 
officials, it demonstrates how the NIEO and accompanying “North-South dialogue” 
negotiations became an inflection point for some of the greatest economic, political, and 
moral crises of the 1970s, including the end of “Golden Age” liberalism and the return of 
the market, the splintering of the Democratic Party and the building of the Reagan 
coalition, and the role of human rights in foreign policy. U.S. policy debates and 
decisions in the North-South dialogue, it concludes, were pivotal moments in the histories 
of three ideological trends—neoliberalism, neoconservatism, and human rights—that 
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“In the wider perspective of history, it may well turn out that the long-term significance 
of the ‘oil crisis’ is the way it has served as a catalyst for the wider and more fundamental 
confrontation between the poor nations and the rich, which threatens to engulf the world. 
The issue today is not oil, in any narrow sense, but whether the existing economic 
system, upon which Western preponderance is based, can withstand the challenge from 
the Third World. This is the question which OPEC, through the example it has given the 
underdeveloped nations, has brought to the center of the international stage.” 
 




“Philosophy, as the thought of the world, does not appear until reality has completed its 
formative process, and made itself ready… When philosophy paints its grey in grey, one 
form of life has become old, and by means of grey it cannot be rejuvenated, but only 
known. The owl of Minerva, takes its flight only when the shades of night are gathering.” 
 





On May 22, 1977, Jimmy Carter delivered the first post-election articulation of 
his foreign policy to the graduating class of Notre Dame University. The speech is 
memorable for Carter’s declaration that human rights are a “fundamental tenet” of U.S. 
foreign policy. More radical, however, was his insistence that history had proven 
incorrect the two most consistent elements of postwar American foreign relations: One, 
“[the] belief that Soviet expansion was almost inevitable but that it must be contained”; 
and two, “the corresponding belief in the importance of an almost exclusive alliance 
among non-Communist nations on both sides of the Atlantic.” In contrast, Carter depicted 
a world divided not between a free West and an unfree East, but between a rich North and 
a poor South. “We know a peaceful world cannot long exist one-third rich and two-thirds 
hungry,” he announced, paraphrasing Abraham Lincoln’s famous words on antebellum 
America.1 
Carter had good reason to claim a relationship between global inequality and 
national security. In 1972, crop failures and the depletion of American grain reserves 
through a deal with the Soviet Union launched the Third World into its most severe food 
crisis ever. A year later, citing in part rising food prices from developed countries, 
members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) quadrupled the 
price of oil they sold to the West.2 While Western leaders castigated OPEC for 
                                                     
1 Jimmy Carter, Address at Commencement Exercises at the University of Notre Dame, May 22, 1977. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7552. 
2 “Of course [the price of oil] is going to rise,” the Shah of Iran told the New York Times: 
Certainly! And how! … However, it’s a solution that you in the West have wished upon 
yourselves. Or if you prefer, a solution wished on you by your ultracivilized industrial 
society. You’ve increased the price of wheat you sell us by 300 per cent, and the same for 
sugar and cement. You’ve sent petrochemical prices skyrocketing. You buy our crude oil 
and sell it back to us, refined as petrochemicals, at a hundred times the price you’ve paid 
us. You make us pay more, scandalously more, for everything, and it’s only fair that, 
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exacerbating the food crisis, the oil producers’ show of strength was a catalyst to an 
emerging Third World coalition in the UN seeking “economic decolonization” through 
establishing a “right to development” and other major changes in global economic 
governance.3 On May 1, 1974—International Labour Day—they presented their demand 
for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) that would redistribute both economic 
resources and political power from the global North—that is, the United States, Western 
Europe, and Australasia—to the global South—everyone else but the Eastern Bloc. 
“What we aim,” explained Venezuelan President and OPEC leader Carlos Andrés Pérez, 
“is to take advantage of this opportunity when raw materials, and energy materials 
primarily, are worth just as much as capital and technology, in order to reach agreements 
that will ensure fair and lasting balances.”4 
The NIEO largely failed to achieve its objectives.5 On the contrary, by the 
beginning of the Latin American debt crisis in 1982, the “North-South dialogue” was 
over and neoliberalism was becoming the pronounced policy of the advanced industrial 
countries and the IMF and World Bank. However, in the 1970s the NIEO dominated the 
                                                     
from now on, you should pay more for oil. (“Price Quadruples for Iran Crude Oil,” New 
York Times, December 12, 1973.) 
3 The concept of a “right to development” was developed alongside and was complementary to the “right to 
self-determination” in Third World activities at the UN during the 1950s. During the 1960s the “Group of 
77” developing countries sought to enshrine the right to development in international law, culminating in 
the NIEO Declaration in May 1974 and Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States in December. 
(Daniel J. Whelan, “’Under the Aegis of Man’: The Right to Development and the Origins of the New 
International Economic Order.” Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, 
and Development 6, no. 1 (2015): 93-108.) For an extended discussion of the right to development’s 
relationship to the NIEO, see Christopher Dietrich, Oil Revolution: Anticolonial Elites, Sovereign Rights, 
and the Economic Culture of Decolonization (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
4 “A Letter from the President of Venezuela to the Chairman of the World Food Conference Meeting in 
Rome,” Caracas, November 5, 1974. 
5 The NIEO did achieve one important concession. In the 1979 Tokyo Round for the General Agreements 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the “enabling clause” was adopted, allowing developing and least developed 
countries to discriminate between different categories of trading partners. This was incorporated into the 
founding of the World Trade Organization. 
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agenda of international economic relations, playing a central role in how American 
officials understood the new phenomenon of “global interdependence.”6 Now-canonical 
political scientists like Robert W. Cox, Susan Strange, Stephen Krasner, and John Ruggie 
invented a new subfield, international/global political economy, largely by analyzing the 
Third World’s unprecedented rise and assertiveness in economic diplomacy at this time, 
when the West appeared fractured, confused, slow-growing, and broke.7 Such changes 
made America’s liberal internationalist establishment especially anxious to form a 
practicable response to the South’s demands. In one of its first reports, the Trilateral 
Commission in 1974 analyzed the “explosion in North-South relations” that “[has] 
gravely strained the fabric of international economic relations” and “raised the most 
                                                     
6  Interdependence is a concept from political science that sought to account for the limitations of 
traditional state power in a world increasingly determined by transnational economic and political 
relationships. See Richard N. Cooper, The Economics of Interdependence (New York: McGraw Hill, 1968) 
for an early and influential formulation. See also Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane, Power and 
Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1977). 
7 As Margulis explains: 
The conventional story told about the origins of GPE [Global/International  Political 
Economy] is that it emerged in the late 1970s/early 1980s because of a dissatisfaction 
with International Relations’ (IR) inability to explain the economic dimensions of world 
politics. In reality, what spurred the development of GPE was not so much a ‘gap’ in the 
IR literature but instead a reaction to unprecedented changes taking place in the politics 
of the world economy at the time – the energy crises and Southern assertiveness in the 
form of the NIEO. In other words, GPE’s appearance as an intellectual project had a lot 
to do with scholars seeking to come to grips with the world (“Introduction,” in Mataias E. 
Margulis (ed.), The Global Political Economy of Raul Prebisch (London: Routledge, 
2017), pp. 9-10)) 
International political economists were fascinated by the Third World’s new coalitional economic 
diplomacy and what it portended for world order. See Robert W. Cox and Harold Jacobson, The Anatomy 
of Influence: Decision Making in International Organizations (New Haven: Yale, 1973); Susan Strange, 
“What is Economic Power, and Who Has It?” International Journal 30, no. 2 (1975); G. K. Helleiner, A 
World Divided: The Less-Developed Countries in the International Economy (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1976); and Cox, “The Crisis of World Order and the Problem of International 
Organization in the 1980s” International Journal 35, no. 2. (1980). By the end of the decade enough of a 
literature had developed for Robert Cox, along with Susan Strange considered the “leader” of GPE/IPE, to 
write a comprehensive review (“Ideologies and the New International Economic Order: Reflections on 
Some Recent Literature,” International Organization 33, no. 2 (1979)). There was also an important 
“realist” contribution to the debate, Stephen Krasner’s Structural Conflict: The Third World against Global 
Liberalism (Berkeley: University of California Press 1985). Krasner’s prediction that the North-South 
conflict would continue more or less along the same lines proved untrue, but his book remains influential in 
IR studies. A second realist addition is David A. Lake, “Power and the Third World: Toward a Realist 
Political Economy of North-South Relations,” 31, no. 2 (1987). 
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troubling questions about the world’s ability to manage its interdependence through 
peaceful cooperation.”8 In fact, from that organization’s founding in 1973 to 1976, 8 out 
of 12 of its “Trialogue” reports focused on North-South relations. In 1977, World Bank 
President Robert McNamara called a special commission on the subject led by former 
German Chancellor Willy Brandt. Their report, with the dire subtitle A Programme for 
Survival, deemed the North-South divide “the great social challenge of our time” and “a 
mortal danger threatening our children and grandchildren.”9 
What happened to the North-South dialogue? U.S. policymakers had an obvious 
interest in defeating the NIEO, or at least rendering it toothless, but perception is reality, 
and the perception up until 1982 was that the breakdown of the dialogue could sabotage 
the West’s fragile post-1973 economic recovery. More specifically, what was the North-
South dialogue’s legacy for American foreign policy as it moved out of the crisis-ridden 
1970s and into the ascendance of the Reagan years and triumphant globalization of the 
Bush I/Clinton/Bush II administrations?  
For successive American governments, the NIEO’s significance lay less in the 
threat of it actually being enacted lock stock and barrel, than in its very real and 
immediate effects on American leadership in a transforming, if not disintegrating, world 
order. Many of those tasked with formulating U.S. grand strategy feared that if the U.S. 
did not respond constructively, it would face widespread opposition not only from 
developing countries, but also from its allies in Western Europe, who were more 
                                                     
8 Richard N. Gardner, Saburo Okita, and B. J. Udink, “A Turning Point in North-South Economic 
Relations: A Report of the Trilateral Task Force on Relations with Developing Countries to the Executive 
Commission of the Trilateral Commission,” 11. 
http://trilateral.org//download/doc/economic_relations_19741.pdf. 
9 Independent Commission on International Development Issues under the Chairmanship of Willy Brandt, 
North-South: A Programme for Survival (London and Sydney: Pan Am Books, 1980), 7.  
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politically amenable to some of the NIEO’s propositions (as well as more economically 
vulnerable to the threat of sustained high oil prices). The NIEO convinced realists in the 
Ford administration and trilateralists in the Carter administration of the necessity of real 
concessions and intergovernmental cooperation on food, energy, and commodities, but 
also galvanized neoliberals who sought to return international economics to the “free 
market.” The effort also found sympathy among some American and European 
proponents of détente and arms control, who saw the Cold War as having had largely 
destructive consequences for Third World development, but faced opposition from a 
growing number of U.S. neoconservatives who co-opted human rights language to 
delegitimize the regimes, and therefore the claims, of the NIEO’s Third World 
proponents. Thus, it is not enough to say that the dialogue failed just because developed 
countries wanted it to, for that was not consistently and uniformly the case. Its role in this 
time of global transition and realignment needs explanations, not assumptions.  
Using newly available sources from two presidential libraries, the private papers 
of cabinet members and ambassadors, and interviews with former National Security 
Council officials, this dissertation shows that both Republican and Democratic 
administrations took the NIEO challenge seriously, and that they attempted to pacify the 
countries of the South through new policies on everything from food, technology, and 
human rights to foreign aid, apartheid, and the Panama Canal. Most important, I argue 
that the NIEO and North-South dialogue became an inflection point for some of the 
greatest economic, political, and moral crises of the 1970s, including the end of “Golden 
Age” liberalism and the return of the market, the splintering of the Democratic Party and 
the building of the Reagan coalition, and the rise of human rights in U.S. foreign policy 
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in the wake of the Vietnam War. Policy debates and decisions in the North-South 
dialogue, I conclude, were pivotal moments in the histories of three ideological trends—
neoliberalism, neoconservatism, and human rights—that would form the core of 




The historiography of the 1970s has exploded in recent years. Most recent 
scholarship proposes to understand the 1970s from a perspective of global crisis, focusing 
mainly on the abrupt breakdown of the postwar order and the struggle in advanced 
industrial countries to make sense of it all.10 Some, such as Daniel Sargent and Jeremi 
Suri, have noted a realization among U.S. policymakers—beginning with Henry 
Kissinger post-Nixon in particular—that the world was growing more interdependent.11 
Kissinger tried to adapt détente and the Nixon Doctrine to an emerging multipolar world, 
one in which multilateral engagement would help advanced industrial countries 
coordinate monetary and energy policies to stabilize the Pax Americana. But he also 
recognized the potential of the Third World to disrupt transatlantic macroeconomic 
coordination through the use of the oil weapon. The Carter administration brought its 
own vision of managing world order that stressed interdependence and multilateral 
                                                     
10 Charles Maier, Niall Ferguson et al, The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2012) and Thomas Borstelmann, The 1970s: A New Global History (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2012) are two important publications. Other recent titles interpreting the 1970s 
from a global perspective include Daniel Rodgers, Age of Fracture (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2011); Mark Mazower, Governing the World: The History of an Idea (New York: Penguin, 2012); Samuel 
Moyn, The Last Utopia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012); Christian Caryl, Strange Rebels 
(New York: Basic Books, 2014); Barbara Zanchetta, The Transformation of American International Power 
in the 1970s (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Daniel Sargent, A Superpower Transformed: 
The Remaking of American Foreign Relations in the 1970s (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015); 
James Cronin, Global Rules: America, Britain, and a Disordered World (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2015). 
11 See Jeremi Suri, Henry Kissinger and the American Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2009) and Sargent, A Superpower Transformed. 
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cooperation but also human rights, creating unexpected difficulties in both its Soviet and 
Third World policies.12 Both Sargent and Suri emphasize that new visions of world order 
were being offered at top levels of U.S. policy, visions which were “caught between an 
emerging global order and an enduring Cold War” that sat uneasily in a time of transition 
and confusion.13 
The importance of the NIEO for American foreign policy in this period of 
transition and confusion has been noted, but most discussions have focused on the 
announcement of the NIEO itself rather than the subsequent economic negotiations. 14 In 
his essential contribution to the “global Cold War,” Odd Arne Westad notes that the 
NIEO “can be seen as a sign of the increasing lack of political identification among Third 
World countries,” but offers little additional analysis.15 His 2017 update, The Cold War: 
A Global History, gives the NIEO scarcely more space, concluding that “overall the 
                                                     
12 Barbara Zanchetta writes of the effects of global interdependence on the Carter administration’s thinking 
toward the Third World, where “the United States had to be more accommodating toward the demands of 
these countries for greater access to the world’s resources and a large role in the global economic system.” 
However, she does not discuss the context of this thinking, which came out of Carter’s foreign policy team 
at the Trilateral Commission observing the Ford administration struggling to strike a balance between 
transatlantic cooperation and Southern demands. See Zanchetta, Transformation, 197. 
13 Sargent, A Superpower Transformed, p. 295.  
14 See the special issue on the NIEO in Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, 
Humanitarianism, and Development 6, no. 1 (2015): 1. For other recent works addressing the NIEO, see 
Giuliano Garavini, After Empires: European Integration, Decolonization, and the Challenge from the 
Global South 1957-1986 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Daniel Sargent, A Superpower 
Transformed: The Remaking of American Foreign Relations in the 1970s (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2015); and Christopher Dietrich, ‘Oil Power and Economic Theologies: The United States and the 
Third World in the Wake of the Energy Crisis’, Diplomatic History (2016) 40 (3). Both Garavini and 
Sargent stress the NIEO’s link to the global energy crisis, though Garavini’s analysis centers more on the 
NIEO’s catalyzing effect on European integration than on its impact for U.S. foreign policy. Like Sargent, 
Dietrich’s article emphasizes the NIEO’s transformative role during the Ford Administration, especially for 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. In a recently published book, Dietrich does address the Carter 
Administration’s response to the North-South dialogue, including its ‘basic needs’ strategy, but this is not 
the book’s focus and comes in the conclusion. (See Dietrich, Oil Revolution: Anticolonial Elites, Sovereign 
Rights, and the Economic Culture of Decolonization (New York: Cambridge University Press, 217), 307-
310.)  
15 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 334.  
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immediate results [of the NIEO] were negative,” and that “[by] focusing on economic 
demands, the ailing Third World coalition blew itself apart.”16 Mark Mazower, on the 
other hand, gives more weight to the NIEO’s challenge for U.S. foreign policy, when he 
writes, “The terrifying worry to Washington [with the NIEO] was that differing European 
and American responses to this demand might break up the politico-economic alliance 
upon which the postwar revival of capitalism and the emergence of the United States as a 
global power had been based.”17  Yet, Mazower then turns to “the real New International 
Economic Order,” that is, the neoliberal order that destroyed any hopes in the Global 
South for the NIEO. He and others have focused on the great financialization of the world 
economy that occurred following the transition from fixed to floating exchange rates in 
the early 1970s, as well as the process of “petrodollar recycling” that contributed to the 
Latin American debt crisis beginning in Mexico in 1982. But it was in the early years of 
the Carter Administration that North and South actually debated whether or not the 
South’s rising debt levels represented an imminent problem. The Carter Administration 
insisted that they did not, but many in the G-77 said they did, and proposals abounded in 
the late 1970s for debt rescheduling and representation in “creditors club” deliberations in 
Washington, London, and Paris. The U.S.’s successful blocking of these proposals is just 
one example of how U.S. policy toward the North-South dialogue really did matter for 
the post-Bretton Woods global order.  
This dissertation also seeks to account for the NIEO’s role in the neoliberal turn in 
the North, where it has mostly been ignored. Stedman Jones’s influential text on the rise 
of neoliberalism, which stresses transatlantic intellectual and political connections, argues 
                                                     
16 Odd Arne Westad, The Cold War: A World History (New York: Basic Books, 2017), 393. 
17 Mazower, Governing the World, p. 345. 
9 
 
that “the trend toward a new macroeconomic strategy was actually firmly bipartisan in 
the 1970s.”18 However, this ignores an important debate about the role of the state in 
international economic affairs in the Ford and Carter administrations, in which free-
market ideologues were positioned as combative outsiders trying to change a still-
dominant consensus around global economic management. Monica Prasad rejects the 
idea of a monolithic neoliberalism by emphasizing the differing experiences of Britain, 
France, Germany, and the U.S., but excludes the global discussion the NIEO prompted 
within the North about what, if anything, should replace the Bretton Woods rules for 
international trade and finance.19 Finally, Daniel Rodgers reflects perhaps the most 
common understanding: that the 1970s was a battle of ideas between Keynesians, who 
lacked explanations and effective policy responses for stagflation, and monetarists, who 
proposed to have both.20 In this account there is no international dimension to the return 
to the free market until the 1980s.21 Including the NIEO in the story of neoliberalism’s 
rise in the North adds a new perspective that moves beyond intellectual and political 
histories to show that neoliberalism had global origins and consequences years before it 
became global consensus.  
Not much was certain about international economic governance in the period 
between the end of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s and the spread and 
consolidation of neoliberalism during the 1980s. From the perspective of most Western 
policymakers, the future of global economic relations was likely to involve more, and 
                                                     
18 Stedman Jones, Masters of the Universe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), p. 216. 
19 Monica Prasad, The Politics of Free Markets: The Rose of Neoliberal Economic Policies in Britain, 
France, Germany, and the United States (London: The University of Chicago Press, 2008). 
20 Rodgers, Age of Fracture. 
21 This excludes the case of Pinochet’s Chile, which is often cited in popular discussions of neoliberalism 




more dramatic, government intervention. As Harold Wilson put it at the 1975 G-7 
summit, at the height of the NIEO controversy, the question for the assembled leaders 
was whether developing countries would follow OPEC’s example by producing more 
“phosphate-pecs, bauxite-pecs, banana-pecs, and others,” or drop their appeals for radical 
structural reform in exchange for a Keynesian “Marshall Plan-type initiative” that would 
stimulate the economies of both North and South.22 These and many other examples 
show that the New International Economic Order  has a role in the neoliberal turn that 





In Chapter 1, “Free Markets and the ‘Food Weapon,’ 1972-75,” I introduce the 
South’s call on May 1, 1974—International Labour Day— at the United Nations for a 
New International Economic Order, in the midst of interdependent food, energy, and 
monetary crises. Fearing the further loss of American legitimacy in the Third World and 
the powerful new alliance between OPEC and the developing world, U.S. Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger mobilized the Ford Administration’s first response. In June, 
Kissinger announced his intention to convene a World Food Conference, in order to 
communicate both American concern for developing countries’ food needs—by 
proposing an International Fund for Agricultural Development—and OPEC’s 
responsibility for the global food crisis. However, his use of the “food weapon” 
backfired. Developing countries stuck to their structural critique of international 
                                                     
22 Gerald Ford Presidential Library, Memorandum of Conversation, Rambouillet Summit, December 2, 
1975. http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1553299.pdf.  
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economic relations and stood behind OPEC leaders like Venezuela and Algeria, who 
promised their own new food and development programs. Kissinger’s proposals also 
suffered from internal opposition, as free-market reformers like Treasury Secretary 
William Simon and Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz charged Kissinger with 
acquiescing to the Third World’s demands for global market intervention and sabotaging 
their own deregulatory crusade at home. 
While the U.S. remained divided over its policy response to the NIEO, its closest 
allies in Europe were converging. Chapter 2, “The NIEO and the Birth of the G-7, 1972-
76,” argues that the NIEO both exposed deep divisions in the transatlantic alliance while 
ultimately prompting its renewal in the semi-institutional “Group of 6” (or “7”) club. 
Kissinger, the architect of the new partnership, promoted economic managerialism 
among the North and economic concessions to the South as a way to break the “unholy 
alliance” between oil-importing developing nations and OPEC and to prevent both from 
striking separate deals with the European Community. While never absolute, this move 
toward transatlantic unity in the emerging “North-South dialogue” negotiations stalled 
further divergence in the North’s economic policies, after over a decade of troubling drift, 
while serving to weaken the resolve of the OPEC-“No-PEC” alliance and thus the 
South’s negotiating power. 
Chapter 3, “‘The United States Goes into Opposition’: Neoconservatives and the 
NIEO at the United Nations, 1974-76,” examines the NIEO’s impact on the early 
neoconservative movement. While Ford Administration officials like William Simon and 
Alan Greenspan saw the NIEO in terms of economic ideologies, a growing number of 
“new conservatives” believed the North-South divide represented a fateful struggle 
12 
 
between American liberalism and its anti-liberal Third World detractors. Their first 
victory came in Ford’s appointment of self-described “right wing liberal” Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan as UN Ambassador. His call for the US to “go into opposition” against the 
postcolonial UN majority won him wide support at home, but left the US isolated from its 
transatlantic partners. His firing by Kissinger after just eight months on the job reflected 
the Secretary of State’s commitment to his own approach of conciliatory rhetoric and 
limited compromise. The chapter concludes with Kissinger’s May 1976 charm offensive 
in Africa, which he had never visited in any official capacity. There, aping the language 
of his hosts, Kissinger declared his support for “liberation on two scales,” and in an 
opening speech to the meeting of the United Nations Conference for Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), announced his government’s commitment to negotiating a 
Common Fund for Commodities, a key plank of the NIEO platform.  
Chapter 4, “Interdependence, Development, and Jimmy Carter, 1972-76,” 
explains how Jimmy Carter went from being a little-known southern governor to US 
President. It focuses on two important influences on his approach to foreign affairs, the 
Trilateral Commission, led by his future National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
and the Overseas Development Council, an influential Washington-based development 
think tank that provided Carter with a number of new hires. The Trilateral Commission’s 
idea of an “interdependent” world divided not between East and West but North and 
South was the starting point for Carter’s post-Cold War foreign policy, while the 
Overseas Development Council’s promotion of the “basic human needs” model of 
development became a major part of his administration’s approach to human rights. 
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Chapter 5, “Debt, Development, and Human Rights: The Dialogue in Latin 
America, 1974-81,” considers the NIEO’s impact on the Carter Administration’s policy 
toward Latin America. While remembered today for its censures of Southern Cone 
dictators, the administration intended its human rights policy to act as a positive incentive 
as well. State Department officials believed that including basic needs in its definition of 
human rights would encourage regional cooperation on development and moderate the 
North-South dialogue. However, key Latin American leaders became frustrated with 
Carter’s evasive stance on structural North-South issues like trade and debt. Many 
developing countries would pay a huge price for the lack of action on debt: the 1982 debt 
crisis, known in Latin America as the “lost decade of development.” 
Chapter 6 examines the Carter Administration’s efforts to transform the North-
South dialogue from within. By 1978 US officials conceded that “political” successes 
like the Panama Canal and human rights had not lessened Southern support for the NIEO 
in North-South negotiations. At Secretary of State Cyrus Vance’s urging, US policy for 
North-South negotiations came to focus on two “practical” development strategies: basic 
needs and “appropriate technology” (AT) transfer. The US found some support for these 
policies at UNCTAD V and the UN Conference on Science and Technology for 
Development (UNCSTD), where the ODC’s influential Board Chairman Fr. Theodore 
Hesburgh, Notre Dame University President and Carter’s personal friend, headed the 
American delegation. Against Hesburgh’s advice, Carter and Secretary of State Cyrus 
Vance refused to cede control over any new domestic or international development fund 
to Third World-dominated bodies. However, due to unexpected international and 
domestic pressures, the administration also failed to secure Congressional funding for its 
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own basic needs and appropriate technology counter-initiatives, reducing its contribution 
to UNCTAD V and UNCSTD—the final two negotiating sessions of the North-South 
dialogue—to near zero.  
By the beginning of the 1980s a new consensus had emerged in the major 
developed countries around international economic governance and development. In one 
way the US turned inward, raising interest rates dramatically to counter inflation and 
introducing tariffs on cheap foreign imports to protect American industries. However, it 
also introduced a new international financial policy. The Reagan administration returned 
the US to the IMF and the World Bank with a new vigor and new missions. The World 
Bank ended its involvement in global economic reform and instead turned to smaller-
scale anti-poverty projects and human capital development. But it was at the IMF where 
neoliberalism’s policy trifecta—privatization, liberalization, and fiscal discipline—
became dogma as the “Washington consensus.” These efforts were first concentrated on 
the poor but influential Latin American countries to which Western banks had loaned the 
petrodollars sent to them by OPEC following the first oil crisis. The Atlantic alliance was 
strengthened around these and other changes occurring during the political and economic 
crises of the 1970s. What resulted was the reconstruction of an essentially Anglo-
American market-based world system that had very little to do with the New 
International Economic Order—the political, economic, and intellectual defeat of which 






Chapter 1: A Carrot or a Stick? Free Markets and the ‘Food Weapon’, 1972-75 
 
Introduction 
   
This chapter details the first phase of the United States’ response to the “Group of 
77” developing countries’ call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) and the 
resulting North-South dialogue. The G-77 announced the NIEO at the United Nations on 
May 1, 1974, in the midst of interdependent food, energy, and monetary crises stemming 
from the breakdown of the postwar economic architecture designed and maintained by 
the developed countries. Despite the heterogeneity of the developing countries’ coalition, 
the NIEO “Programme of Action” received a standing ovation in the General Assembly, 
which passed the resolution with 120 votes for, 6 votes against, and 10 abstentions.23 
“What we aim,” Venezuela’s President Carlos Andrés Pérez explained at the World Food 
Conference a few months later, “is to take advantage of this opportunity when raw 
materials, and energy materials primarily, are worth just as much as capital and 
technology, in order to reach agreements that will ensure fair and lasting balances.”24 
As Secretary of State and National Security Adviser to Richard Nixon and Gerald 
Ford, Henry Kissinger took the lead in forming the U.S. government’s response. While a 
new class of pro-market, anti-state economists in the U.S. Treasury, Council of Economic 
Advisors, and Federal Reserve believed the NIEO should be firmly and openly opposed, 
Kissinger sought to engage the G-77 in a variety of old and new international forums. 
Two lines of reasoning lay behind this decision. 
                                                     
23 Pushpa Thambipillai, Jayaratnam Saravanamutt, ASEAN Negotiations: Two Insights (Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies), 31.  
24 “A Letter from the President of Venezuela to the Chairman of the World Food Conference Meeting in 
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First, Kissinger feared the consequences of Third World economic solidarity 
during the 1973 oil crisis. Two OPEC members, Algeria and Venezuela, organized 
support for the NIEO amongst members of the Non-Aligned Movement and G-77, and 
both pledged financial support for oil-importing developing countries to maintain 
diplomatic and economic unity. OPEC’s success in exercising control over the price of 
oil served as a powerful example to other developing countries, giving credibility to past 
proposals from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
for new international arrangements for the supply of other commodities upon which 
developed countries depended.25 Thus, Kissinger advocated a strategy of selective 
engagement and concessions, with the intention of splitting the (mostly poorer) oil-
importing developing countries from their suddenly rich OPEC brethren. A flexible and 
progressive response to some of the developing countries’ demands, he believed, would 
reveal this inherent contradiction of interests while demonstrating that developing 
countries had a lot more to gain by cooperating with Washington than Algiers. 
Second, the North-South dialogue was happening regardless of whether or not the 
U.S. was engaged. The European Community (EC) was even more dependent on foreign 
oil and other commodities than the U.S. Following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Britain, 
France, and West Germany began negotiating separate oil deals with several OPEC 
producers, and the Lomé Convention between the EC and 71 Africa, Latin American, and 
Caribbean countries promised new trade preferences at America’s expense. Nor were 
several social democratic governments opposed in principle to some of the NIEO’s 
measures, themselves advocating heavily statist policies for their own countries. 
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Kissinger not unreasonably believed that a policy of inflexible opposition—especially 
one based in the free-market dogma of Ford’s economic advisors—would find no support 
in the Europe while widening the present fracture in transatlantic relations, at their most 
critical juncture since World War II. 
Kissinger’s North-South strategy was informed not by a sense of sympathy but by 
his sense of history. He believed that the interconnected oil, monetary, and fiscal crises of 
the early 1970s were evidence of the relative decline of U.S. power and the negative 
consequences of unilateral action. This is the basic premise of his understanding of 
interdependence. Failing to engage the NIEO’s supporters would further alienate 
important Third World countries to the advantage of the Soviet Union, while bolstering 
their support for OPEC’s showdown with the West over oil prices. Failing to secure 
European support for a common response from the developed countries would have 
effects on a number of other important foreign policy concerns, such as support for 
NATO and détente, as well as the coordination of a common macroeconomic response to 
the global economic slump. Therefore, in the final two years of his government career, 
Kissinger dedicated an unprecedented amount of diplomatic energy and resources to 
managing the North-South divide. 
Kissinger’s first initiative was to call for a World Food Conference, held in Rome 
in November 1974. There, he announced America’s commitment to increased food aid, 
technology transfer, cuts in developed country tariffs, and the creation of an international 
food bank under the auspices of the World Bank. On this last proposal he faced particular 
opposition from Earl Butz, the influential Secretary of Agriculture who tied his own free-
market revolution in U.S. food production to increased global demand for American 
18 
 
farmers’ products. These disagreements over what Kissinger labeled economic 
“theology” had significant consequences for the Ford Administration’s ability to form a 
coherent North-South strategy, both within the cabinet and with its allies in Western 
Europe.26 
 
Causes of the 1972-74 World Food Crisis 
 
As the 1973 oil crisis rocked the economies of the industrial world, the 
developing countries were undergoing a crisis far more profound in human costs. The 
1960s were a decade of promise in food production, due to advances in agricultural 
technology in the North and agricultural modernization in the South. This “Green 
Revolution” meant that from 1960 to 1972 global production of grains, the main food 
supply for most of the world, increased almost every year, saving millions from hunger 
but also dramatically reducing crop diversity and increasing dependence on fossil fuels.27  
Rising incomes and populations in developing countries buffeted global demand 
for grains. Not only did more people need to be fed—as poor people become richer, they 
tend to eat more dairy, poultry, and meat, which require large amounts of grain to raise.28 
Yet while incomes rose across the world, developing countries took a decreasing part of a 
growing pie. Their share of world trade declined from 31 percent in 1950, to 21.4 percent 
in 1960, to just 17.2 percent in 1970, by which time the three largest economies—the 
U.S., West Germany, and Japan—together accounted for more than a third.29  
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Overall growth in food supply and world trade masked these asymmetries, but 
they had serious consequences. Because the demand for food is highly inelastic, even 
small decreases in food supply can result in large price increases. This effect is 
exacerbated in poor countries, where most grain produced is used for immediate 
consumption—feeding family and livestock—rather than sold.30 Nor was the Green 
Revolution performing as well as its supporters had promised. “Agricultural output has 
grown so slowly [in developing countries],” the Council of Economic Advisers explained 
in 1967, “that food output per person in many countries is below pre-World War II 
levels.” At the same time, “over half” of their annual GDP growth—which at 4.5 percent 
was just shy of the UN’s target for the “Development Decade”—“has been needed just to 
maintain their low level of living.”31 
The “surplus psychology” for food supply was supported by American agriculture 
and trade policy. Due to generous farm subsidies implemented during the Great 
Depression, by the mid-1960s the U.S. had become the world’s leading exporter of grain. 
In response the U.S. government promoted cheap wheat exports and increased food aid, 
and what was not sold, was stockpiled. But mounting federal deficits in the late 1960s led 
to political attacks on the cost of stockpiling. President Nixon complained the U.S. was 
paying the large majority of a scheme to stabilize world food prices, while the EC 
discriminated against American food exports through the Common Agricultural Policy.32 
The Nixon Administration concluded that reducing stockpiles and holding back 
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production would help American farmers by increasing world prices, and from mid-1970 
to mid-1972, the U.S. reduced its production of wheat by one-third, bringing down its 
share of global production from 15 percent to 10 percent.33  
In June 1971, the Nixon Administration moved to liberalize trade with the Soviet 
Union, Eastern Europe, and China. In addition to improving East-West relations, this 
served the dual purpose of raising farm incomes in time for the 1972 elections and 
clearing out US stockpiles. In what one journalist dubbed the “Great Grain Robbery,” the 
Soviet Union alone absorbed about half of U.S. carryover stocks in 1972 and more than 
one-quarter of total 1972 production.34 In 1961, world food reserves—held mostly by the 
U.S.—could sustain 105 days’ supply of world needs; by 1974, those reserves could 
sustain only 33 days.35 The combination of lowered production and the deliberate 
liquidation of American stockpiles made the U.S., and thus the world, ill prepared for any 
sudden shocks.36 
The first shock came on August 15, 1971, when the Nixon Administration ended 
the Bretton Woods Gold Exchange Standard by allowing the dollar to float. The 
structural causes and effects of this event are complex, but the general story is fairly 
straightforward. At the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, the U.S. set up the dollar as 
the world’s reserve currency under a system of fixed exchange rates (with some 
adjustments), with the dollar pegged to the price of gold. Other major currencies were 
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then pegged to the dollar. Postwar reconstruction flooded the world with much-needed 
dollars, and since the U.S. owned over half of the world’s gold stock, the system seemed 
trustworthy. As Germany and Japan recovered, however, the U.S. share of world 
economic output declined, from 35 percent in 1950 to 27 percent in 1969.37 At the same 
time, spending on foreign aid, the Vietnam War, and increased foreign investment sent 
more dollars abroad at the same time that the world was demanding fewer of them.  
Some countries still played ball, choosing to take more dollars instead of forcing 
the leader of the world’s monetary system to devalue. But the writing was on the wall—
countries like West Germany and France proved unwilling to permit more and more 
inflation to support the lifestyles of American citizens or the quagmire in Vietnam, and 
traders in foreign exchange markets, believing the dollar to be overvalued, began to sell 
them rapidly. In May, 1971, West Germany left the Bretton Woods system; in July, 
Switzerland and France asked for over $140 million in gold. “I don’t give a shit about the 
lira,” Nixon insisted in June, and he asked his advisers to come up with a policy that 
would boost the domestic economy in time for the 1972 elections.38 John Connolly, his 
new non-economist Treasury Secretary, was entrusted with pulling together the views of 
Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Burns, Undersecretary for International Monetary 
Affairs Paul Volcker, and Office of Management and Budget Director George Schultz. 
The Administration’s “New Economic Policy,” announced August 15, was the 
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suspension of the dollar’s convertibility into gold, a 90 day wage and price freeze, a 10 
percent cut in foreign aid, and a 10 percent import surcharge.39 
The dollar’s devaluation might have helped poor countries buy more American 
grain, and indeed, Nixon intended to increase agricultural exports to balance U.S. 
accounts, a strategy pursued even more aggressively by Secretary of Agriculture Earl 
Butz following the 1972 elections. However, the grain agreements with Communist 
countries depleted the majority of the American surplus at the same time as a series of 
bad weather events limited production in other important producers, such as Australia, 
Argentina, India, and Peru.40 
The devaluation also set off a series of events in international energy markets with 
serious consequences for food prices. Throughout the 1950s, several Middle Eastern oil 
producers charged Western governments with colluding with multinational oil companies 
(MOCs) to keep prices artificially low. Following the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s 
refusal to cooperate on a new agreement with the Iranian government, Prime Minister 
Mohammed Mossadegh nationalized the country’s oil industry. The Anglo-American 
coup that ousted Mossadegh from power in 1953 served as a powerful example of the 
limitations of the Third World’s economic and political sovereignty into the postwar era.  
Determined to increase their share of profits from the MOCs exploiting their 
reserves, in 1960 the governments of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela 
met in Baghdad to announce the formation of the Organization of Oil Exporting 
Petroleum Countries (OPEC). Through most of the 1960s OPEC was essentially an 
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informal bargaining group, confining its activities to negotiating better profit-sharing 
agreements with MOCs. But since oil was priced in dollars, the U.S. devaluation caused a 
major drop in OPEC members’ real revenues—at the same time that prices were rising 
for just about everything else.  
At first OPEC pledged to price a barrel of oil against gold to maintain price 
stability, to little apparent effect. But on October 17, 1973, citing the U.S. decision to 
resupply the Israeli military during the Arab-Israeli War, OPEC members announced that 
they would stop oil exports to the U.S. and other supporters of Israel, including the 
Netherlands, Portugal, and South Africa. At the same time, OPEC leaders claimed that 
the war was merely the spark. “Of course [the price of oil] is going to rise,” the Shah of 
Iran told reporters in November: 
Certainly! And how! … However, it’s a solution that you in the West have 
wished upon yourselves. Or if you prefer, a solution wished on you by 
your ultracivilized industrial society. You’ve increased the price of wheat 
you sell us by 300 per cent, and the same for sugar and cement. You’ve 
sent petrochemical prices skyrocketing. You buy our crude oil and sell it 
back to us, refined as petrochemicals, at a hundred times the price you’ve 
paid us. You make us pay more, scandalously more, for everything, and 
it’s only fair that, from now on, you should pay more for oil.41 
 
The U.S. decision to resupply Israel “at most played the role of a catalyst,” Algeria’s 
Minister of Oil insisted, “in taking a decision which was already well prepared and well 
justified on the economic level.”42 Regardless, by the end of the embargo in March 1974, 
the price of oil had quadrupled from about $3 per barrel to $12. 
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The 1971 devaluation had already increased the price of grain by as much as 15 
percent; after the 1972 wheat sale to the Soviet Union, grain prices quadrupled.43 Better 
harvests and weather in early 1973 were promising, but the oil shock dashed any hope of 
falling food prices. The growth of U.S. agriculture was in large part the result of new 
fuel-intensive farming practices; the same was true for the more modest gains in food 
production made by developing countries. The U.S. and EC responded by restricting food 
exports to control domestic prices, but poor countries had no such defense against 
skyrocketing prices for the petroleum-based inputs upon which the Green Revolution 
depended. 
“The developing countries, buffeted by high fuel prices, fertilizer shortages, and 
inadequate grain supplies, were frightened and rightfully so,” the director of the 
International Food Policy Research Institute explained.44 India, which had come close to 
self-sufficiency in 1971, faced inadequate rains in 1972, and once oil prices shot up the 
following year, self-sufficiency was out of the question.45 So was much of the content of 
its development plans, as the Indian government ran through its foreign exchange to 
attempt to meet domestic food demand with high-priced imports. Bangladesh faced even 
worse problems in 1973, but the U.S. was unwilling to release food aid until the country 
ceased jute exports to Cuba.46 Western intellectuals pondered the morality of inaction, but 
offered little. Some even came down on the side of inaction in order to wean off 
chronically dependent countries like Bangladesh. “Cruel as it may sound,” the President 
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of the National Academy of Sciences explained, “if the developed and affluent nations do 
not intend the colossal, all-out effort commensurate with this task, then it may be wiser to 
let nature take its course.”47 In other words, produce, pay, or perish. 
 
Food for Oil: Kissinger’s Strategy 
 
It was Richard Nixon who first alerted Kissinger to the problems the world food 
situation posed for U.S. foreign policy. On September 5, 1973, he told Kissinger that he 
was “concerned about the foreign policy repercussions arising from the various problems 
associated with the international agricultural situation.” Not only had U.S. agricultural 
policy “long been a source of irritation in our relations with Europe,” Nixon explained, 
referring to disputes over the EC’s Common Agricultural Policy, but “the recent 
emergency of protein and grain shortages has brought a new dimension… causing 
problems for many developing countries and for us in our relations with them.”48 He 
asked the NSC to produce a study on the issue, and in response it endorsed the idea of a 
“world food security system” involving an “international food stockpile agreement” that 
would “ensure that in times of shortage, those with the least ability to pay would not be 
the first to suffer.”49 
On September 23, 1973, Nixon promoted his National Security Adviser, Henry 
Kissinger, to Secretary of State (Kissinger then held both positions). Introducing himself 
as “the world’s most junior Foreign Minister,” the following day Kissinger announced to 
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the UN General Assembly his proposal for a world food conference, to be held in 
November 1974 under the auspices of the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization.50 
“We will participate without preconditions, with a conciliatory attitude and a cooperative 
commitment,” he insisted. “We ask only that others adopt the same approach.” In a 
tentative recognition of the Third World’s larger complaints against the global economic 
system, Kissinger promised in the next sentence to “examine seriously” the Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States, proposed by Mexican President Luiz Echeverria at 
the April-May 1972 session of the Third World-dominated UN Conference on Trade and 
Development.51 
In October, the oil crisis hit; less than half a year later, the NIEO was announced 
with OPEC members Algeria and Venezuela as its most vocal backers. Just as Nixon 
didn’t “give a shit about the lira,” nor did Kissinger, as he put it, “give a damn about 
Bangladesh on humanitarian grounds. I want it [food] for foreign policy.” The U.S. had 
for decades used the give and take of guns to the Third World for foreign policy 
objectives, but now, Kissinger wanted to use the give and take of butter to pressure 
OPEC into settling the oil question. “This is one of the few weapons we have to deal with 
oil prices,” he insisted to newly-installed President Gerald Ford in September 1974. The 
U.S. could point out that OPEC’s actions hit poor countries disproportionately, but many 
Third World leaders took a longer view, agreeing with Algeria and Venezuela that the 
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industrial countries had initiated the crisis through decades of unequal economic relations 
and finding inspiration in the example of a group of commodity producers standing up to 
rich consumers. “The President is scolding everyone at the United Nations for being 
miserly on energy, and the less we say we'll do on food, the less effect it has,” Kissinger 
explained to Secretary Butz and Alan Greenspan. “We are trying to tell the Third World 
they must be cooperative, and in turn we will try to cooperate.” 52 
 
Earl Butz, American Farmers, and the “Food Weapon” 
 
Kissinger’s proposals for intergovernmental cooperation on food aligned him 
more with the American liberal establishment than with other Ford cabinet members. “An 
internationally agreed system of food reserves is now in the self-interest of all nations,” 
former USAID employee and Overseas Development Council director James P. Grant 
told Congress in 1973.53 In June 1974 George McGovern chaired hearings of the Senate 
Select Committee on Nutrition on global food issues, at which he too called for an 
international system of food reserves; five months later, McGovern, Richard Clark, and 
Hubert Humphrey joined Kissinger and Butz as “unofficial” members of the U.S. 
delegation at the World Food Conference.54  
Kissinger’s biggest challenge before the conference was internal. Ford’s 
economic advisors opposed Kissinger on both ideological and bureaucratic grounds. But 
while the Treasury or Council of Economic Advisors was not directly responsible to any 
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one constituency, the Secretary of Agriculture was. Earl Butz was the most consequential 
USDA head since Henry Wallace in the 1930s—in fact, his mission was to dismantle the 
system of price supports enacted during the New Deal to stabilize farm incomes.55 Like 
Kissinger, Butz saw a major role for food in American foreign policy, and his disruptive 
approach to American agricultural production threatened Kissinger’s entire North-South 
strategy. 
Earl Lauer Butz was born on his family’s small farm in Albion, Indiana in 1908. 
After graduating first in his high school class—out of just seven other students—he 
excelled in agricultural studies at Purdue, earning a B.S. in 1932 and Ph.D. in 
Agricultural Economics in 1937. Following stints as an Assistant Secretary of Agriculture 
and U.S. delegate to the Food and Agriculture Organization during the Eisenhower 
Administration, Butz returned to Purdue and joined the boards of several American 
agricultural conglomerates.56 Seen by Nixon as a free market reformer and a friend of 
industry, he left Purdue in 1971 to head up the USDA. 
Butz was a controversial choice for Secretary. The first red flag for farmers was 
his service under (and outspoken praise for) Ezra Taft Benson, “the most hated 
agriculture secretary ever” due to his strong antipathy toward New Deal reforms.57 The 
second was his close ties to large American agribusiness conglomerates like Ralston-
Purina, where Butz’s predecessor, Clifford M. Hardin, had already lined up a vice 
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presidency at the time of his resignation. “He [Butz] is the worst possible choice I could 
imagine,” the head of the National Farmers Organization stated, “one of those land-grant 
college educators who was supposed to assist all farmers in America, but who identified 
with giant agri-business corporations.”58 During his confirmation hearings a coalition of 
liberal northern Democrats, conservative southern Democrats, and farm belt Republicans 
grilled Butz on his past statements predicting the end of the family farm and urging small 
farmers to “adapt or die” through “vertical integration.”59   
Not everyone in the Farm Belt opposed Butz’s nomination. “The family farm has 
been in desperate straits for many years,” the Salt Lake City Tribune explained in his 
defense. “Rising costs and declining farm prices have combined to clamp the small 
farmer in an increasingly untenable price squeeze.”60 Halfway through the hearings the 
American Farm Bureau Federation, which claimed to represent 2 million “member 
families,” became the first farm group to endorse Butz.61 Still, his 51-44 approval in the 
Senate came only after making one promise: Butz pledged, in writing, to take immediate 
action to increase farm incomes by raising corn prices. “You said you wanted an 
aggressive, articulate Secretary of Agriculture,” he insisted at his swearing-in. “You’ve 
got one. It may be that I’m more vigorous than you want.”62 
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Butz moved fast. Less than 24 hours after taking office he announced that the 
USDA would begin buying up corn in the open market “to firm up farm prices,” thereby 
encouraging farmers to take advantage of a 1970 Farm Bill provision that removed many 
restrictions on planting quotas.63 Butz was eager to defend higher domestic food prices, 
telling consumers that in food, you’ve never had it so good: Americans were eating more 
calories, and more red meat, from a smaller percentage of their incomes than ever before, 
he told U.S. News and World Report in a lengthy interview.64  
Despite the religious fervor with which he condemned government spending and 
“handouts”—his negative comments on the widely popular food stamp program also 
dogged him during his confirmation—in practice Butz was no budget puritan. He earned 
the ire of Treasury Secretary George Schultz for siphoning a total of $700 million in 
“miscellaneous raids on the Treasury” for the corn buyback and other programs, but since 
“there is no one on the White House staff who knows much about agriculture,” the New 
York Times Magazine reported, “he is relatively free of second-guessing.”65 Nixon 
wanted to win the Farm Belt in 1972, and with Butz’s support—farm incomes for 1972 
were a record $19.2 billion—he overwhelmingly did.66 
Unlike his predecessors, Butz had no plans to sit on that surplus until a shortage 
struck. He instructed farmers to unleash their productive potential by planting corn and 
soybeans “fencerow to fencerow,” assuring them that world markets would absorb what 
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domestic markets could not. The 1971 Soviet wheat deal was the first move, accounting 
for one-third of the overall increase in agricultural exports in 1972; exports also increased 
substantially to Eastern Europe, Latin America, Japan, and, for the first time in two 
decades, China.67 In April 1973, Butz announced to Nixon “[with] a great deal of 
pleasure… the virtual liquidation of farm products from the Commodity Credit 
Corporation,” the lynchpin of the New Deal system of managed farm prices. “This marks 
the first time in more than two decades that American agriculture can enjoy a market as 
free from the stifling effects of government stocks as it now can.”68 
This was only the beginning of the American farmer’s new frontier. “This is a 
‘hinge point’ in history,” Butz told an audience in Chicago. “Agriculture is taking a 
dominant position in America’s export trade.” Indeed, American exports were down 
across the map except in agriculture, which Butz positioned as the cure for the U.S. 
payments deficit. “That $11 billion [in farm exports for FY 1972] is roughly equivalent to 
the total value of all our exports of industrial machinery last year,” he explained. “It is 
more than three times our total chemical exports—and four times the total exports of all 
U.S. consumer goods.” The result, he predicted, would be a virtuous circle between a 
hungry world, a cash-strapped U.S. government, and American farmers with the “daring” 
and “imagination” to expand their farms and, maybe, get rich in the process: “Agriculture 
is already making a major contribution to America’s trade balance. We have the potential 
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to do even better. Overseas markets are growing. We can supply those markets, increase 
our exports, and strengthen our farm income.”69 
Butz was also quick to stress a second foreign policy benefit of his radical market 
reforms. “We are learning in this country, perhaps belatedly,” he told a Washington, D.C. 
audience, “how to use food as a positive factor in world diplomacy.” This would not be 
like the “so-called ‘Food for Peace’ program” of the 1950s and ‘60s, he insisted, in which 
the American surplus was simply given away to improve America’s image in the Third 
World. Instead, Butz cited the role of food exports in opening China, achieving détente 
with the Soviet Union, and reaching “peace and reconciliation” in Vietnam and the 
Middle East as proof that “food has become a major force for [international] 
negotiations.” America’s “food power” was indeed “a major weapon.”70 
The question in the middle of 1974 was how that weapon would be used toward 
OPEC and the Third World: Was it a carrot, or was it a stick? Kissinger’s proposal for a 
World Food Conference and promise to negotiate some sort of international reserve 
system indicated a more cooperative approach, but Butz was adamant that the U.S. avoid 
anything that might suggest a return to government intervention at home or new system 
of intergovernmental management abroad.71 “On food aid and stockpiling, a debate is 
developing,” Butz explained to Nixon on May 28, just weeks after the NIEO’s 
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announcement. “[Senator Hubert] Humphrey and his friends think we should have a large 
Government food reserve. I disagree. We are out of the food reserve business and I think 
we should stay out. We carried the world food reserve and everyone got soft—they didn’t 
have to plan. We need food reserves, but they can be carried by private industry and 
foreign governments.72 
Kissinger’s National Security Council was “doubtful” that “such privately held 
stocks could be counted upon” in a crisis, nor could “private trade… be expected to incur 
the heavy carrying charges (interest and storage) for the stocks required to meet a 
contingency which occurs only once in six years or so.”73 Government-held stocks were a 
necessary part of any proposal—at least one that would be taken seriously by developing 
countries. “What we need at this stage, and through the World Food Conference,” 
Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs Thomas Enders told Kissinger, “is an 
agreement to a target level of stocks, and that afterwards, if Butz and others are still 
resisting, then we will need a presidential decision to overrule him on government-held 
stocks.” Kissinger would not fall on his sword at the conference because of Butz’s 
ideological opposition; anyway, he insisted, “I am perfectly willing to take it to the 
President.”74  
Further, as Kissinger knew well, a weapon’s destructive potential and its actual 
diplomatic power were often widely mismatched. In late 1973 the White House rejected 
Butz’s suggestion for a food embargo against OPEC members; as a State Department 
official remarked, food power was “power over people who are hungry—people we don’t 
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want to push around anyway.”75 In other words, for Kissinger, the “food weapon” was a 
scalpel; for Butz, it was more like a cudgel. “There is some leverage in the plight of the 
underfed peoples of the world,” Enders added, “But that is not going to swing it…. We 
have got to do something ourselves.”76  
 
Kissinger vs. the Economic Policy Board, Part I 
 
Gerald Ford’s chief economic advisors were no less skeptical of Kissinger’s 
approach to the World Food Conference. Most of the opposition was ideological, but a 
great deal, too, had to do with the way Kissinger systematically excluded them from the 
making of foreign economic policy. 
Economic policy in the Ford Administration was formed through the Economic 
Policy Board (EPB), a cabinet-level body established shortly after Ford took office. 
Treasury Secretary William Simon was Chairman and the day-to-day activities were 
handled by Ford’s influential Assistant for Economic Affairs, William Seidman. The 
EPB included all members of the cabinet except the Attorney General and Secretary of 
Defense, with an executive committee composed of Simon, Seidman, CEA Chairman 
Alan Greenspan, OMB Director Roy Ash, and, for a few months, Butz. 
According to Roger Porter, the EPB’s Executive Secretary, the State Department 
downplayed the EPB’s importance for two reasons. First, as Secretary of State, Kissinger 
already had daily access to Ford to communicate his policy preferences and concerns, and 
their “memcons” make clear that Ford respected and trusted his advice. (It is also worth 
noting that their relationship benefitted from Ford’s lack of insecurity around Kissinger, 
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in sharp contrast to Richard Nixon.77) Second, the State Department believed that its 
views would not receive a fair hearing under Simon, whose disagreements with Kissinger 
over foreign economic policy were well known. The famously impatient Secretary of 
State preferred instead to make policy on his own and let others catch up.78 
One month before the World Food Conference convened in Rome, Kissinger 
shared a draft of his keynote address with the EPB. The opposition was unanimous. 
Simon, Seidman, Greenspan, and Ash all objected to Kissinger’s insistence on including 
specific aid commitments, arguing instead that the U.S. should speak only broadly about 
its responsibility for ending the food crisis. “The tone emphasizes much too much of 
what we will do for others,” Seidman stated, “and not really enough of what they must do 
for us.”79 
This kind of tone was exactly what Kissinger wanted to avoid. “The speech 
[alone] is not going to do the job,” he explained. “Can we really say that ‘all countries 
have responsibilities,’ when we know that Bangladesh and the Sahel can't do anything, 
and that some others can do greater and still others lesser?”  Such rhetoric would be 
roundly mocked by the Third World, negating the whole point of American leadership at 
the conference. “We should set forth a philosophy, try to convince people, not give an 
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old-maidish lecture to others about what they should do,” Kissinger insisted, not for the 
last time. “We should be less schoolmasterish.”80 
Recognizing the EPB’s opposition to his approach, Kissinger instructed State 
Department officials not to worry about “sell[ing] it within the Government,” as “the 
same people will oppose it with the same arguments.” However, his own staff was by no 
means united. Thomas Enders was concerned that a public presentation of Kissinger’s 
international food bank proposal would “draw fire” from “the LDCs who will think that 
we are attempting to promote an OPEC for food.” Kissinger did not necessarily think this 
was a bad thing, as long as the threat was perceived as towards OPEC and not the South 
in general: “What we would be saying [to OPEC] is that if you cooperate [on oil], we 
won't have to talk about food.”81 
Ford’s economic advisors objected to more than just Kissinger’s insistence on 
numbers. “All too frequently,” the Treasury Department complained, high food prices 
were used “as a way of justifying, and among some developing countries excusing, the 
oil price increase.” Did not Kissinger’s plans for an international system of reserves to 
regulate supply and prices to some extent endorse this logic? The Shah’s analogy—“If 
the price of wheat can triple in one year, why shouldn’t the price of oil be allowed to 
triple?”—was somewhat misleading, given the effects of natural phenomena like weather 
and poor crops on global food supply. But Treasury’s argument ignored several important 
decisions—such as the 1971 devaluation; the 1972 grain sales to the Soviet Union; the 
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1973 decision to restrict food exports; and the lack of a meaningful response to famines 
in South Asia and Africa—implicating American policy in the food crisis. 
Regardless of the economics, developing countries continued to see OPEC’s 
actions as a legitimate response to decades of selfish and unfair treatment by the 
industrial countries. Algeria and Venezuela’s self-appointed leadership of the NIEO, 
announced barely a month after Arab states ended their embargo against the U.S., 
suggested the emergence of a new political economy for the energy and food crises 
defined primarily in North-South terms. Both the U.S. and OPEC had promised to aid oil-
importing developing countries hurt by higher energy and food prices, but the World 
Food Conference was an opportunity for the U.S. to take the lead. The NSC explained: 
State believes that without a commitment to increase the quantity of food 
aid, our position at the [World Food] Conference will look hollow. 
Reflecting Secretary Kissinger’s very strong view, State argued that the 
US must demonstrate its willingness to use its food resources 
constructively if its position in trying to get OPEC countries to use oil 
responsibly is to have any credibility. It emphasized that our food aid 
commitment will be seen as a major test of America’s willingness to 
resolve the global food crisis. 
 
In other words, credibility on food would translate into credibility on oil; OPEC, not the 
U.S., would be seen as the inflexible one, prolonging the Third World’s food and energy 
deficits to line their own pockets.  
To do this, the U.S. had to give more than vague promises of future support. 
“Announcement of the target is necessary,” the State Department insisted. Not only could 
an aid target “get the Europeans, Japanese, and others to assume a significant share of the 
burden for stockpiling food for emergencies, thereby relieving us of part of the cost and 
responsibility.” Simply repeating Ford’s commitment at the 1973 UN General Assembly 
to “increase spending” on food—as recommended by the EPB—would leave the U.S. in 
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an even worse position than before the Conference: “It would not be credible for the U.S. 
to have called a major conference, spent a year preparing for it, and now have no view on 
what reserve target would be necessary to provide for food security.”82 
 
The 1974 World Food Conference 
 
When the delegates convened in Rome in November 1974, the politics of the food 
crisis had changed significantly since Kissinger first called for the conference 14 months 
prior. The various representative bodies of the South—the Non-Aligned Movement, the 
G-77 countries in UNCTAD, and the more activist wing of OPEC—had since heightened 
their calls for change in the structure of global trade, finance, and development. The 
specter of the NIEO loomed large over the conference, which involved an issue of life or 
death for many of the countries represented. 
Kissinger insisted to Butz before the conference that his goal was “to give a 
speech that has a philosophy in it.” Just what was that philosophy? It was not, as 
Kissinger put it once again, “the protestant missionary approach,” where the U.S. would 
simply lecture the world’s poor on what they must do to solve their food problems. 
Kissinger called the EPB’s approach to the NIEO “economic theology,” but he was also 
preaching his own new faith: the gospel of interdependence. For him, both ordinary 
Americans and Ford’s economic advisers were unaware of the political links that U.S. 
leadership of the global economy required. Nearly every speech Kissinger gave in his 
time as Secretary of State emphasizes this point, and he gave so many speeches on the 
subject—nearly two a month in just over two years—because he believed that the U.S. 
                                                     
82 GFPL, Files of the National Security Adviser, Presidential Subject File, Box 6, Food/Food Aid/World 
Food Conference (3), Scowcroft to the President, “Results of Meeting to Review Issues in World Food 
Conference Speech,” November 2, 1974. 
39 
 
had not come to terms with changes in global political economy since the oil shock and 
NIEO. “I am trying to force into national awareness the need to strengthen bonds 
between us and the developing countries,” Kissinger explained to Butz about one of his 
recent foreign policy speeches. When Butz offered to help with the “philosophy” part of 
his address, Kissinger demurred.  “I have no problem with the technical part [of your 
recommendations],” he told Butz. What Kissinger wanted to achieve went beyond 
economic policy: “What I want to do is convince the political leadership of these 
countries that we mean it when we call for cooperation.”83 
As much as Kissinger talked about a philosophy, it was circumstance—the oil 
shock and the NIEO—that led him to this emphasis, and to his perceived imperative to 
show developing countries that the U.S. was listening. His goals for the conference were 
to avoid admitting U.S. responsibility for the food and energy crises while at the same 
time implying OPEC’s guilt. Coming out first with a major international proposal for 
food would put OPEC on the defensive, he hoped, exposing the true fragility of the 
developing countries’ coalition.  
 “In the past 30 years the world came to assume that a stable economic system and 
spreading prosperity would continue indefinitely,” Kissinger began, addressing over 
1,000 delegates from 100 countries. “Surpluses of fuel, food, and raw materials were 
considered a burden rather than a blessing.” The postwar decades gave way to “rising 
expectations” around the world, but the events of the last few years showed that “the 
same interdependence that brought common advance now threatens us with common 
decline.” In explaining those events, Kissinger took direct aim at OPEC, citing “a 
                                                     




political embargo and then abruptly raised prices for oil” as the reason for lower 
industrial and farm production, and for “accelerat[ing] a global inflation that was already 
at the margin of governments' ability to control.”  
After blaming OPEC for exacerbating the crisis, Kissinger then assumed 
American leadership in solving it: 
We regard our good fortune and strength in the field of food as a global 
trust. We recognize the responsibilities we bear by virtue of our 
extraordinary productivity, our advanced technology, and our tradition of 
assistance. That is why we proposed this conference. That is why a 
Secretary of State is giving this address. The United States will make a 
major effort to match its capacity to the magnitude of the challenge. We 
are convinced that the collective response will have an important influence 
on the nature of the world that our children inherit. 
 
His five point program included increasing food production in exporting countries-, 
accelerated production in importing countries, improving the means of food distribution 
and financing, enhancing food quality, and insuring security against food emergencies.  
The last point contained Kissinger’s most important offer: the creation of an 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), funded half by the OECD 
countries and half by OPEC. Here was the “philosophy” he hoped would sway the 
developing countries: 
It is neither prudent nor practical for one or even a few countries to be the 
world's sole holder of reserves. Nations with a history of radical 
fluctuations in import requirements have an obligation, both to their own 
people and to the world community, to participate in a system which 
shares that responsibility more widely. And exporting countries can no 
longer afford to be caught by surprise. They must have advance 
information to plan production and exports. 
 
In his own way, Kissinger was endorsing the food-oil analogy that so bothered the 
Treasury Department. Developing countries were angered that the U.S., after deliberately 
exhausting its reserves for foreign and domestic policy reasons, limited what it had left so 
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that American consumers did not have to pay more. The U.S. did, in significant ways, 
control the price of food—not to the extent that OPEC controlled the price of oil, but the 
point stands. But it didn’t have to by itself any longer. This was Kissinger’s act of good 
faith—of, as he put it to Butz, “convinc[ing] the political leadership of these [developing] 
countries that we mean it when we call for cooperation.”84 He explicitly presented the 
IFAD as a first positive gesture in a North-South conflict that had yet to reach the level of 
dialogue: “It should include all the major exporters as well as those whose import needs 
are likely to be greatest.” In a reference to the NIEO’s call for global negotiations, he 
added, “This group's work should be carried out in close cooperation with other 
international efforts to improve the world trading system.”85 
There are important ironies in Kissinger’s approach. No one would dispute that 
“all nations—East and West, North and South—are linked to a single economic system.” 
But Kissinger also wanted to convince the oil-importing developing countries supporting 
the NIEO that when producers’ cartels restrict supply to force political change, “the 
poorest and weakest nations will suffer most.” It was indeed true that, at least in the short 
term, food price spikes hurt poor countries more than rich ones; as Fr. Theodore 
Hesburgh, President of Notre Dame University and board chairman of the Overseas 
Development Council, put it at the time, “If you run out of gas, you can’t go on a picnic 
in the country, but if you run out of food, you die.”86 Still, high energy prices would 
become a major contributor to developing countries’ debt throughout the 1970s, as OPEC 
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“petrodollars” were “recycled” through Washington banks and lent out to dozens of cash-
strapped countries. 
But none of this was immediately apparent in 1974, especially since OPEC 
continued to link its actions to the South’s broader mission and signal that they would 
provide large financial assistance to other developing countries. Further, G-77 members 
knew that what they were proposing for, say, bauxite and sugar was much more modest 
than OPEC, in both political intent and economic impact. In fact, Kissinger’s logic for 
food could be equally applied to other commodities. Just as food exporting countries 
should not be “caught by surprise” by changing demand from the South, developing 
countries did not want the prices of their own commodity exports to be at the whim of 
economic temperaments in the North. It was not a big intellectual leap to go from 
Kissinger’s endorsement of an international system of food reserves and financing to the 
G-77’s proposal for a “Common Fund for Commodities.” 
Still, in blaming OPEC for most of the global economy’s problems, Kissinger had 
effectively admitted that an organization of commodity producers from the South had 
single-handedly brought the global monetary system to its knees—and that the developed 
countries had been powerless to stop them. And while Kissinger held up the 1973 oil 
crisis as proof that producers’ cartels hurt poor countries even more than rich ones, did 
not the global impact of American monetary, trade, and agricultural policy produce the 
same effect for food—an even more vital resource? “The central purpose of the U.S. 
delegation seemed to be to extract a promise from the oil-producing countries to use 
some of their oil revenues to finance agricultural improvement in the Third World,” one 
observer noted following the conference. Kissinger cited the “special responsibility” of 
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oil-producing countries to fund development, since “many of them have income far in 
excess of that needed to balance their international payments or to finance their economic 
development.” Thus, the observer continued, “the pressure was… on the members of 
OPEC right from the beginning of the conference. Put your money on the table… and we 
will respond by doing something about immediate problems of world starvation by 
releasing more food aid.”87 In other words, Kissinger was saying that if you don’t help, 
neither will we. 
Kissinger was confident that this strategy would work. “The Arabs are scared,” he 
told his staff before the conference, “and regardless of what they say in public they are 
very conciliatory to me in meetings.”88 However, the OPEC countries countered by 
calling for their own Agricultural Development Fund, to which they would contribute the 
bulk of the funding. OPEC’s proposal was backed by some developed countries, 
including Australia, The Netherlands, and New Zealand, but the U.S. refused to support 
it. Instead, Kissinger returned to his first, more limited proposal, which was to launch a 
Coordinating Group for Food Production and Investment organized by the World Bank, 
UN Food and Agriculture Organization, and UN Development Program, which would 
work toward what finally became in 1977 the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development. Any real money would thus be split between two institutions, “one 
supported by the rich countries and the other by the newly rich”—and each with opposing 
political intentions.89  
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Some saw hope in these efforts, but the priorities of each side ensured that the 
success of both proposals would be undermined by their creators. Jan Pronk, Minister of 
Development Coordination in the Netherlands in the 1970s and an active participant in 
several critical North-South forums, believed at the time that the oil for food concept was 
“brilliant.” Pronk was a co-sponsor of OPEC’s Agricultural Development Fund, “which 
was not an anti-Western resolution,” he explained, “because it was OPEC plus the 
Netherlands.” However, Pronk lamented that neither plan became the “great ‘oil-for-food 
fund.’ Why not? OPEC remained hesitant and the West remained suspicious.”90 
Despite its unwillingness to reconcile the two proposals, the U.S. delegation 
reported that the conference was “a considerable success from the U.S. standpoint. A 
framework was developed for concerted international action on the food problem and 
U.S. objectives were almost completely achieved.” This did not mean, however, that the 
U.S. was able to avoid blame for the food crisis and several other wrongs. As Kissinger 
had suspected, neither food nor energy could be discussed in global forums without 
inevitably returning to the NIEO. “Many of the developing countries, particularly the 
more radical members of the Group 77, utilized the plenary forum to the fullest in 
delivering national speeches excoriating the United States and other developed nations as 
responsible for the current food crisis and for the generally depressed economic state of 
developing countries,” the U.S. delegation explained. “They called for radical 
adjustments in the current economic order and for reparations from developed to 
developing countries.”91 
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Venezuela was one such delegation. Carlos Andrés Pérez was elected President in 
March 1974. He pledged to use Venezuela’s oil wealth in the service of economic 
development and social justice at home, but he also had ambitions to act as a spokesman 
for the heterogeneous coalition behind the NIEO.  Though Perez supported OPEC’s price 
hikes, he continued to ship oil to the U.S. during the blockade; his “reward” came the 
following year when the U.S. Congress excluded all OPEC members from special 
developing country tariffs, regardless of whether or not they had participated in the 
blockade. Pérez would go on to play a key role in Jimmy Carter’s plans for Latin 
America, who enlisted Perez as his closest partner on North-South affairs, human rights, 
and the Panama Canal. 
Pérez stressed one aspect of the food crisis in his speech that the U.S. preferred to 
avoid. He began by quoting from a message he had sent to Ford in September 1974, at 
the time of Ford’s address on the energy and food crisis to the UN General Assembly. 
“Among other things,” he wrote, “the world food crisis is due… to the high prices the 
developed nations are charging us for the farming and industrial machines and other 
inputs that are essential to agriculture and the growth of our economies.” He argued that 
the conference would fail in its objectives unless developing countries “attained a 
necessary and compatible balance” of the prices of their commodities with the prices of 
developed countries’ capital goods. Pérez called the measures proposed by the U.S. and 
other developed countries “partial and discriminatory,” charging that they would only 
perpetuate the divisions of the existing system. “Pessimism and distrust,” not hope, were 
the feelings of developing countries that listened to Kissinger talk as if the food crisis was 
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caused by God and OPEC alone. “Unless the issue of international trade is faced 
squarely,” Pérez declared, “it will not be possible to detect [its] causes.”92  
Algeria—a leading representative of all three groups involved in North-South 
politics—the Non-Aligned Movement, G-77, and OPEC—went even further. Speaking 
on behalf of the NAM and G-77, President Houari Boumedienne declared the UN’s 
Second Development Decade (of the 1960s) a “failure.”93 According to a State 
Department telegram, Boumedienne “blamed [the] LDC food problem on US and EEC 
restrictive practices and colonial exploitation.” The Algerian president listed the creation 
of a special fund for developing countries in the IMF, reductions in developed country 
tariffs, renegotiation of international commodity agreements, greater regulation of 
multinational corporations, and the establishment of new international institutions as 
necessary to carry out the conference’s program of action—in other words, the NIEO. 
The State Department telegram summarized, “DCs have great responsibility [for the 
crisis] and nonaligned will see that New [International] Economic Order prevails.”94 The 
U.S. delegation, however, reported back a more optimistic summary: “Closing statements 
by chairmen of the various groups reflected general satisfaction with Conference results, 
although Algeria, speaking on behalf of the 77, was less than enthusiastic in its appraisal, 
the tone of its comments being that although half a loaf is better than none, it did not 
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meet the expectations with which the developing countries had entered the 
Conference.”95 
 
Kissinger vs. the EPB: Part II 
 
Kissinger won the battle with the EPB over numbers. At the Conference he 
announced $350 million for agricultural development; a combined $55 million for 
malnutrition; and $10 million for iron deficiency. For his food bank, he estimated a 
“worldwide reserve of as much as 60 million tons of food above present carryover levels 
may be needed to assure adequate food security.” 
Conflict returned almost immediately. In the five months since the Conference, 
the NSC explained, “State and Agriculture, and to a lesser extent other agencies, have 
spent most of their time… arguing about how the U.S. should implement [Kissinger’s 
proposal].” The difference was “fundamental, and the inflexible positions taken so far 
threaten to make a meaningful U.S. initiative possible.” The disagreement was between 
State’s “tight” system—according to the OMB, “essentially a price-fixing, international 
commodity agreement with nationally held buffer stocks and export controls in time of 
shortage96—and Agriculture’s “loose” system, “in which the agreement would be to 
consult on further action [in the event of a crisis] under pre-negotiated supply positions.” 
Opposition from Butz was “implacable,” and he continued to insist that the loose system 
would be meaningful enough.97  
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Kissinger’s response was to once again work around the interdepartmental 
process. On May 13, 1975 at the Kansas City International Relations Council, he 
announced “a comprehensive American approach” to the problems of the world 
economy. Kissinger made clear the U.S.’ position on what the South had been proposing: 
the U.S. would not indulge the “so-called Third World’s… calls for a totally new 
economic order founded on ideology and national self-interest.” He defended the pillars 
of the postwar system—open trade, free movement of capital and technology, readily 
available supplies of raw materials, and existing international institutions—though he 
also acknowledged the “uneven” progress of developing nations. “Order cannot survive,” 
Kissinger insisted, “if economic arrangements… fail to meet the aspirations of nations 
and peoples for progress.” But there would be no New International Economic Order: 
“The United States is prepared to study these views attentively… [and] [we] are prepared 
to consider realistic proposals… but we are convinced that the present economic system 
has generally served the world well.” 
Although Kissinger made clear what the U.S. was not prepared to do, he also 
made much clearer than before what the U.S. was willing to negotiate. First, he 
recommitted the U.S. to the so-called Paris dialogue, or Conference on International 
Economic Cooperation (CIEC). The talks, initiated by French President Valery Giscard 
d’Estaing, were an attempt by Giscard to initiate direct negotiations with oil producers. 
The EC was already pursuing negotiations on other commodities through the Lomé 
Convention. The final agreement, signed February 1975 by the EEC and 71 African, 
Caribbean, and Pacific Countries (ACB), provided non-reciprocal preferences for most 
ACB exports to the EC, in addition to $3 billion in development aid. Hailed in Europe as 
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a success and well-received by participating developing countries, the Lomé Convention 
was a direct response to the NIEO: its preamble pledged “a new model for relations 
between developed and developing states, compatible with the aspirations of the 
international community towards a more just and more balanced economic order.”98 
Kissinger watched these developments with concern. The French had been 
ambivalent at best on his proposal in 1973 for an International Energy Agency (IEA) 
within the OECD, which would act as an emergency oil sharing mechanism for 
developed countries. Hardliners in the Quai d’Orsay argued that the IEA’s mission of 
sharing and stockpiling contradicted the EC’s position on prioritizing the move toward 
energy independence. Giscard, however, “listened to the doves” and instead of vetoing 
the IEA, a power France had in the OECD, he abstained. Giscard was a Atlanticist and 
founding member of the 1973 “library group,” designed to facilitate cooperation between 
the finance ministers of the U.S., France, Britain, West Germany, and Japan, and he 
abstained in order to continue his policy of improving France’s relationship with the 
U.S.99 However, given France’s heavy dependency on Third World oil and commodities, 
he also sought a leading role for his country in the North-South dialogue. 
The official U.S. position on the CIEC had been non-committal, and initial 
meetings were not encouraging. In April 1975 talks broke down over Algeria’s insistence 
on including all raw materials in the discussions. Treasury officials were loath to discuss 
the “linkage” issue, but Ford, keen to build cooperation on a number of economic and 
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security issues, overruled them. At the Helsinki meeting of the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe in July, Ford and his European counterparts agreed to accept 
Algeria’s demand in order to resume the talks.100 “The realities of European politics,” the 
State Department noted, “forced the USA to accept a linkage between energy and North-
South issues.”101 Forced or not, Kissinger presented this policy reversal as another 
progressive move by the U.S. toward meeting the G-77’s concerns. “Our own thinking on 
the issue of raw materials, and the manner in which it can be addressed internationally, 
has moved forward,” he announced. “We can thus resume the dialogue in a new 
atmosphere.” 
Kissinger did not, however, concede the arguments he had been making since the 
NIEO’s announcement. He stated U.S. opposition to indexing global commodity prices to 
inflation, insisting that since “most raw material production takes place in the industrial 
countries,” indexation would harm “the poorest, most populous states [which] are net 
importers of raw materials” while helping “those least in need,” the industrial countries. 
As an alternative, Kissinger announced a three-part approach. The U.S. would propose 
new rules and procedures at the Geneva Multilateral Trade Negotiations on raw materials 
access and dispute settlement; discuss new commodity agreements on a “case-by-case” 
basis; and pursue new financing efforts for raw materials investment by the World Bank. 
On food, Kissinger was less prosaic (and quite self-congratulatory): 
On behalf of President Ford, I announced a proposal [at the World Food 
Conference] for a long-term international effort to eliminate the scourge of 
hunger. For we regard our good fortune and strength in the field of food as a 
global trust. We recognize the responsibilities we bear by virtue of our 
extraordinary productivity, our advanced technology, and our tradition of 
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assistance. And we are convinced that the global response will have an important 
influence on the nature of the world our children inherit.  
 
Kissinger then described the principles of his grain reserves system, though, per the 
cabinet’s preference, he again mentioned no numbers.102 
Opposition to Kissinger’s policies—and tactics—was again unanimous among 
Ford’s economic advisers. The EPB had already cautioned Ford against Kissinger’s 
suggestion for an International Food Review Group (IFRG) to follow up on his proposals. 
The “principal question,” Seidman wrote, “was who should have the basic responsibility 
for food policy—a domestic policy oriented group or a foreign policy oriented group.” 
The IFRG was obviously the latter: “The working group proposed by Secretary Kissinger 
does not provide for representation of Treasury, OMB, and CEA.”103  
Ford granted Kissinger his group, which was essentially the inverse of the EPB. 
Kissinger was Chairman and Butz was Vice-Chairman; Simon, Ash, and Greenspan were 
assigned to a “working group” that would report directly to Kissinger.104 Predictably, 
Kissinger ignored them. “The IFRG Working Group has been working on the grains 
reserves problem for 5 months,” a CEA official wrote to Greenspan two days before 
Kissinger spoke in Kansas City: 
With this speech Kissinger and State are finessing that whole exercise. 
They are playing a dangerous game on a subject that is very important to 
U.S. agriculture… State has chosen to ignore all the protests and 
comments against their commodity-agreement type grain reserve. I 
recommend as strongly as I possibly can that we object to the basic 
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elements of this proposal. It essentially amounts to abandoning the free 
market system of agriculture that we are attempting to establish.105 
 
James Lynn, Roy Ash’s replacement at OMB, agreed, urging Seidman to take action 
against “this effort by State to gain Cabinet support for an international commodity 
agreement on grains outside established channels, without adequate analysis and by 
attempting to persuade Cabinet officers individually."106 Seidman said as much to Ford in 
a letter two days later, giving equal criticism to Kissinger’s economic policies and 
bureaucratic procedure.107 
The NSC agreed with Kissinger’s proposal, but noted that he was doing himself 
no favors by going around his colleagues’ backs. In EPB meetings, a staffer wrote, the 
NSC “supported more rational discussion” on the export controls feature, which “is 
completely unacceptable to Agriculture” but without which “the proposal is hollow.” 
However, the NSC also admitted that “the tactics which State has pursued have obviously 
exacerbated the opposition of other agencies.”108 Council on International Economic 
Policy (CIEP) member Mike Dunn confirmed this in a memo to Seidman. “The timing 
could not be worse,” Dunn wrote. The CIEP was just about to complete its first annual 
international economic review for the President, and Kissinger’s “speech alone will 
‘scoop’ the review and EPB/CIEP and indicate that State alone runs policy in this entire, 
vital field.” Dunn suspected that Kissinger had not briefed Butz before the Kansas City 
speech, which “represents a bypass of the entire EPB/CIEP coordination structure.” Dunn 
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also opposed the rest of the speech on substance, believing it “unrealistic to talk in these 
terms of LDC aspirations” and that the speech “goes too far in accepting commodity 
agreements in principle.”109 
Despite Kissinger’s rejection of the NIEO’s calls for “an entirely new economic 
order,” Simon and Seidman still feared that the Secretary was abandoning the free market 
in both rhetoric and policy. “While we would like to avoid confrontation,” they wrote 
Ford, “we clearly cannot acquiesce in, or compromise with, this new economic order, 
within which the U.S. would have to choose between “(a) becom[ing] socialist or quasi-
socialist or (b) become economically isolationist.” There was no middle ground with the 
NIEO. “The principles of free markets and free enterprise are, after all, what we stand for 
and what we believe in. If we fail to speak out in their defense, no one else will be able to 
do so.”110  
Kissinger assured the President that “on substance I agree with Simon” and 
admitted, “I am not reliable on economic matters.” “But,” he continued, “these issues are 
not basically economic. My role is to project an image of the U.S. as progressive.” 
Greenspan was “a theoretician,” trying to “vindicate a system which no one will 
support.”111 To Kissinger, Ford’s economic advisors far overestimated the support for 
free market “theology” in Western European governments. Combined with their greater 
vulnerability to oil prices, European capitulation to the NIEO—or something resembling 
it—was a real possibility. Kissinger stressed this point by mentioning his meeting in 
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Bonn with Helmut Schmidt, who, Scowcroft reported to Ford, “considers a forthcoming 
approval on commodities as essential. If US insists on status quo, Federal Republic 
would go it alone and Europe would separate from us.”112 “If we insist on theoretical 
positions,” Kissinger explained, “Schmidt will separate from us on raw materials… He 
will not follow us on a confrontation course with the LDC’s. If he won’t, neither will 
France, Great Britain, or Japan.”113 
Two weeks after Kissinger’ speech in Kansas City, he and Simon travelled to the 
International Energy Agency and OECD ministers’ meetings in Paris, where Kissinger 
addressed both bodies. In his IEA speech Kissinger again stressed the “share[d] 
responsibility” of the U.S. and OPEC “for easing the plight of the poorest nations and 
reiterated the U.S.’ commitment to resuming the CIEC.114 In his speech to the OECD, he 
made several statements on North-South relations that, to Europeans, were entirely 
uncontroversial. For one, he endorsed “locomotive theory” as a macroeconomic solution 
to the slump in developed and developing countries. The term would come later and was 
popularized by the Trilateral Commission and the Carter Administration, but the idea—
that “economic expansion in the industrial world and economic cooperation with the less 
developed countries go hand in hand”—was endorsed by Ford and his counterparts six 
months later at the first “Group of 6” developed country summit in Rambouillet, France.  
Kissinger also stressed the problem of legitimacy, insisting that the “[developed 
countries’] economic well-being depends on a structure of international cooperation in 
which the developing countries are, and perceive themselves to be, participants.” At the 
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same time, he castigated “international meetings that exhaust themselves in self-indulgent 
rhetoric and self-righteous propaganda” referring to the Third World bombast 
characteristic of the UNGA and specialized organizations: “Such methods are futile and 
counterproductive.” Instead of the “theoretical debate over whether we are seeking a new 
order or improving the existing one,” he insisted to OECD leaders, both North and South 
must “deal in reality, not rhetoric.”115 
This time, the EPB received Kissinger’s speech a week in advance, but still found 
nothing to endorse. The Treasury Department thought the OECD speech “must be 
substantially reoriented if it is to reflect what we believe the basic thrust of U.S. 
international economic policy is and ought to be.” The U.S. could not endorse any 
“fundamental changes in the international economic system.” For them, developing 
countries, not the system, were the problem. “What will make the difference in the future 
between success and failure,” a Treasury official wrote, “will primarily be how well or 
how badly they manage their own economic affairs. The rest of the world can’t do the job 
for them. Whatever is presented in the way of aid and other support will have a marginal 
impact compared to their own efforts and their own policies.” The CEA found “the most 
disturbing aspect to the speech…its overall tone,” which implied “(a) that the DC’s 
[developing countries] have a case in their requests for commodity stabilization, 
compensatory finance, etc., and (b) that we intend to respond positively to the 
requests.”116  
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Rejecting the idea of a new economic order as presented by the G-77 was not 
enough; for Ford’s pro-market advisors, responding with any positive measures besides 
current U.S. foreign aid levels and IMF and World Bank financing was abandoning 
America’s commitment to free markets. Even Kissinger’s pledge to share more 
technology with developing countries, which the CEA admitted “is government policy to 
do this up to a point,” was giving too much: “I believe…that there were some things that 
we were at least going to attempt to keep to ourselves.” The CIEP also joined Treasury 
and CEA in attacking Kissinger’s “bombastic” rhetoric on macroeconomic policy. The 
premise that “the growth rate of the LDCs is basically dependent on the OECD 
countries”—the locomotive theory—“is naïve, egotistical, and dangerous,” a CIEC 
official argued. “No, the fact of the matter is that their own economic policy, social 
structure and political will are the determinant factors.”117 
One day after these reports were filed, Kissinger called a meeting with Simon, 
Seidman, and NSC official Robert Hormats to defend himself: 
With regard to the new economic era…. I believe we have to avoid an 
international dispute where Americans say the existing system is great and the 
LDCs call for a new economic order. This is a losing wicket. Nobody will support 
us, particularly since there are so many socialist governments in industrialized 
countries… it is suicide to defend the existing system. We would be like the 
Austrians in the 19th century. 
 
Kissinger made clear that he wouldn’t’ “fall on my sword on particular technical points,” 
since this missed the purpose of his several speeches on the NIEO. In less than four 
months, members of the UN General Assembly would meet for another special session to 
discuss the progress of North-South relations since the NIEO’s announcement. Kissinger 
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saw the session as a major opportunity for the U.S. to neutralize OPEC’s role in North-
South relations. This would involve exactly what the EPB feared: announcing a 
willingness to negotiate new commodity agreements, which the EC was already doing 
through the Lomé Convention. “I would like to split the LDCs at the UN [Seventh] 
Special Session and keep some of the industrialized countries with us,” he explained. 
“And I am willing to give them something on rhetoric to accomplish this.”118 
Ford’s economic advisors were not persuaded, and on May 26—two days before 
the OECD speech—the President convened a meeting with Kissinger, Simon, Seidman, 
Greenspan, Arthur Burns, Scowcroft and staff to discuss the dispute. Ford began by 
declaring himself a believer in the free market system but also a pragmatist not stuck on 
phraseology. He then listened to their respective approaches.  
Kissinger reiterated his belief that if we defend the existing order as it is, we will 
be “beaten back and beaten back, with no support.” Instead, the U.S. should “fight on 
technical issues” and not the “theological fight, between free market and regulated 
market.” On the latter, they would lose in both the South and the North. “Schmidt for 
instance,” he stressed once more, “told me clearly that the energy meeting [the CIEC] 
was the last time that the FRG will support the U.S. on these sorts of issues.” A 
progressive strategy from the U.S. would allow it to “control the situation better by 
seeming conciliatory and cooperative. And many of these issues are political issues so 
that we can use other leverage when the time arises.” 
For Simon, the NIEO was about a lot more than politics. “If we don’t defend the 
free market,” he asked, “who will?” At the same time he also dismissed Kissinger’s 
                                                     




worry about losing allies, insisting, “We have a great deal of company. We are not 
isolated.” Instead of Kissinger’s new proposals and conciliatory rhetoric, Simon insisted, 
“We are better off to talk about the importance of market principles, although we should 
recognize that it has deficiencies…. Our efforts to defend the free market system will be 
applauded.” The President questioned to which allies Simon was referring, noting, “I 
don’t see the British jumping up to defend it.” Still, Burns agreed with Simon, arguing 
that “support for the market is alive and growing” even in socialist countries, and that the 
U.S. should not “acquiesce in manipulation or market control arrangements” on 
developing countries’ behalf. 
Not for the last time, Kissinger’s pragmatism played to Ford’s own sensibilities. 
The President concluded that the speech was “designed to put us in a stronger position” 
to “defend what we want which is the preservation of the system,” and the speech was 
delivered as Kissinger intended.119 In addition to endorsing the locomotive theory, 
Kissinger announced continued support for the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development and plans to negotiate an international grain reserve system. On 
commodities, the U.S. would continue to oppose producer cartels but would negotiate 
specific agreements, a reversal of the Administration’s knee-jerk opposition to any new 
agreements after the NIEO’s announcement. It would also increase World Bank financing 
for resource investments and work with the IMF to review mechanisms to protect 
developing countries against commodity price fluctuations. Additionally, the U.S. would 
support the creation of a new gold trust fund in the IMF for the poorest countries—half of 
the funding for which must come, Kissinger insisted, from the oil producers. 
                                                     







Pressure from the Third World for global economic change dominated Henry 
Kissinger’s tenure as Secretary of State from the moment of his appointment in 
September 1973. On September 5, in the midst of OPEC’s first oil price increases, Non-
Aligned Movement leaders met in Algiers to warn of an impending “revolution” coming 
in international economic relations. The NAM’s economic declaration cited a lack of 
concern from developed countries, exploitation by multinationals, an inflationary rise in 
the price of imports, and “the aggravating effects of the international monetary crisis” for 
the poor prospects of developing countries in the UN’s second Development Decade. 
Their declaration called for greater economic cooperation between developing counties 
both within existing UN institutions and groups and outside, including the establishment 
and strengthening of producers’ organizations (or cartels) for “major commodities of 
importance to the world economy.” 120 
Less than a year later, Algeria led the Third World in calling for a special session 
of the United Nations to address problems of raw materials and development. They 
announced the need to “work urgently” toward a New International Economic Order 
“based on equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, common interest and cooperation 
among all states… to eliminate the widening gap between the developed and the 
developing countries.” They declared the independence of the colonized world the 
“greatest and most significant achievement during the last decades,” and determined that 
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the “present international economic order” stood in “direct conflict” with those 
developments. The crises in the developed countries illustrated “the reality of 
interdependence” for all. The NIEO repeated the NAM’s assertion of “full permanent 
sovereignty” over economic resources, the right of every country to choose the economic 
and social system “deemed most appropriate,” compensation for past exploitation and 
abuse, increased food aid and technology transfers from developed countries, the 
regulation of multinationals, and the establishment of producers’ organizations for raw 
materials.121  
The developing countries continued their challenge in the UN at the 29th General 
Assembly in December, 1974, where Mexican President Luis Echeverría presented a 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS). The most controversial 
provision declared that states have the right to nationalize, expropriate, and transfer 
ownership of foreign property with compensation to be decided by the laws of the host 
government, effectively rendering null and void deals made with previous governments. 
This was, in effect, an attempt by the G-77 to accord legitimacy to the NIEO through 
international law. “Let us remove economic cooperation from the sphere of good faith,” 
Echeverría stated, “and move it to the legal sphere. Let us transfer the accepted principle 
of solidarity among men to the area of relations between countries.”122  
In 1973, Kissinger pledged to the General Assembly that his government would 
“examine seriously” the idea of a charter, which had come from a resolution passed by 
the G-77 at the 1972 UNCTAD meeting. Not surprisingly, when CERDS was presented 
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to the General Assembly, the U.S., “with deep regret,” voted against its submission; they 
were joined only by Britain, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, and Luxembourg.123 The 
Charter passed the General Assembly 120-6-10, but it is also not surprising that it failed 
to gain the status of international law intended by many of its signatories. 
It was obvious that neither the United States nor its allies were ever going to agree 
to such changes. But it also made no sense for the South to issue watered down 
declarations devoid of firm principle and radical measures—especially when OPEC had 
showed what radicalism could achieve, despite the effects of its actions on the oil-
importing “no-PECs.” “The G-77 needed a confrontation,” Jan Pronk explained. “Just to 
continue asking and talking would not have helped them at all.”124 Indeed, the South had 
first petitioned the North for a more inclusive global economic order at the Bretton 
Woods Conference in 1944 and continued to do so through various UN bodies 
throughout the 1950s and 60s, to little effect.125 “We do understand… that this 
[confrontation] could mean a similar disaster for the developing [countries],” 
Venezuela’s Carlos Andrés Pérez admitted at the World Food Conference. “What we aim 
is to take advantage of this opportunity when raw materials, and energy materials 
primarily, are worth just as much as capital and technology, in order to reach agreements 
that will ensure fair and lasting balances.”126 
                                                     
123 Charles N. Brower and John B. Tepe, Jr., “The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States: A 
Reflection or Rejection of International Law?” The International Lawyer Vol. 9, No. 2 (April 1975): 299. 
124 Weiss, UN Voices, 226. 
125 For the South’s at Bretton Woods, see Michael Franczak, “’Asia’ at Bretton Woods: India, China, and 
Australasia in Comparative Perspective,” in Giles Scott-Smith and J. Simon Rolph (eds.), Global 
Perspectives on the Bretton Woods Conference (London: Palgrave, 2017) and Eric Helleiner, Forgotten 
Foundations of Bretton Woods: International Development and the Making of the Postwar Order (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2014). 
126 “A Letter from the President of Venezuela to the Chairman of the World Food Conference Meeting in 
Rome,” Caracas, November 5, 1974. 
62 
 
Out of confrontation emerged a response, however limited or self-interested. By 
the middle of 1975, the EC had already renegotiated major economic agreements with 
dozens of developing countries through the Lomé Convention. They also made clear their 
willingness to bypass Washington by initiating the CIEC, leaving the door open to the 
establishment of new cartels on terms favorable to the EC. 
The U.S. government took the NIEO and its related developments very seriously, 
but it meant different things to different people. William Simon, William Seidman, Alan 
Greenspan, and Earl Butz believed it should be firmly opposed, arguing that attempts to 
bargain down the NIEO only legitimated its claims that the existing market-based 
economic order was unjust and therefore illegitimate. Henry Kissinger disagreed. For 
him, economic concessions were political tools that could restore legitimacy to a U.S.-led 
global order. In other words, the U.S. was not the world’s dictator, it was the world’s 
hegemon, and without some degree of legitimacy there could be no effective hegemony. 
U.S. leadership required the consent, or at least opportunistic participation, of key actors; 
getting that consent or participation required cutting deals with statists and making 
compromises on principles.  
Not surprisingly, the State Department perceived many early successes, but these 
were far from obvious or unqualified. As outlined in this chapter, Kissinger’s first 
response to the NIEO’s demands involved improving the global distribution of food aid 
through intergovernmental coordination and greater government involvement. But the 
International Fund for Agricultural Development was opposed by the departments of 
Agriculture and Treasury and failed to convince the South that even larger reforms were 
needed through comprehensive global negotiations. 
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Kissinger’s plan to use the IFAD as a weapon again OPEC was also unsuccessful. 
Throughout 1975 the Arab countries announced numerous development funds and banks 
with the goal of reinvesting oil profits to diversify Third World economies, mainly in the 
Middle East and Africa.127 Although these efforts received neither adequate funding nor 
sustained focus, they nevertheless served to shore up the South’s solidarity through the 
oil and food crises. Kissinger not only underestimated OPEC’s willingness to continue 
high oil prices at the expense of non-oil importing developing countries. He also 
underestimated the power of OPEC’s example for other commodity producers, who were 
unwilling to ignore the role played by the developed countries, and the U.S. in particular, 
in their declining growth, export prices, and share of world trade during the North’s age 
of affluence. 
Throughout 1975-76 Kissinger expanded his strategy through different forums. 
The next chapter places developments in U.S. North-South policy in the context of U.S.-
European-Japanese (or “trilateral”) relations, which evolved through the establishment of 
yearly developed country summits. Once again, Kissinger took the lead in promoting 
these engagements, seeing them as a way to increase developed country coordination on a 
number of economic and security related issues and to renew the West’s sense of 
confidence and cohesion in the face of mounting energy, monetary, and fiscal challenges. 
Kissinger also pushed forward in the CIEC. Again, he fought with the EPB over how to 
present U.S. economic policy—both North-South and North-North—in these meetings, 
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but its results would begin to reveal more clearly the successes and failures of his NIEO 








In 1972, Henry Kissinger was on a roll. During that year Kissinger negotiated the 
Paris Peace Accords, initiating the formal end of the Vietnam War. With President Nixon 
he opened relations with China while concluding the first Strategic Arms Limitation 
Treaty, inaugurating a new era of détente with the Soviet Union. After Anwar Sadat 
expelled Soviet advisors from Egypt, Kissinger quickly established a backchannel with 
Sadat’s National Security Advisor to begin work on a new peace agreement with Israel 
and to consolidate America’s role as the paramount superpower in the Middle East.128 
Indeed, before 1973 Kissinger was everywhere but Europe, and his and Nixon’s 
disregard was not without consequence. Europeans were ambivalent about some of the 
implications of détente: Willy Brandt pursued Ostpolitik with East Germany with the 
confidence provided by a tough U.S. policy toward the Soviets, while the Conservative 
government in Britain feared being left out of U.S.-Soviet negotiations and reciprocated 
by trying to keep the U.S. out of European conversations.129 There was also the fallout 
from Nixon’s unilateral decision to float the dollar, which sent global currency markets 
into disarray and led European finance ministers and central banks to expand the money 
supply to avoid contraction. Then there were the effects of the U.S. devaluation on global 
energy prices. In response to the cheapening of its dollar-priced oil, OPEC raised its 
rhetoric against the West and increased its excise tax against oil companies, who simply 
passed the cost on to American and European consumers. 
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Kissinger’s belief in the importance of the Atlantic partnership was genuine, and 
after the globetrotting of 1972 he set out to repair the rift. Neither 1973 nor 1974 would 
be his “Year of Europe,” but by the end of President Ford’s two-and-a-half year term, the 
Atlantic alliance was stronger than it had been in over a decade. This chapter argues that 
the Third World’s challenge, in the form of the oil crisis and New International Economic 
Order, played a central role in uniting developed countries around a political and 
economic consensus intended to sustain the postwar order. If this move toward unity did 
not always produce a common response to the fiscal, monetary, and energy crises of the 
mid-1970s, it did prevent any dramatic divergence in the developed countries’ economic 
policies toward the Third World, after over a decade of troubling drifts.  
After the NIEO’s announcement the U.S. and others had tried to separate 
energy—the most urgent of these crises, with its associated effects on fiscal and monetary 
capacity—from discussions about raw materials, but influential Third World leaders like 
Algeria would not let them. Fiscal and monetary policy convergence in the developed 
countries strengthened the West’s hand when forced to discuss energy and raw materials 
together. It also—and this was Kissinger’s main goal—increased confidence in the 
developed countries that these crises could be managed collectively and calmly through 
discussion among like-minded Northern elites, rather than resorting to protectionism and 
cutting separate deals with energy and raw materials producers. This was a major boost 
for Kissinger’s strategy: Northern unity increased the likelihood of splitting the “unholy 
alliance” between OPEC and oil-importing developing countries while simultaneously 
decreasing the South’s ability to conduct separate negotiations with Europeans. 
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The chapter begins with a short history of European integration and the European 
Community’s (EC) efforts in the late 1960s to forge a new economic relationship with the 
Third World. It then discusses the oil crisis within the context of U.S.-European relations 
and proceeds with some background to the Ford Administration’s efforts to strengthen 
developed country cooperation, including attempts to repair transatlantic relation at the 
beginning of the energy crisis. Next, it explains how Ford and Kissinger worked to 
institutionalize cooperation at the November 1975 G-6 summit in Rambouillet, France, 
and June 1976 G-7 summit in Puerto Rico. Treasury Secretary William Simon was 
initially opposed to the summits and clashed with Kissinger over commitments to fiscal 
stimulus and North-South cooperation. However, Simon and other liked-minded 
economic officials in the Ford Administration came to see the summits as useful avenues 
for promoting fiscal discipline in developed countries, insisting on structural adjustment 
packages for loans to Italy and Britain. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the 
effects of this “North-North dialogue” on Northern economies and unity in advance of 
the two final North-South dialogues of the Ford Administration: the Conference on 
International Economic Cooperation, or “producer-consumer conference,” held 
December 1975 to June 1977 in Paris, and the fourth meeting of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, held in May 1976 in Nairobi.  
 
Europe Comes Together, 1945-72 
 
On April 23, 1973—six months before OPEC’s embargo, and roughly a year 
before the announcement of the New International Economic Order—Kissinger 
announced a “Year of Europe.” The U.S.-European relationship had been “the 
cornerstone of all postwar foreign policy,” he declared, but that era had come to an end. 
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Europe’s moves toward economic and political unity had created new tensions in 
transatlantic relations: Americans accused Europeans of free-riding on defense and taking 
economic self-interest too far, and Europeans accused Americans of being “out to divide 
Europe economically, or to desert Europe militarily, or to bypass Europe diplomatically.” 
The growing energy crisis, “unforeseen a century ago,” raised the stakes of “atrophy… 
neglect, carelessness, or distrust” in the alliance. “New realities” therefore required “new 
solutions.” Kissinger promised that U.S. officials would work out a new Atlantic Charter, 
which President Nixon would bring with him on his trip to Europe at the end of the 
year.130 
Nixon never made that trip. His attention was diverted instead to fighting off calls 
for his resignation due to the Watergate coverup, which did nothing to incentivize 
Europeans to increase their association with his faltering administration. As Kissinger put 
it during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Nixon was no longer seen as a “functional 
president.”131 Europeans also felt condescended to by Kissinger’s sudden attention. 
French President Georges Pompidou remarked that for France, every year was the “Year 
of Europe”; as British Prime Minister Edward Heath put it in his memoirs, “For Kissinger 
to announce a year of Europe was like for me to stand on Trafalgar Square and announce 
that we were embarking on a year to save America!”132 Regardless, the consequences of a 
united and independent Europe ran deeper than any single president or secretary of state. 
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If anything, U.S. efforts to create European unity following World War II had worked too 
well.  
After 1945 the U.S. supported an economically and politically united Europe out 
of the conviction that prosperous and integrated European countries would have no 
incentive to turn to communism or return to war. The Marshall Plan was given to Europe 
with relatively few strings attached, but its $13.5 billion in aid was disbursed under a new 
U.S.-backed mechanism, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), 
designed to develop intra-European trade and study the feasibility of a European customs 
union. In late 1949 the U.S. changed Marshall Plan requirements when it determined that 
credits were not being used enough for European economic integration. In 1950, the U.S. 
supported the creation of the European Payments Union under the OEEC’s direction, 
designed to strengthen monetary cooperation among member states and to lessen 
Europe’s dependence on U.S. dollars.133  
The U.S. also supported French proposals for the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC). Launched in 1951, the ECSC was designed to prevent the 
possibility of war between Germany and France by integrating the production of coal and 
steel. Like the Marshall Plan, the new community would be open to any interested 
European nation, ensuring that no single nation would have a monopoly on the inputs of 
war. “This transformation will facilitate other action which has been impossible until this 
day,” France’s Foreign Minister Robert Schumann announced. “A new Europe will be 
                                                     




born from this, a Europe which is solidly united and constructed around a strong 
framework.”134  
Once the framework was in place, expansion continued with consistent U.S. 
support. In the 1957 Treaty of Rome, the ECSC’s Common Market was expanded into 
the European Economic Community (EEC), governed by a set of new institutions 
including the European Commission, Assembly, and Court of Justice. In 1961, the OEEC 
was superseded by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), in which the U.S. and Canada joined the OEEC’s European founders. 
Other developments in the 1960s also brought Europe closer together—and closer 
to the Third World. The roots of Europe’s new economic relationship with the Third 
World began with the Treaty of Rome, before most decolonization took place (and before 
many Europeans accepted its inevitability). Over the objections of Germany and 
Belgium, Charles de Gaulle demanded that the Treaty include France’s new economic 
agreements with the French Community, the name of its renewed imperial project, in 
exchange for his country’s vote. Through the French Community’s formal association 
with the EEC, France intended to strengthen its economic hold on its colonies, accord 
European legitimacy to the continuation of its empire, and transfer some of the costs of 
maintaining these relationships to other European countries. Taken without any 
consultation with its colonies, France’s imperial preferences were extended to all EEC 
members, and the French Community was granted access on the same conditions to the 
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EEC. Additionally, Europe would provide credits through the European Development 
Fund (EDF) to French Community members.135 
Decolonization further institutionalized EEC-Third World economic ties. It was 
not a wholly voluntary decision for European governments, some of which fought bitterly 
to hang on to colonies well into the 1970s. But by the early 1960s most European 
governments believed formal independence was inevitable, and they set out to preserve 
political and economic arrangements with former colonies as the process unfolded.  
Development aid was one important tool for securing the continued economic 
cooperation of former colonies and their integration into new post-colonial economic 
agreements with European states and the European Community (EC) at large. To that 
end, in the early 1960s the OECD set up the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), 
which would administer the EDF to postcolonial territories. The EC soon became a major 
donor to the Third World, and like the U.S. and Soviet Union, it had its own interests to 
preserve.136 
Preferential trade agreements were another tool, and such agreements between the 
EC and former colonies, mostly in Africa, multiplied throughout the 1960s. The first 
Yaoundé Convention in 1963 gave free access to EC markets for most exports, as well as 
additional EDF credits, for the eighteen African states (then, the Associated African and 
Malagasy States) included in the Treaty of Rome. The second Yaoundé convention in 
1969 proceeded along similar lines. Since the Treaty of Rome stated that “other countries 
of similar development” to the AAMS could form similar agreements, the Arusha and 
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Lagos agreements attempted to expand preferences to African countries not covered 
under Yaoundé I and II. In 1971 the EC also agreed to introduce the Generalized System 
of Preferences (GSP), lowering tariffs in the EC on exports from all developing 
countries.137 
Developments in European political culture also encouraged a new EC policy 
toward the Third World. Garavini explains the shift in the European left’s priorities 
marked by the crises of 1968: 
The liberation movements of the Third World, the protest movements of 
the young and the working classes, and the evolving neo-Marxist 
intellectual currents had opened Europe’s doors to a partial rethinking of 
economic science, and to reconsider the damage caused to the nations of 
the Third World, to the Earth, and to all mankind by Western models of 
development.138 
 
Despite pushback from liberal and conservative parties and few real electoral victories, 
the general concerns raised by Europe’s New Left were shared by more than just their 
supporters. The political orientation of the European governments that came to power in 
1969-70 was a mixed bag: conservatives Edward Health in Britain and Georges 
Pompidou in France; social democrats Willy Brandt in West Germany and Olof Palme in 
Sweden; and various Christian Democrats in Italy, to name a few. Whether Europe was 
entering a “golden age of social democracy” or the age of the “social-liberal coalition,”139 
all of these governments responded to new European public opinion in similar ways. 
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First, European governments heeded popular demands for a higher social wage 
and increased economic management. In OECD countries the percentage of GDP 
allocated for public spending increased just four points in the 1960s, to 31 percent; by 
1980, it surpassed 45 percent. Second, Europeans recommitted to the project of unity. At 
the 1969 Hague Summit, Pompidou rejected his predecessor de Gaulle’s hostility toward 
Britain’s EC membership, paving the way for Britain’s accession in 1973 under Heath. 
(Ireland and Denmark also joined that year.) The EC also strengthened the Common 
Agricultural Policy with new tax provisions and tariffs, and pledged a future economic 
and monetary union that would bring Europe closer than ever to Winston Churchill’s 
“United States of Europe.”140 Lastly, the EC granted new trade concessions to the Third 
World through the Lomé Convention (discussed later) while also moving toward a 
common global position at the third United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) negotiations in Santiago, Chile.  
 
Divergence at Santiago, 1972 
 
The divide between European and American approaches toward the Third World 
showed in preparations for UNCTAD III. While differences within the EC remained—
namely over protectionist policies like the CAP—many European countries devoted 
serious attention to improving relations with the “Group of 77” (G-77) coalition of 
developing countries, some through an openly critical position on international 
capitalism. The Italian’s socialist Commerce Minister declared multinational 
corporations’ “neo-capitalism” in the Third World “as atavistic as it is alarming,” and 
Italy endorsed the G-77’s push for a link between Special Drawing Rights and 
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development aid at the IMF. The Dutch went even further, endorsing not only the SDR-
aid link but also the amendment of the EC’s own protectionist agricultural policies and 
the renegotiation of existing commodity agreements. “Political parties, churches, and 
student movements today all have a passionate interest in cooperation between developed 
countries and developing countries,” the Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation 
explained in Santiago. “This is especially true in my country.”141 
France’s calculations were more complicated. Valery Giscard d’Estaing, then 
Finance Minister, wanted to continue French leadership of Europe’s policy toward the 
Third World, but he also wanted to defend the EC’s favoritism of African states as 
written into the Treaty of Rome. Before UNCTAD III Giscard reiterated to African 
leaders their dependence on European aid, which may have led the AASM to focus their 
efforts at the conference on increased aid for the poorest developing countries (located 
mostly in Africa). While Giscard endorsed new commodity agreements he opposed any 
opening of European markets, reasoning to the mostly Latin American supporters of CAP 
liberalization that such measures would benefit primarily U.S. agriculture exports.142 
After studying the views of different agencies, the Nixon Administration 
recommended “a forthcoming but low key approach” for UNCTAD III. This would 
“make the best of a difficult situation in which demands of the LDCs are excessive.” 
American officials were confident that “cooperation among developed countries has been 
good,” but they were also aware of Europe’s desire to cut new deals with the Third World 
on commodities. Thus, the real divergence would be on support for individual commodity 
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agreements, which the U.S. opposed. On these, “sharply divergent views… [with] the 
Europeans, and particularly the French,” were likely.143 
In fact, at UNCTAD the U.S. opposed the EC on a number of developed country 
(“Group B”) resolutions responding to G-77 proposals. It “publicly dissociated” itself 
from a Group B recommendation that the G-77 push for new concessions at the General 
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). It had one supporter in the EC, West 
Germany, which joined the U.S. in opposing French proposals for World Bank financing 
for buffer stocks and assistance in concluding commodity agreements. The U.S. also 
resisted Group B calls for “improvements” to the GSP and new terms for debt relief and 
aid. Nevertheless, proceeding with negotiations required what one observer called “the 
continued unity of Group B around the lowest common denominator,” that is, 
“hardliners” outside of Europe including Australia, New Zealand, and Canada but led by 
the United States.144 
Such differences should not have come as a great surprise. In fact, it should have 
been a surprise that they were not more severe. One month before Santiago, Peter 
Flanigan, Nixon’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs, visited European capitals 
to gauge EC opinion on the upcoming negotiations. Flanigan was concerned with “the 
development of a spirit of economic isolationism or turning-inward on both sides of the 
Atlantic,” and European reactions were not encouraging. Raymond Barre, the EC’s 
Commissioner for Financial and Monetary Policy, justified the CAP’s protectionism as 
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an economic necessity and defended the expansion of reciprocal preferences with 
developing countries as “the inevitable consequence” of British entry into the European 
Free Trade Association. In other words, European economic integration, which the U.S. 
had done so much to promote, led naturally to efforts to protect European markets and 
develop preferential trade agreements with the Third World. Discussions with Giscard 
were “frank and not discouraging,” though France continued to defend the CAP and LDC 
preferences after Santiago. The British agreed that Europe needed to address the external 
tensions brought about by internal unity, but “feel a constraint as new members not to 
move out in front of the Six either too far or too fast.” Talks with West German Finance 
Minister Karl Schiller were more encouraging, but “even he cautioned against expecting 
too much” in an “outward-looking” EC policy.145 
The most damning talks were with the European Commission’s new president, 
Sicco Mansholt. Garavini argues that “predictions of an uninspired Community 
‘performance’ at UNCTAD would have been realized if not for the 
nomination…precisely in connection with the beginning of discussions in Santiago, of 
Sicco Mansholt as President.”146 While the actual effects of Group B’s “lowest common 
denominator” performance are questionable, the Dutch socialist Mansholt was 
determined to use his role as EC President to reposition Europe’s North-South policy as 
progressive, united, and distinct from America’s. 
Mansholt was blunt, even abrasive, in his remarks with American officials. When 
Flanigan mentioned the continued importance of transatlantic economic cooperation, 
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Mansholt “said that, in comparison with the ‘minor’ economic problems among 
developed countries, those between developed and developing economies were much 
more serious.” Mansholt informed Flanigan “that he was not the least concerned with 
soyabeans, (‘to hell with your soyabeans’)” and accused U.S. officials of being unaware 
of the “real world,” where “20 percent of the world was starving.” He called U.S. 
performance at UNCTAD “disappointing” and warned Flanigan of “a serious 
confrontation between Europe and the U.S. …over trade and aid policies toward LDC's.” 
“He assured me that Europe will meet its obligations,” Flanigan noted twice, “even if the 
U.S. will not.”147 
Mansholt was elaborating a more radical position for the EC than most member 
governments were prepared to pursue. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a British, German, or 
even French finance minister insisting to a U.S. official at such a low point in 
transatlantic relations that “the problems Europe has with the U.S. are not important.” But 
Mansholt was representative of a broad desire in European capitals to develop a more 
common and global North-South policy that implied a significant departure from the 
U.S.: 
These problems, he suggested, would be the most critical with which the 
[Paris] EC summit should deal in its discussion of relations with third 
world countries (implying that relations with the U.S. would be decidedly 
secondary). He also stated that a large part of the new EC political 
cooperation talks (“an EC foreign policy”) will be devoted to 
consideration of strengthening economic links between the EC and all 
developing countries. He recognized that the past concentration on Africa 
was disproportionate and that these links had to be broadened to include 
South America, Asia, etc. He concluded that it was the real world he was 
talking about, not that which occupied so much of the time of our 
respective governments. 
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The meeting ended with Mansholt accusing the U.S. of attempting to destroy Salvador 
Allende’s socialist government in Chile by blocking loans from international financial 
institutions. This was all the more significant since Allende, widely admired across the 
South for his nationalization of copper companies, had managed to secure his country’s 
capital for UNCTAD III. “He said that Allende was faced with a serious challenge from 
both the left and the right in Chile,” Flanigan reported, “and that, if he went under, the 
country would give way to anarchy and, ultimately, become another Cuban-style 
dictatorship.”148 
 
The Year of Oil, 1973-74 
 
Henry Kissinger did not share Mansholt’s views on Chile or the South. “Nothing 
important can come from the South,” he reportedly told Gabriel Valdés, Chile’s foreign 
minister, in 1969. “The axis of history starts in Moscow, goes to Bonn, crosses over to 
Washington, and then goes to Tokyo. What happens in the South is of no importance.” 
“Mr. Kissinger,” Valdés responded, “you know nothing of the South.” “And I don’t 
care,” Kissinger replied.149 
As it turned out, Kissinger did care about the South, but for different reasons. 
Despite once describing Chile as “a dagger pointed straight to the heart of Antarctica,” he 
told Congress that Salvador Allende’s 1970 election was “a challenge to our national 
interest… Chile would soon be inciting anti-American policies, attacking hemispheric 
solidarity, making common cause with Cuba, and sooner or later establishing close 
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relations with the Soviet Union.”150 His association with the 1973 coup led by General 
Augusto Pinochet, resulting in the popular socialist leader’s death, would only exacerbate 
distrust in the South towards his initiatives for LDCs following the oil crisis and New 
International Economic Order. It also contributed to an underappreciated reaction in 
Europe comparing U.S. behavior in Chile with the Soviet Union’s repression of the 
Prague Spring in 1968. Both cases “brought home the lesson, particularly relevant to the 
European situation, that the two superpowers interpreted their self-interest in such a way 
as to preclude any meeting point between democracy and socialist parties within their 
respective spheres of influence.”151 
Kissinger would not perceive an importance for the South beyond its placed in 
U.S.-Soviet relations until the aftermath of the oil crisis and the announcement of the 
NIEO. Instead, with China opened, détente underway, and the Vietnam War drawing 
down, in the beginning of 1973 Kissinger turned to building partnerships with the 
European governments he and President Nixon had neglected. This proved more difficult 
than both had imagined, not least due to the evolving domestic scandals consuming the 
President’s attention. As Kissinger recalled with understatement, “Nixon’s relations with 
Europe’s leaders lacked any particular intimacy…. [and] he had few opportunities to put 
into practice his deep commitment to Atlantic relationships.”152 Most damning in Nixon’s 
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eyes was the apparently related resurgence of socialism and European unity. He 
complained to Kissinger:  
The way Europeans are talking today, European unity will not be in our 
interest, certainly not from a political viewpoint or from an economic 
viewpoint. When we used to talk about European unity, we were thinking 
in terms of those men who would be at the top of Europe who would be in 
control. Those men were people that we could get along with. Today, 
however, when we talk of European unity, and when we look ahead, we 
have to recognize the stark fact that a united Europe will be led primarily 
by left-leaning or socialist heads of government. I say this despite the fact 
that Heath is still in power. Even in Britain and France we have situations 
where the media and the establishment strongly pull to the left at this 
point, and also where the media and the establishment take an increasingly 
anti-U.S. attitude.153 
 
Clearly, this was a situation that Nixon was neither equipped to understand in historical 
terms nor to confront in policy. 
Kissinger was more determined (and able) to make a change in transatlantic 
relations. Since the early 1960s he had expressed support for a “federal idea” for world 
governance. This was not the global federalism of Wendell Willkie or Norman Cousins, 
but a more restricted vision based on more or less formal partnership between the 
Western democracies within his “axis of history.” In 1961 Kissinger explained his 
concept of an “Atlantic Confederacy” involving an “Executive Committee” of 
transatlantic leaders who “would forge a common position for negotiations with the 
Soviet Union… formulate overtures for peace and stability in Europe, and… pool their 
resources to increase the military pressures on Moscow to avoid conflict.” He condemned 
the U.S.’ rigid opposition to Charles de Gaulle’s proposed “Directorate” of American, 
British, and French leaders: “No attempt was made to explore de Gaulle’s reaction to the 
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possibility of a wider forum.” Key to such a proposal was the inclusion of West 
Germany. “European history demonstrates,” Kissinger remarked, “that stability in Europe 
is unattainable except through the cooperation of Britain, France, and Germany.”154 
Stability in postwar Europe was indeed attained and maintained through British, 
French, and German cooperation, but, as outlined above, one unintended consequence 
was the increased exclusion of the U.S. from key decisions. U.S.-European policy 
discussions proceeded in the 1960s on an ad-hoc basis, leading in the early 1970s to 
European suspicion of détente, accusations of selfishness in trade and monetary policy 
and, as the preceding sections emphasize, an underappreciated but real divergence in 
political and economic relations toward the South. On this last point Kissinger was 
especially blind. His overwhelming focus throughout his academic and government 
career had been East-West security. On international economics Kissinger had said little; 
on the “South,” which as Europeans and LDCs understood the term implied a division 
based on economic relationships, at best he had said nothing, at worst, he was stridently 
dismissive.  
While not yet pushing Kissinger to renegotiate the U.S.’ economic ties with the 
Third World at large—this would come after the NIEO—the 1973-74 oil crisis 
demonstrated the limitations of his focus on Cold War security. However, lack of 
appreciation for the political economics of oil extended across the Atlantic. Blinded by 
the fact that, adjusted for inflation, oil had actually become cheaper in the 1950s and 
1960s, few Western leaders realized the extent to which their unprecedented prosperity 
and growth—their “Golden Age”—depended on OPEC’s cooperation in keeping prices 
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low. Western Europe had become particularly vulnerable: in 1950, coal and coke 
(managed by the ECSC) accounted for 83 percent of Western Europe’s energy 
consumption, with oil at just 8.3 percent. By 1970 coal and coke’s share had declined to 
29 percent, while oil had increased to 60 percent of total consumption.155  
The U.S. was less vulnerable—in 1973 it produced two-thirds of its own oil 
consumption—but it was by no means immune.156 U.S. oil producers were entirely 
unprepared for production cuts in the Middle East and lacked the means to increase 
production to match the gap. The most visible manifestation across America was long 
lines at the gas station, but the effects reverberated throughout the economy. “No 
economic event in a long generation, excluding only wartime upheavals, has so seriously 
disrupted our economy as the manipulation of oil prices and supplies over the past year,” 
Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Burns told Congress in 1974. The world was in the 
midst of a global commodity boom; in 1972-73, wholesale prices of industrial 
commodities had been rising at 10 percent a year. At the same time, American industrial 
plants were operating at full capacity and many major industrial materials were already in 
short supply. “Inflationary expectations were therefore becoming more deeply ingrained 
at the very time when inflation was curtailing the purchasing power of worker incomes 
and creating some weakness for big-ticket items in consumer markets,” Burns explained. 
“Thus, the oil embargo, together with the huge increase in oil prices that began in the fall 
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of 1973, contributed to the twin economic problems plaguing us in 1974—namely, high 
rates of inflation and weakness in production.”157 
Although all developed economies were hit hard—growth in the OECD countries 
went from 5-6 percent over 1972-73 to just 0.5 percent in 1974 and a contraction of 0.3 
percent in 1975—the oil crisis did not at first produce a common response.158 The major 
European countries and Japan distanced themselves from U.S. policy throughout the 
Arab-Israeli War. Only Portugal and the Netherlands allowed U.S. planes on their way to 
resupply Israel to refuel at their bases; OPEC responded by including those countries in 
their oil blockade. “The Europeans, especially the French, are playing a lousy game,” 
Nixon lamented. “The British are in trouble, so it’s easy out to kick the United States 
around.”159  
The most immediate concern for Europe was economic, but the British and 
French also resented their deliberate exclusion by Kissinger from any peace process. 
Thus, in the months after the embargo, the European Community issued a declaration 
calling for an immediate ceasefire and a return to the 1967 borders. Their “general 
strategy,” Nixon officials explained, was to get the U.S. to “carry the burden” towards a 
settlement while endeavoring (particularly the French and British) to “obtain a seat at any 
international conference,” and to launch bilateral dialogues with producers through “more 
                                                     
157 Kissinger-Simon Proposals for Financing Oil Imports: Hearings before the Joint Economic Committee, 
Ninety-third Congress of the United States, Second Session, November 26-29 1974 (statement of Treasury 
Secretary William Simon), found at 
http://www.jec.senate.gov/reports/93rd%20Congress/Hearings/Kissinger-
Simon%20Proposals%20for%20Financing%20Oil%20Imports%20(679).pdf.  
158 Alberto Clo, Oil Economics and Policy (New York: Springer Science & Business Media, 2013), 126.  




or less quiet efforts” to resume production for their countries.160 The efforts may have 
been quiet, but the results spoke loudly: by the end of 1973, Britain, France, Germany, 
and Japan had each signed or promised separate deals with Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, 
Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, and Algeria.161 
The U.S. response was twofold, and at first glance contradictory. In November 
1973 the Nixon Administration announced Project Independence. The program intended 
to achieve energy security through increased production in the Western Hemisphere, 
diversification of fuel sources, and energy saving measures at home. The EC had 
announced similar measures for conservation, but combined with bilateral arrangements, 
the two programs suggested a new fragmentation of oil politics, where the U.S. and 
Europe would pursue separate, perhaps opposing, strategies. For The New York Times, 
Nixon’s insistence that by 1980 “Americans will not have to rely on any source of oil but 
their own” sounded like “the economic nationalism of the nineteen-thirties, with its 
disastrous influence toward international tension and war.”162 
This analysis missed the combined effect of Project Independence with the 
second, largely unannounced part of U.S. strategy: multilateral cooperation with Europe. 
According to the State Department, the energy crisis had “silver linings” for American 
power. The Saudi/Kuwati embargo (or “inconvenience”) showed that the U.S. was the 
strongest economic power (unlike Europe, “it cannot be shut down”); it forced public 
attention on the need for long-term economic supplies; it increased pressure on the 
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Israelis; and, most important, it provided “an opportunity to revitalize our alliances by 
moving toward cooperation across the energy front.”163  
Kissinger quickly began meeting with European officials to warn them of the 
consequences of bilateral arrangements. “This [bilateral arrangements] will be difficult to 
organize,” he told German officials, “and if we fail to achieve agreement on a cooperative 
effort, we will have to go our own way and make our own bilaterals.” Because of U.S. 
control over production in the Western Hemisphere, which would be expanded under 
Project Independence, “We are in a far stronger position to do this.” The Germans 
agreed, noting that if the U.S. responded with its own bilateral deals, “it would destroy 
NATO.” Kissinger believed that despite OPEC’s impact on the OECD, the U.S. remained 
the strongest country, while Europe’s move toward bilateralism only showed their 
desperation. A multilateral solution by developed countries, led by the U.S., could bring 
transatlantic cooperation to new levels, all under firm U.S. leadership. Britain and Japan 
had signaled their willingness for a multilateral effort, but the Germans still wondered 
about France. “I am almost certain that they will come along,” Kissinger insisted, 
“because they will realize they will have no alternative.”164 
In February 1974, just four months after OPEC’s embargo began, the U.S., 
Canada, and twelve other industrialized countries including Japan met in Washington to 
discuss a common response to the energy crisis. Both the U.S. and Europe recognized the 
discord that had preceded the meetings. A few days prior, Lord Cromer, Britain’s 
Ambassador to the U.S., lamented to Nixon how “unfortunate” it was “that the Year of 
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Europe initiative came at the time of the EC's first joining together.” However, coming 
together also revealed fundamental disagreements within the EC. “When we joined,” 
Croner continued, “France had the Common Agricultural Policy set up and they wanted 
nothing changed. We haven't had the leverage on the French which we have needed, but 
with rising commodity prices, French influence may decline.”165  
Kissinger still worried about the Europeans moving ahead on bilateral talks with 
producers, a strategy spearheaded by France. He and Treasury Secretary William Simon 
agreed that the EC’s announcement for negotiations two days before the meetings in 
Washington was “dangerous” and “scary”; the implication was that the Europeans would 
back the Arab states in any future joint energy negotiations, forcing the burden of 
compromise onto the U.S. According to Kissinger, the EC was being “led by France and 
others [were] too weak to resist.” But Kissinger believed that European unity was not 
strong enough to overcome individual states’ self-interest, represented best in this case by 
finance ministers. “The foreign ministers are idiots,” he remarked, but in monetary 
discussions “there is no feeling of confrontation.”  Nixon thus instructed Simon to “talk 
turkey” with the “technical types,” that is, the finance ministers, in the meetings—“they 
don’t have to posture like foreign ministers.”166 
At the Washington Energy Conference, the foreign ministers all agreed on the 
“unprecedented” nature of the crisis and pledged “a substantial increase in international 
cooperation in all fields,” implying a willingness to open negotiations on other North-
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South issues.167 Kissinger stressed the implications of Europe’s bilateral strategy while 
also promoting his idea for an International Energy Agency (IEA), which he had 
announced the month before. Much like the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD), which Kissinger would endorse later that year at the World Food 
Conference, the IEA would govern an international system of (oil) reserves that would 
release supplies in times of crisis. Although the attendees admitted the problems LDCs 
faced by continued high oil prices, the IEA, unlike the IFAD, was directed primarily 
toward the developed countries. In a sense, the IEA would act as an extension of Nixon’s 
Project Independence across the West. 
The conference was an important step forward for Kissinger’s strategy, which 
sought to deal with Europeans individually rather than as a community. He also 
benefitted from existing EC tensions. In the words of one European commentator, “What 
happened in Washington did not provoke a crisis in the Community. Rather, it 
demonstrated the state of crisis that had already existed in the Community.”168 The EC’s 
political structure left it at a serious disadvantage in negotiations with the United States, 
which came to the conference with a unified strategy it could adopt as needed. The EC, 
however, had never formed an energy strategy beyond the European Coal and Steel 
Community, which meant little after Europe’s energy needs had changed so dramatically 
from coal to oil. The EC would not suddenly develop one in the middle of negotiations 
with Washington. There was a vacuum of leadership in the EC, and as both U.S. and 
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European officials recognized, that vacuum was being filled by France, to the delight of 
no one but the French. Throughout the conference France objected to U.S. proposals and 
even declined to sign the final communique. Instead, Foreign Minister Jobert delivered a 
dissent rejecting Kissinger’s IEA and any idea of a developed country consumers’ 
organization.169 
“The French are determined to unify all [EC members] against the United States,” 
Kissinger said after the Conference. “I am convinced we must break the EC.”170 In its 
response to the energy crisis, however, the EC was breaking itself. The French considered 
the IEA too confrontational and insisted to Britain that Europe must first develop its own 
energy strategy before adopting joint measures with the U.S. But given OPEC’s decision 
in January to once again raise prices—and Washington’s relative economic strength 
through it all—others did not want to wait. France’s “notably graceless” objections only 
pushed other European delegations, led by Britain and Germany, closer toward the U.S. 
For Sir Edward Tomkins, Britain’s Ambassador to France, the conference brought “to a 
point of uncomfortable focus the central problem of our convergences and divergences 
with the French over the position of Europe vis-à-vis the United States and over the 
balance of our European and Atlantic connections.”171 With the exception of France, the 
remaining eight European delegations at the conference agreed that cooperation and 
coordination with the U.S., and not bilateral deals with OPEC, would be Europe’s 
strategy for the energy crisis. 
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The North Comes Together, 1974-75 
 
Section 2.2 explained how EC member governments’ attempts to renegotiate and 
expand trade relations with LDCs were an important component of their move toward 
political, economic, and institutional unity. Section 2.3 showed how the energy crisis 
challenged this and other assumptions about the future of Europe. The European project 
thrived during a time of economic growth and easy access to raw materials in the 1960s, 
but the abrupt end of cheap oil revealed the inherent weakness of its political structure 
when individual states were placed under severe economic duress. The EC’s president 
could serve as an effective continent-wide ambassador when there was general agreement 
on technical issues and when the benefits were clearer, like in extending preferences to 
LDCs before the energy crisis. But the crisis revealed the ultimate inability of the EC’s 
political structure to produce a common, forward-looking energy strategy without the 
support, or at least the acquiescence, of the United States. It also showed that despite the 
EC’s growth and unity, major stakeholders like Britain and West Germany would not toss 
aside their diverse economic and political ties to the United States—especially when 
détente suggested greater burden sharing on defense at a time when their governments 
had neither the will nor the means to do so. 
Dramatic and rapid international change following the Washington Energy 
Conference would once again transform transatlantic relations. The developed countries’ 
overwhelming focus in 1973 was, of course, high energy prices and their consequences, 
low growth and inflation. This was not the case across the South. While officials in 
Washington, London, and Paris feared the end of ever-rising prosperity, high food prices 
brought on by a combination of drought, depleted American wheat reserves, the dollar’s 
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devaluation, and high oil prices were forcing millions in the Third World to go without 
food. As Chapter 1 explains, leaders across the South saw the energy and food crises as 
interlinked, and many blamed the international economic architecture, designed and 
managed by the U.S., as the main culprit. “Unless the issue of international trade is faced 
squarely,” Venezuela’s Carlos Andres Pérez asserted in 1974, “it will not be possible to 
detect [the food crisis’] causes.” While recognizing that high oil prices were a contributor 
to the food crisis as well as the general contraction in worldwide economic growth, there 
was a sense across the Third World that only a crisis in the developed countries, rather 
than the polite politics of UNCTAD, would lead to real changes in global trade, finance, 
and development. “What we aim,” Pérez explained, “is to take advantage of this 
opportunity when raw materials, and energy materials primarily, are worth just as much 
as capital and technology, in order to reach agreements that will ensure fair and lasting 
balances.”172  
The promise of that opportunity was embodied in the Group of 77’s Declaration 
on the Establishment of the New International Economic Order, announced on Labor 
Day, 1974, at a special United Nations session on raw materials and development called 
for by LDCs—the first of its kind. Algeria’s President Houari Boumediene, a leader of 
both OPEC and the Non-Aligned Movement, gave the keynote address outlining the 
NIEO’s demands for increased aid, technology transfers, commodity cartels, and other 
proposals long familiar to UNCTAD participants. Boumediene received a standing 
ovation of three to four minutes from the General Assembly, where his foreign minister, 
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Abdelaziz Boutefilka, held the presidency. Pakistani economist Sartaj Aziz recalled the 
feeling in the South after the Algerian leader’s dramatic speech: 
So that evening, there was a dinner at the Pakistani minister’s house. 
[Ghanian official and future UNCTAD Secretary General] Ken Dadzie 
was there, [UN Ambassador] Donald Mills of Jamaica was there, and 
some other delegates. We were all talking about Boumediene’s speech and 
feeling very good about it. Somebody said, ‘You know, Boumediene is not 
alone. The Third World has come of age. Look at Nyerere of Tanzania, 
look at Michael Manley in Jamaica, look at Anwar Sadat in Egypt, look at 
King Faisal in Saudi Arabia, look at Bhutto in Pakistan, and Bandanaraike 
in Sri Lanka.’ There were about eight to ten leaders who had become 
world-class statesmen in the Third World.”  
 
There was also a belief that the time when developed countries, stable and united in their 
politics and economics, could act with imperial certainty and arrogance in their dealings 
with developing countries was passing. “On the other side, in the developed world,” Aziz 
continued, “there was a strange vacuum developing. Nixon had just been Watergated. 
Pompidou of France was dying. Wilson was not a very strong leader in Great Britain.”173 
These assessments did not anticipate changes in leadership in the developed 
countries that would fill this vacuum. In March, Edward Heath’s Conservative 
government in Britain was replaced by a Labour government under former Prime 
Minister Harold Wilson. According to Kissinger, Wilson “wasted no time in restoring the 
special relationship.”174 Foreign Secretary James Callaghan, who would replace Wilson 
as Prime Minister two years later, immediately instructed the Foreign Office to improve 
Anglo-American relations.175 “The same ever-so-polite needling familiar from the Heath 
period which had been designed to underscore the new priority of Europe in British 
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policy,” Callaghan informed Kissinger, was gone. “’Henry and I are going to work 
together. If there are any disagreements, bring them to me, and Henry and I will solve 
them.’”176  
After the death of Georges Pompidou in April and Willy Brandt’s resignation in 
May, two pro-Atlantic finance ministers, Valery Giscard d’Estaing and Helmut Schmidt, 
assumed power in France and West Germany. Both had long histories of cooperation 
with Washington as members of the Library Group, so-called because its members first 
met in the library of the White House in early 1973. The Library Group consisted of the 
finance ministers of the U.S., Britain, France, Germany, and Japan; their intention was an 
informal forum for the ministers to hold high-level discussions without political 
considerations, which Europeans had attributed to Nixon’s abrupt dismantling of the 
Bretton Woods system in 1971. 
Kissinger especially admired Giscard’s intellect. Unlike Pompidou’s Foreign 
Minister Michel Jobert, who was an “idiot,” Giscard, like Kissinger, was “an 
extraordinarily perceptive student of global trends,” whose analytical ability and centrism 
led him to “[see] the challenges faced by the West in ways that paralleled our own.”177 
Kissinger’s priorities also aligned with those of Helmut Schmidt, whose support for 
Kissinger’s proposals at the Washington Energy Conference led Jobert to accuse him of 
betraying European unity. Schmidt diminished worries about détente’s consequences for 
West Germany, assuring Ford and Kissinger that “we have no doubts” about America’s 
commitment to its security. Instead, “convinced that only collective action by the 
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industrial democracies could avert a collapse of the postwar social order,” he prioritized 
international economic issues, especially efforts to unite the U.S. and Europe in common 
response to the energy crisis.178 Like Giscard, with whom he had developed a close 
friendship during Library Group meetings, Schmidt believed European unity could in fact 
enhance the alliance. As he described his government’s foreign policy just after taking 
office, “We subscribe to political unification in Europe in partnership with the United 
States.”179 
These changes in Northern governments were profound. By reaffirming the 
primacy of transatlantic cooperation, leaders in West Germany and especially France 
were removing central obstacles to Kissinger’s model for global governance. Britain 
could commit to the European Economic Community without fear of prejudicing its 
relations with the U.S.; France implied that it would no longer use its dominance within 
the EC as political leverage over the U.S. as well as its European partners; and West 
Germany, whose diplomatic power with the U.S. suffered under the de Gaulle and 
Pompidou governments, could assert itself as a political force commensurate with its 
economic strength and security importance. Ford and Kissinger moved quickly to take 
advantage of these changes, holding separate meetings with the leaders of Japan, Austria, 
Canada, Germany, and France throughout December 1974 to discuss new measures for 
cooperation in energy and monetary affairs.  
The results came quickly. The most important breakthrough was with Giscard, 
whom Ford spoke with at a well-publicized summit on the French island of Martinique. 
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“It went extremely well for everyone,” Ford and Kissinger told bipartisan Congressional 
leadership at the White House. The key achievement was an agreement between Ford and 
Giscard to strengthen consumer solidarity before a major North-South event scheduled 
for March 1975.180 Originally Giscard’s initiative, the Conference on International 
Cooperation (CIEC), or Paris dialogue, was launched in order to separate discussions on 
oil from raw materials after LDCs insisted on their linkage in the UN Seventh Special 
Session. Kissinger explained that without developed country coordination before the 
conference, “we would be beaten to death” by OPEC and the LDCs. The new 
arrangement with France was a “solution broader than energy.” 181 As Giscard told Ford, 
“We can't make an agreement [on energy] without the support—not just the consent—of 
the United States.”182 “The civil war in the Atlantic community, where each has to choose 
between the U. S. and France, should be moderated if France carries out its obligations,” 
Kissinger concluded from the Martinique meeting. “We have made a big step toward the 
cohesion of the industrial countries.”183  
 
North-North Dialogue at Rambouillet, November 1975 
 
In the winter of 1975, two major meetings—one between the North, the other (the 
CIEC) North and South—both tested and strengthened this cohesion. The first was the 
November G-6 summit, held in Rambouillet, France between the leaders of the U.S., 
                                                     
180 This would become the Conference on International Economic Cooperation, also known as the “Paris 
dialogue” and, after Algeria insisted the inclusion of all raw materials, the “North-South dialogue.” This is 
discussed in the next section. 
181 GFPL, Memcom, December 17, 1974. 
http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1552890.pdf.  
182 GFPL, Memcom, December 15, 1974. 
http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1552887.pdf.  




Britain, West Germany, France, Italy, and Japan. The idea originated in Library Group 
discussions in 1973, when Helmut Schmidt suggested to U.S. Treasury Secretary Schultz 
regularized meetings of “essentially Atlantic Finance Ministers who would periodically 
meet very privately to consult on the whole range of interrelated commercial, financial, 
energy, etc. problems.184 Chancellor Schmidt and President Giscard expanded the idea to 
informal discussions between the new heads of state as CIEC preparatory talks broke 
down in April 1975, over Algeria’s insistence that all raw materials be included in 
discussions. At the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe that summer, 
Giscard, Schmidt, and Ford agreed to begin preparations for a summit, managed closely 
by their “personal representatives” to avoid any bureaucratic obstacles.185 
The summit’s broad purpose was to restore the West’s psychological confidence 
in the face of interrelated fiscal, monetary, energy, and raw materials problems. To 
achieve this, the summit leaders would discuss—or affirm—a predetermined agenda 
including trade, monetary policy, energy, North-South relations, and East-West relations. 
One major goal for Europeans was to commit the U.S. to fiscal stimulus, which would 
boost growth and confidence in weaker European countries and, over time, reduce 
inflation across the OECD. “If an economic conference should take place this year, we 
shouldn’t expect too many results,” Schmidt told Ford and Kissinger. But “if we could 
create the impression we intend to work together and coordinate our policies, that will be 
enough.”186 
                                                     
184 FRUS, 1969-76, vol. XXXI, Foreign Economic Policy, 1973-76, doc 34. 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v31/d34.  
185 Helmut Schmidt, Men and Powers: A Political Retrospective (New York: Random House, 1990) 




Ford and Kissinger embraced the summit. It fit with Ford’s preference for 
personal diplomacy between heads of state, as well as his desire to distance himself from 
Nixon’s legacy in Europe of suspicion and neglect. For Kissinger, the summit would 
assist his strategy since the Washington Energy Conference, which was to deal with 
international economic issues—and North-South issues especially—on a political basis 
between American and European leaders. The summit could send a message to 
developing countries in advance of the resumption of CIEC talks in December, scheduled 
for one month after Rambouillet. Kissinger explained: 
We should try to break what the Chancellor [Helmut Schmidt] correctly 
called the unholy alliance between the LDCs and OPEC. This can happen, 
and we can achieve our results, if they know that their disruptive actions 
could stop discussions on commodities or that they will pay a price in 
terms of cooperation, or military exports. In this way we can combat our 
dependence with a coherent strategy.187 
 
This was the stick; the carrot was a willingness to cut new deals with oil producers 
prepared to abandon the NIEO. “We agree on the need for cooperation with producers,” 
Kissinger insisted. “With cooperation we can separate the moderates from the radicals 
within OPEC, the LDCs from the OPEC countries, and prevent a lot of other ‘PECs.’”188 
Ford’s pro-market economic advisors did not see much potential in the summit. 
Treasury Secretary William Simon accused Giscard of wanting the summit in order to 
return the international monetary system to fixed exchange rates.189 He and others also 
doubted the emphasis on fiscal stimulus; instead, Simon, William Seidman, and Alan 
Greenspan all agreed that “we should emphasize what we are trying to do structurally to 
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revitalize the private sector, through deregulation, etc.”190 To them, the summits risked 
institutionalizing Keynesian solutions to problems that actually had their roots in 
Keynesian policies. “Interference by governments in the operation of an open world 
market system is counterproductive,” Peter Flanigan, the President’s pro-Wall Street 
adviser explained. “This is the basic philosophy of our approach to international 
economic problems.”191 
As explained in Chapter 1, Ford’s economic team’s greatest hostility was directed 
at Kissinger’s North-South strategy. Since the oil crisis and NIEO, Kissinger had 
announced, with minimal consultation outside of the State Department, numerous 
initiatives designed to win the support of moderate LDCs and weaken their support for 
OPEC. Building from his proposal at the 1974 World Food Conference for an 
international system of food reserves funded by the U.S. and OPEC, Kissinger collected 
his initiatives in an important speech at the Seventh Special Session of the United Nations 
in September 1975, where he insisted on the U.S.’ willingness to enter discussions with 
LDCs on raw materials and development in good faith.  
There and elsewhere Kissinger made clear that the U.S. would not accept a NIEO, 
stressing instead improvement of the existing system. To Simon and others, however, 
Kissinger’s public admission that LDCs had legitimate concerns, if illegitimate demands, 
put in jeopardy the entire free enterprise project at home and abroad. “The principles of 
free markets and free enterprise are, after all, what we stand for and what we believe in,” 
                                                     
190 FRUS, 1969-76, vol. XXXI, Foreign Economic Policy, 1973-76, doc. 116. 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v31/d116.  
191 Quoted in Sargent, A Superpower Transformed, 191. 
98 
 
Simon and Seidman’s Economic Policy Board wrote in response to Kissinger’s 
proposals. “If we fail to speak out in their defense, no one else will be able to do so.”192 
In advance of Rambouillet, Simon and Seidman pressed their case to Ford. The 
“fundamental” issue between Kissinger’s North-South strategy and their own, they told 
the President, was whether the U.S. “responds by reaffirming our own commitment to the 
basic principles of free enterprise and markets,” or “indicat[es] that we are prepared to 
accept the inevitability of a fundamental change in international economic 
arrangements.” If the U.S. promised at Rambouillet “’new solutions or new 
arrangements’” with LDCs, “the world will perceive this as a willingness on our part to 
compromise our basic system.” Instead of calling for increased aid and new commodity 
agreements, as Kissinger had done at the UN, Simon and Seidman argued that at the 
summit the U.S. should stress “continued reliance on the effective private institutions 
which have evolved” in those countries. Failing to issue strong statements of support at 
Rambouillet for market-based solutions globally would signal a lack of commitment to 
market-based domestic reforms. Kissinger’s approach, they wrote, would “[jeopardize] 
the principles you have been building at home and our economy and military strengths 
will increasingly count for less in the world.”193 
Kissinger held that the U.S. would gain nothing by countering the NIEO with a 
vision of the market that was unpopular even in developed countries. Put simply, the U.S. 
would not win an ideological fight, with the LDCs, OPEC, or its partners in Europe, who 
were more dependent on foreign oil and commodities and more politically receptive to 
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some of the NIEO’s statist measures. “If we insist on theoretical positions,” Kissinger 
explained to Ford, “Schmidt will separate from us on raw materials… He will not follow 
us on a confrontation course with the LDC’s. If he won’t, neither will France, Great 
Britain, or Japan.”194 
Indeed, elements in Europe already had separated on that issue. Schmidt, Giscard, 
and Wilson’s shared emphasis on restoring the transatlantic alliance and cooperating on 
energy did not prevent them from endorsing ongoing EC efforts at cutting separate deals 
with LDCs on raw materials. The Lomé Convention, signed February 1975 by the EC 
and 71 African, Caribbean, and Pacific Countries (ACB), provided non-reciprocal 
preferences for most ACB exports to Europe, in addition to $3 billion in development aid. 
Hailed across Europe as a success and well-received by several participating LDCs, the 
Convention was a direct response to the NIEO, its preamble pledging “a new model for 
relations between developed and developing states, compatible with the aspirations of the 
international community towards a more just and more balanced economic order.” EC 
officials saw Lomé as an achievement of both European unity and Europe’s new 
relationship with its former colonies. Claude Cheysson, a member of the European 
Commission who negotiated the 1975 agreement, concluded: “All this work has produced 
an agreement which, I say with some pride, is unique in the world and in history. Never 
before has there been any attempt to do anything of this kind. It is the first time in history 
that an entire continent has undertaken a collective commitment.”195 
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Despite the EC’s measures and the neoliberals’ opposition, Kissinger’s State 
Department was confident that his pre-Rambouillet raw materials strategy was beginning 
to show results. Officials concluded that since Kissinger’s overtures at the UN, the 
OPEC-LDC alliance was weakening, with “moderates” opting for “pragmatic 
cooperation with the West—where their economic interests necessarily lie.” As many had 
predicted, OPEC price increases were beginning to put LDCs finances under severe 
strain, especially in fast-growing “moderates” with strong political and economic ties to 
the U.S. like Brazil, Mexico, Egypt, and South Korea. 
Expecting that the “more radical non-aligned” and OPEC would counter at the 
CIEC with new aid proposals and a new “political and ideological base for LDC unity,” 
State recommended that to consolidate those gains and discourage additional EC-LDC 
negotiations, the U.S. should assume a position of leadership at Rambouillet. Their 
strategy combined firmness on some points and flexibility on others. President Ford 
should commit to negotiating commodities on a case-by-case basis, but reject the South’s 
plans for indexation and a Common Fund buffer program; encourage new financing 
measures through the IMF and private markets for debt relief, but oppose debt moratoria 
and forgiveness; and stress the centrality of recovery in the industrial countries to growth 
in LDCs.196  
The U.S. largely pursued this strategy at Rambouillet, and for the most part so did 
Europe. At the Third Session on Energy, Raw Materials, and Development, Ford and his 
counterparts all agreed on the need to break the “unholy alliance” of OPEC and LDCs, 
but strategies on how to do this at the CIEC varied. The Europeans were above all 
                                                     
196 GFPL, Federal Reserve, Subject File, Box B62, International Economic Summit, Rambouillet 1975, 
Briefing Book, “Relations with Developing Countries.” 
101 
 
concerned about the consequences of confrontation. To them, even the appearance of 
confrontation would reverse any progress they had made in moderating the South’s 
demands since the UN’s Seventh Special Session. Delegates praised Kissinger’s UN 
proposal for a Development Security Fund in the IMF to stabilize LDC export earnings, 
which was similar to the EC’s UN proposals. But since then Europeans were no less 
vulnerable to additional price shocks from the South. Inflation had already been rising 
throughout 1972-73; the oil crisis induced contraction not only through raising the cost of 
energy and related goods, but also through the diminished expectations of the business 
community, which held back investment from fear of higher oil and, after the NIEO, raw 
materials prices.197 “This disruption cannot continue,” Schmidt insisted. “Germany has 
no raw materials except intelligence, technology, and of course coal.” Kissinger stressed 
that it would be “suicidal” to enter the CIEC without cohesion among the oil importers 
and insisted that “cooperation among us is not confrontational vis-à-vis OPEC.” But this 
would not be enough. “Attacks can strengthen the solidarity of the LDCs,” Giscard 
responded. “We must show the developing countries that we are aware of their 
problems.”198 
Here the industrial countries converged on one central point. Early on in the 
summit Harold Wilson had suggested a “Marshall Plan type initiative” that would ward 
off protectionist measures in both North and South, but this was unlikely. As Wilson 
himself admitted, “We will be able to offer the developing countries little [in aid]” 
because of the North’s own economic problems, “and certainly far less than the minimum 
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they feel is their right. And even in holding the line we set ourselves a most difficult 
task.” Thus, the cheapest—and most politically and economically effective—response 
was new commodity arrangements designed in cooperation with the developed countries. 
Such agreements would seek to stabilize LDCs’ export earnings rather than prices, which 
LDCs’ demand for cartels and indexation promised. “The prospects for individual 
commodity agreements [as opposed to cartelization and indexation] are not too 
discouraging,” Wilson noted. “But we have to face the fact that the OPEC syndrome is 
catching on. There are already phosphate-pecs, bauxite-pecs, banana-pecs, and others.”199  
Wilson stressed as an example his initiatives for commodity stabilization at the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government conference in Kingston, Jamaica, six months prior 
to Rambouillet. The Commonwealth grouping represented a quarter of the UN’s 
population, Wilson pointed out, and this and other centers of decision-making and 
engagement could prove essential in moderating the South’s demands. Kissinger’s 
proposal showed the “common ground” already present in the North on a basic idea for 
commodities. “At the Seventh Special Session [of the UN], the UK’s proposals at 
Kingston, the united approach by the EC and the wide ranging US proposals [of 
Kissinger] led to the final resolution of the session,” Wilson said. “We must demonstrate 
in the future the same unity that we then achieved or the Group of 77 will divide us.”200  
Schmidt adopted a slightly different approach. While insisting that the developed 
countries should “educate the developing countries to understand, think, and operate in 
market economy terms,” he also envisioned “something analogous to the Lomé 
agreement” expanded worldwide. Such a system would stabilize export earnings by 





providing payments to LDCs in bad times; in times of surplus, the LDCs would pay it 
back. It was not a giveaway—it would be managed through the IMF, which would charge 
interest on late payments. But the industrial countries could use funds otherwise directed 
toward development aid to subsidize some of the interest. By combining controls, 
support, and intervention with financial discipline, “This would be more than the Lomé 
model. It could be done with all industrialized countries on one side and all the 
developing countries on the other. It would take into account total raw materials exports. 
And this could be in the upcoming dialogue.”201 
Giscard agreed with Schmidt and Wilson on the difficulty of increased aid, again 
citing tight developed country budgets and the risk of worldwide inflation. Instead, 
Giscard suggested, “We can set up reasonable and effective arrangements in 
commodities.” He, too, endorsed a worldwide system to ensure LDC export stabilization. 
“Such a system would contribute to the stability of the world economy,” Giscard 
emphasized. “We should show awareness [at the CIEC] of the importance of continuous 
improvement in the lot of the LDC’s.”202 
 
North-North Dialogue at Puerto Rico, June 1976 
 
After a deep dip in 1975 the U.S. economy was coming back. Unemployment was 
still high—around 7.9 percent in January 1976, down slightly from the previous year—
but the number of employed was increasing, without a corresponding jump in inflation. 
“It is my feeling that the meeting in Rambouillet was very important,” President Ford 
told the EC Commissioner, Francis-Xavier Ortoli, two months after the summit. “It had 
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psychological as well as substantive benefits.” Ortoli agreed that “the cooperative 
approach has helped. We have avoided counter-productive measures. So things are not so 
bad. We are pleased with the results of Rambouillet.”203  
Ford and Ortoli’s optimism was premature, at least for the health of Northern 
economies. Throughout 1976 inflation increased across Europe as the governments of 
weak industrial economies like Britain and Italy borrowed to meet their budgets, 
threatening the return to protectionism that many had feared. As Sargent explains, 
Greenspan and Simon, who had been less enthusiastic about using political summitry for 
economic policy, now favored it, but not for the same reason as Kissinger. Greenspan and 
Simon wanted to use the second G-7 summit, scheduled for June 1976 in Puerto Rico, to 
enact market “discipline” on the sick countries. Simon advised Ford to offer financial 
assistance to Italy with strict budget conditionalities, while Greenspan warned against “a 
new wave of inflation” brought on by post-Rambouillet stimulus in Western Europe.204 
Greenspan rejected the Keynesian consensus still dominant in Europe and indeed most of 
the U.S., explaining that “stable growth presupposes a shift of resources into investment 
and away from public and private consumption.” He also anticipated the IMF’s 
“structural adjustment” packages—essentially the face of the IMF for poor countries and 
anti-globalization activists from the Reagan Administration to the present. Rather than 
bilateral aid, the difficult “domestic corrective measures” for European deficit countries 
should be administered through “a general mechanism in the context of the IMF, which 
will be able to provide financial assistance to developed countries in special need, 
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preconditioned on special corrective programs to insure a return of sound economic 
equilibrium.”205 This was also similar to what Schmidt had proposed at Rambouillet for 
LDCs. 
The State Department “expressed skepticism” against “punitive” measures, but 
still favored another summit. Ford and Giscard met and agreed that “responsible and not 
“punitive” measures were needed.206 Kissinger, no ideologue but also no free-spender, 
agreed that the Puerto Rico Summit could be used to ensure more responsible spending 
among its allies. But “responsible” here is instructive. One of the key questions of 
interdependence theorists was whether democracy prevented industrial countries from 
making the tough decisions necessary for economic adjustment. This had many 
implications. A 1975 report by the Trilateral Commission, titled the “The Crisis of 
Democracy,” accused the publics of Western democracies in the 1960s of a fundamental 
contradiction in their demand for government “to increase its functions, and to decrease 
its authority.”207 In a background paper for Puerto Rico on the major industrial countries, 
Seidman’s Economic Policy Board made the same diagnosis: 
Governments [in the 1960s] committed themselves to ameliorate social 
inequities at home and abroad and to achieve an ever rising standard of 
living. However socially commendable, these commitments proved to be 
too ambitious in economic terms—both in what they actually attempted to 
achieve and in the expectations they raised among the public. Thus, the 
major task for the next several years is both economic and political—not 
only to regain acceptable levels of output but also to set realistic goals that 
are accepted by the public at large.208 
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Kissinger had reached a similar conclusion, though, typically, more about politics than 
economics: “If the British are smart, it could be in their interest to be pressured into 
agreement on conditions, so that they can say that the only reason they imposed stringent 
conditions on the British economy is because of those American SOBs.”209 
Thus, Ford and Schmidt, as head of Europe’s only surplus country, went to the 
Puerto Rico summit in June 1976 looking to discipline the debtors. Ford and Schmidt 
faced opposition to their primacy of fighting inflation over reducing unemployment, 
especially from Britain’s embattled Prime Minister James Callaghan. Shortly after Puerto 
Rico, however, Callaghan was repeating the same reasoning to his own supporters. He 
told the 1976 Labour Party conference that the “option [to increase spending] no longer 
exists. And in so far as it ever did exist, it only worked on each occasion… by injecting a 
bigger dose of inflation into the economy, followed by a higher level of unemployment as 
the next step.” Asking for help from the U.S., West Germany, and the IMF, he found only 





The Rambouillet and Puerto Rico summits showed how understandings of 
postwar Keynesian economics in the industrial countries both persisted and were rejected 
during the global economic crisis of the 1970s. At Rambouillet, President Ford and his 
counterparts agreed on a sort of global Keynesianism for the world economy. While 
keeping an eye on inflation, the theory went, the healthier developed countries should 
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continue spending, since their purchasing power would stimulate both weaker OECD 
neighbors and the developing world through increased demand for their exports—later 
named “locomotive theory” by officials in the Carter Administration. Locomotive theory 
was also a way for developed countries to avoid the kind of global structural changes 
called for by the South, without abandoning the key features of the global Keynesian 
approach. However, some in the North, especially the Scandinavian countries and the 
Netherlands, all of whom were left out of the G-6 and G-7 summits, pushed more radical 
North-South measures within the European Commission. In addition to endorsing 
indexation and debt relief, they also favored direct transfers to LDCs for global 
stimulus—a different global application of domestic Keynesian principles that was 
increasingly out of touch with understandings of economics and out of favor among the 
major industrial country governments. These differences would cause some problems in 
the Northern coalition at the CIEC, where, unlike in previous talks, the EC would have 
common representation.210 
Kissinger’s State Department still endorsed locomotive theory and rejected large 
fiscal transfers to the South, as well as calls to “punish” profligate European governments 
from its Treasury Department colleagues. The consensus remained that government was 
still the solution in that it should be managed better—even held to task by its creditors—
but not shrunk or attacked on principle, especially during a severe economic crisis. For 
Kissinger, the state’s economic power was above all a political lever, essential for 
domestic stability and international bargaining. But for neoliberals in the Ford 
Administration, government was the problem. Big budgets were the result of big 
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government, not just the politicians who manage them. The solution was to try to remove 
the politics from economics by transferring the enforcement of discipline from individual 
countries to the IMF—which, of course, reflected the policy and ideological preferences 
of Washington (and specifically the U.S. Treasury). 
For Kissinger, the summits’ main success was unrelated to the neoliberals’ 
ideological concerns. Rambouillet’s “greatest contribution” was that it provided the “kind 
of political directoire of the industrial democracies” that he had advocated since de 
Gaulle proposed the idea in the 1960s.211 The Rambouillet directorate excluded the most 
progressive European countries, like Sweden and the Netherlands, who advocated greater 
concessions on commodities and debt relief at EC discussions. Rather, at the directorate’s 
center were Britain, Germany, and France, now in closer economic cooperation with the 
U.S. since the Marshall Plan. On their greatest area of divergence—energy and raw 
materials—they were close to united. By the time of the CIEC talks, the major developed 
countries had agreed to 1) prioritize breaking the OPEC-LDC alliance; 2) stress the 
impact of the oil cartel’s actions for LDCs’ prospects; and 3) block LDCs’ calls for debt 
relief and indexation, instead limiting commodity reform to export, not price, 
stabilization. 
This convergence validated Kissinger’s efforts since 1973 to renew the 
transatlantic alliance around a shared purpose. That shared purpose came from, quite 
unexpectedly for all, the imperative to counter the Third World’s challenge to Western 
countries’ economic stability, in the face of what appeared as a massive structural crisis. 
But what once threatened divergence among the world’s most powerful economies, now 
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suggested convergence around the maintenance of an entire global order that none sought 
to abandon.  
Due to a combination of Kissinger and Ford’s persistence, propitious changes of 
leadership in Britain, Germany, and France, and the increased threat of oil and raw 
materials shortages in the West, transatlantic leaders in the mid-1970s partly realized the 
truth of the “interdependence” over which they obsessed in public speeches. 
Interdependence could only be managed within a stable international order. The EC had 
tried to create its own, alternative order in the early 1970s by isolating the U.S. through 
exclusive raw materials agreements with LDCs and, after the oil crisis began, exclusive 
energy agreements with the OPEC countries. But the U.S.’ relative strength through the 
crisis communicated the consequences of this strategy, as the U.S. could make its own 
deals that would undercut Europeans. Equally important was the fact that Europe still 
leaned on the U.S. for subsidized security. If the U.S. reduced its commitments, their 
budgets would gain a burden no European nation could carry, in good economic times or 
in bad. 
This did not mean that U.S.-European divergence on energy and raw materials 
was no longer a risk. Nor did it mean that the Third World’s challenge was over. After 
the first meeting of the CIEC in December 1975, National Security Advisor Brent 
Scowcroft warned Ford that “[U.S.] dependence on these countries [LDCs] for markets 
and raw materials is increasing. And their political and economic influence is growing.” 
He also still worried that  
The Europeans and Japanese (who are far more dependent on the Third 
World than is the US) might attempt to out-flank us [at the CIEC] in 
playing up to the developing and OPEC countries. And political and 
economic tension between us and the Third World would build. 
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Frustrations could lead to an adverse climate for US investment in the 
Third World, a weakening of trade ties, less reliable raw material supplies 
and a more hostile political environment. 
 
The U.S. should use the CIEC to “pursue a variety of policy options, both bilateral”—
with Third World producers—“and multilateral”—with producers and European 
consumers—“to better secure its economic (trade, investment, and raw materials) and 
political interests.”212 
Outside of the CIEC, the U.S. pursued its North-South policy options at the fourth 
UNCTAD meeting in Nairobi, Kenya, also covered in the next chapter. The State 
Department placed great importance on UNCTAD IV, for several reasons. Policy toward 
UNCTAD, which would focus on commodities and debt relief, could not be separated 
from the CIEC; it would arise in all future discussions with developed and developing 
country leaders; and any success would require substantial effort from the executive 
branch. UNCTAD “as an organization has special meaning for the developing world,” 
State reported to Kissinger, “having prepared the intellectual foundations of much of the 
New International Economic Order.” It was especially important that the U.S. take 
UNCTAD seriously now; in the past, it had not. Further, despite developed country 
convergence on commodities and debt relief, on the link between special drawing rights 
at the IMF and foreign aid, “We are almost isolated” from Europe. “If we can squelch 
divisive proposals among DCs [developed countries],” State concluded, “UNCTAD IV 
gives us the chance to further harmonize DC policies toward the Third World.”213 
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Kissinger sought to demonstrate his government’s commitment by giving the 
keynote address at UNCTAD IV, making him the first cabinet-level U.S. official to 
participate in an UNCTAD meeting. The address was the centerpiece of a multi-country 
goodwill tour of Africa in the final months of his career. It was Kissinger’s first official 
trip to Africa as Secretary of State, and it showed in his conversations with African 
leaders. Attention to the continent in the Ford Administration had been limited to 
involvement in a proxy war in Angola with the Soviet Union and implicit support for 
white minority rule in South Africa and Rhodesia. The trip was additionally complicated 
by the actions of UN Ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who had contradicted 
Kissinger’s North-South overtures at the UN with dramatic denunciations of Third 
World—and especially African—leaders. Moynihan used the Third World’s human 
rights record to counter its claims for economic redistribution; he also publicly and 
privately called out Kissinger, his boss, for failing to stand up for human rights in East-
West relations. These developments were concurrent with a human rights movement that 
both of Ford’s opponents in 1976, the Republican Ronald Reagan and Democrat Jimmy 
Carter, used for their own ends. All of these trends would come together in Kissinger’s 
final major initiative, for both North-South policy in the Ford Administration and indeed 





Chapter 3: ‘The United States Goes into Opposition’: 




Prompted by allegations from investigative journalists and the findings of U.S. 
Senator Sam Ervin, in January 1975 Congress established a new intelligence committee 
tasked with investigating and publicizing illegal activities by the CIA abroad and at 
home. Its report “showed that all six administrations from Franklin Roosevelt’s through 
Richard Nixon’s—four Democrats and two Republicans—had secretly abused their 
powers,” wrote Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., the Committee’s General Counsel. “This 
was probably the committee’s single most important finding.”214 Regardless, the 
bipartisan committee had a decidedly Democratic stamp, and while no president would 
have granted the commission everything it requested, the task (and consequences) of 
disclosure and denial fell to President Gerald Ford. 
This reaction against executive power and secrecy was one consequence of 
America’s Third World policy under Nixon and Ford, but it was not the only. In the early 
1970s, Americans of both parties came to resent what they saw as the passive acceptance 
by American elites of America’s declining global power and the Third World’s rise. In 
speech after speech at the United Nations, Third World leaders called the postwar 
economic order unequal and immoral, and OPEC leaders like Algeria and Venezuela 
singled out the United States for its selfish leadership. Newsweek told Americans that the 
global conflict between the “have’s” and “have not’s” was “The World’s New Cold 
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War,” encouraging their sense of siege.215 The liberal internationalist establishment 
agreed. “The main axis of conflict at most international conferences today,” Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, then Director of the Trilateral Commission, explained in 1975, “is not 
between the Western world and the Communist world but between the advanced 
countries and the developing countries.”216  
Chapters 1 and 2 showed how Kissinger’s eagerness to pacify the South through 
concessions on trade and aid led to conflict with Ford’s neoliberal economic advisors, 
who considered the G-77’s proposals to regulate international commodity prices directly 
counter to their own mission to end price controls at home. But while William Simon and 
Alan Greenspan focused most on the economic principles at stake, another set of actors, 
at the time largely outside government, saw an even greater threat emanating from the 
South. The North-South conflict was not simply a battle between rich and poor nations, 
Irving Kristol, one leading voice, explained in the Wall Street Journal, but “much more a 
question of one’s attitude towards liberal political and economic systems, and toward 
liberal civilization in general.”217  
In 1973 sociologist Michael Harrington used the term “neoconservative” to 
describe Kristol and other former liberals who opposed the Democratic Party’s embrace 
of “interest group” politics and ambitious social engineering through welfare 
programs.218 For neoconservatives this was embodied in 1972 Democratic presidential 
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nominee George McGovern’s “New Politics,” part of an attempt to forge a new base of 
support from younger feminists, environmentalists, black activists, and others who had 
come of age politically in the 1960s. For neoconservatives, however, Democrats had 
drunk the New Left “Kool-Aid.” As one writer put it in Commentary, the New Politics 
movement elevated “TV militants” like Jesse Jackson over NAACP moderates, pandered 
to the counterculture, and generally accepted the New Left’s charge that “the average 
American had been brainwashed by the Establishment and was tainted by racism.”219 For 
neoconservatives those politics were being played out internationally at the United 
Nations, where State Department diplomats allowed the Third World’s attacks on 
American liberalism to go unchallenged. While in the 1980s and beyond 
neoconservatives took pride in their dismissal of the UN’s relevance and authority, in the 
1970s they wanted to stay and fight for an institution they believed was worth saving. 
Their first major victory came in 1975, when Kissinger appointed Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan, a former Ambassador to India and Kennedy and Johnson administration 
official, as his Ambassador to the UN. 
This chapter first explains neoconservatism’s origins within the context of North-
South relations. Most histories of neoconservatism overwhelmingly focus on 
neoconservatives’ attitudes toward détente and human rights in the Soviet Union, but 
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Moynihan’s UN tenure—by all accounts, a watershed moment for the movement—
demonstrates the centrality of a North-South, rather than East-West, framework.  
We then return to Kissinger’s North-South strategy at the beginning of 1975 to 
explain the reasons for Moynihan’s appointment. The U.S. delegation badly mishandled 
the December 1974 vote on the G-77’s “Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 
States,” essentially a legal blueprint for the NIEO. Although their prescriptions differed, 
both Moynihan and Kissinger believed that what developing countries said at the UN—
and how they organized to say it—mattered. Thus, Kissinger chose the Seventh Special 
Session on Development and International Cooperation, a follow-up conference to the 
NIEO held in September 1975, to unveil a wide range of new proposals in response to the 
G-77’s mounting demands.  
The new U.S. positions on commodity and development financing were praised 
by North and South alike, and many delegates considered it the beginning of a true 
North-South “dialogue.” Ironically, with Kissinger in the Middle East for emergency 
peace negotiations, the speech was delivered by one of his biggest critics. While 
Kissinger was able to rebuff the neoliberals’ calls for free-market bromides, he was less 
able to control Moynihan’s bold, often chauvinistic, assertions of the political, economic, 
and moral superiority of American liberalism. Moynihan’s combative neoconservatism 
threatened Kissinger’s attempts to articulate an approach to the Third World more in line 
with Western Europe’s, and their private and public disputes led to Moynihan’s 
resignation in February 1976, after just seven months on the job. It also earned Moynihan 
tremendous popularity among the American public, who found compelling his 
assessment of the UN as a club of tin-pot dictators and racist fanatics denouncing the 
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U.S. in one breath and demanding money in the next—and who in turn voted him into the 
U.S. Senate, where he represented New York State until his retirement in 2001.  
The chapter concludes with a discussion of Kissinger’s last major act as Secretary 
of State, his visit to thirteen African countries in April 1976. During the trip Kissinger 
praised African socialists like Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere, renounced U.S. support for 
minority rule in southern Africa, and connected support for majority rule to economic 
development and the North-South dialogue. He also became the first high-ranking U.S. 
official to address the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), where he presented another significant policy reversal: endorsement of the 
G-77’s call for a Common Fund to support global commodity prices. Kissinger’s trip was 
intended as not only an affirmation of the U.S. government’s good faith in the North-
South dialogue; it was also a rejection of Moynihan’s legacy at the UN, marking the end 
of a brief but key phase in neoconservatism’s ascendency in U.S. foreign relations. 
 
Moynihan in Opposition 
 
Like all political labels, the term “neoconservative” has a varied and contested 
history. As the author of one recent study put it, “From the 1960s to the 2000s, 
neoconservatism transformed itself so thoroughly as to become unrecognizable.”220 Since 
at least 1979 there has been no shortage of histories, most of them written by partisan 
attackers or defenders of either neoconservatism’s founders or its post-2001 iteration.221 
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More helpfully, recent scholars have identified different neoconservative “movements,” 
thereby distinguishing the philosophies of “right wing liberals” in the 1970s, like 
Commentary editor Norman Podhoretz and sociologists Daniel Bell and Nathan Glazer, 
from the more rigid anti-statism of the George W. Bush Administration.222 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan was one of those “right wing liberals” and a central 
figure in the history of neoconservatism. Born in Tulsa, Oklahoma in 1927, Moynihan 
moved to New York City as a child, where he shined shoes before graduating high school 
and finding work as a longshoreman. Unlike future friends Podhoretz and Irving Kristol, 
Moynihan was never a member of the “New York Intellectuals,” the fabled group of anti-
Stalinist leftist writers and literary critics who debated aesthetics and Trotskyism with 
equal fervor. Instead, after a year at City College, Moynihan enlisted in the Navy, during 
which time he gained a B.A. from Tufts University. 
Despite subsequently earning an M.A. and Ph.D. in International Relations from 
Tufts’ Fletcher School, Moynihan was not initially interested in foreign affairs; indeed, in 
a great irony, the future ambassador failed the State Department’s Foreign Service exam. 
Instead, following the completion of his dissertation in 1961, Moynihan joined the 
Kennedy Administration—the embodiment of the tough “vital center” liberalism to 
which he subscribed—as an Assistant Secretary of Labor. 
During this time the young Ph.D. gained national attention for a controversial 
report he authored on black poverty that made its way to the press. By asserting a causal 
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link between black family instability and black poverty, many accused Moynihan of 
“blaming the victim” (and worse). It did not help that the report became public 
knowledge in August 1965, the same month as the Watts riots in Los Angeles. Civil 
rights leader Whitney Young, Jr. called Moynihan’s thesis a “gross distortion,” while 
Harvard psychologist William Ryan accused him of harboring a “new ideology” in which 
blacks were “savages.”223 “I am now known as a racist across the land,” Moynihan 
despaired to NAACP Director Roy Wilkins.224 
The controversy over the “Moynihan Report” was a turning point in Moynihan’s 
relationship to the Democratic Party. “The reaction of the liberal Left to the issue of the 
Negro family was decisive,” he wrote in a reply to his critics. “They would have none of 
it. No one was going to talk about their poor people that way.” By this time, Moynihan 
“was a neoconservative in all but name.”225 Like Podhoretz and Glazer, Moynihan 
believed that he had not abandoned liberalism; rather, in its rejection of consensus 
politics, resistance to internal criticism, and unwillingness to confront its radical 
elements, liberalism had abandoned him. Following his resignation from the Johnson 
Administration in 1965, the Americans for Democratic Action board member called for a 
“formal alliance between liberals and conservatives” to combat the “nihilist terrorism” 
and “erosion of authority” in America’s cities and universities. Still preferring the term 
“liberal dissenter,” Moynihan mocked the “mob of college professors, millionaires, 
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flower children, and Radcliffe girls” that he blamed for Johnson’s decision not to run for 
President in 1968.226  
Through it all, Moynihan’s stock on the right began to rise. While Podhoretz 
declared “full-scale war” on the New Left from the pages of Commentary—marking its 
crowning as the “new conservatives’” principal organ227—Moynihan joined the Nixon 
Administration in 1970 as a “special counselor to the President” on race relations and 
urban affairs. When the press picked up on another memo widely interpreted as urging 
Nixon to neglect the black community, for Moynihan, it was history repeating itself as 
farce. As if he needed another excuse to abandon his sympathies for the American left, in 
response to the “benign neglect” memo Students for a Democratic Society members 
reportedly threatened to trash his house in Cambridge—the same day that antiwar 
protesters hung a Viet Cong flag from Peace Corps headquarters in Washington.228  
In January 1971, Moynihan returned to Harvard but remained in the Nixon 
Administration part-time as a special observer to the United Nations. He was shocked by 
the Third Worldist consensus of UN committee agendas and reports; the Economic, 
Cultural, and Social Council’s 1970 “Report on the World Social Situation,” for instance, 
was a “totalitarian tract” that he compared to a “hastily written undergraduate thesis.” 
Most troubling for Moynihan was the State Department’s lack of a reaction. “It is 
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incomprehensible to me,” he told UN Ambassador George H. W. Bush, “that a State 
Department that would take the nation into a hopeless and disastrous war in Asia in 
defense of abstract principles about democracy is not able—or in some perverse way—
not willing—to summon the intellectual competence to defend democracy in a United 
Nations debate.”229 
For the second time in two years, in late 1972 Nixon offered Moynihan the job of 
UN Ambassador. Believing that the “[UN] corpse had already begun to decompose,” he 
turned it down in favor of Ambassador to India, Nixon’s other offer. His main 
achievement was the renegotiation of a large food loan India owed to the U.S., but his 
experience abroad left him convinced of a fundamental crisis in U.S.-Third World 
relations. In letters to Podhoretz and Glazer—now co-editor (with Irving Kristol) of 
neoconservative journal The Public Interest—he denounced Nixon and Kissinger’s 
hesitancy to resupply Israel during the 1973 war, the refusal of Europeans to support the 
United States when it did send arms, and, especially, the anti-Israeli sentiments of the 
“leftist, ‘anti-colonial’” government of Indira Gandhi. “I came here thinking that liberty 
was losing in the world,” Moynihan concluded. “I leave thinking that liberty may well be 
lost.”230 
If the Moynihan Report and “benign neglect” episodes confirmed his views of the 
American “totalitarian left,” Moynihan’s experiences as a U.S. diplomat convinced him 
that an analogue of that virus had also infected the making of American foreign policy. 
He was not alone among neoconservatives. In 1972, “New Politics” advocates in the 
Democratic Party united around liberal anti-war candidate George McGovern for the 
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nomination, edging out neoconservative favorites Henry Jackson and Hubert Humphrey. 
In response, Jackson supporters formed the Coalition for a Democratic Majority (CDM), 
urging the Party to return to a more aggressive policy toward the Soviet Union and, 
importantly, the promotion of democracy and human rights.231 While neoconservatives 
feared the loss of Truman- and Kennedy-esque containment within the Democratic Party, 
the Republican Party was no more welcoming, as the Nixon Administration embraced 
détente and balance of power politics while opposing many of the social programs 
neoconservatives still favored. Thus, while McGovern campaigned on the slogan “Come 
Home, America,” the CDM issued its last plea to liberals: “Come Home, Democrats.”232  
More important for Moynihan was that the American foreign policy establishment 
had seemingly lost the will to defend America—not so much with weapons, but with 
words. In a 1974 Commentary essay titled “Was Woodrow Wilson Right?” he 
determined that American elites were in the middle of a “crisis of faith… demoralized, 
even victimized” by a combination of the radical left at home and the “poisonously anti-
American” political elites of “most of the rest of the world.”233 The problem was not just 
that American elites had lost hope; it was also the case that few, if any, of them actually 
understood what they were up against. From Moynihan’s perspective, it was not hard to 
find a parallel between American liberals’ refusal to acknowledge the uncomfortable 
truths he raised about black poverty in 1965, and the unwillingness of American foreign 
policy elites to stand up and defend liberalism against its anti-liberal and anti-democratic 
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Third World detractors. In a not-so-subtle jab at his State Department colleagues, 
Moynihan told the New York Times while serving as a UN delegate, “I will not split the 
difference between a totalitarian society and an open one, or suggest that there’s good to 
be said on both sides.”234  
After his resignation as Ambassador to India in late 1974, Moynihan, at 
Podhoretz’s urging, collected these ideas for a lengthy essay for Commentary’s March 
1975 issue. He began work as soon as he returned to Harvard in early January; a month 
later, Podhoretz, a gifted publicity hound, called a press conference for the article’s 
release. Within days, Moynihan, who had already graced the cover of Time in 1966, was 
back in the national spotlight for a major television interview.235 
In “The United States in Opposition,” Moynihan gave both an historical overview 
of what he saw as the Third World’s “ideology” and a prescription for how to combat it. 
His explanation of “what happened in the early 1970s” was highly idiosyncratic, and 
clearly reflected both his recent time in India and his profoundly Anglocentric view of 
history (and perhaps some aftertaste of the two lonely and bitter years he spent as a 
Fulbright Scholar at the London School of Economics). Moynihan located that ideology’s 
origins in the “general corpus of British socialist opinion” from 1890-1950, which 
harbored both “a suspicion of, almost a bias against economic development” and an 
“aristocratical [sic] disdain” of the United States’ model of capitalist development. In 
short, he argued that colonial elites, educated in the Marxist-inflected Fabianism popular 
at the LSE, took this ideology back to their countries, where they asserted a right to not 
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only political independence from their colonizers but also economic reparations from the 
developed capitalist world writ large. “Before very long,” Moynihan explained, “the 
arithmetical majority and the ideological coherence of those new nations brought them to 
dominance in the United Nations and, indeed, in any world forum characterized by 
universal membership.” 
More important than his explanation of the Third World’s ideology was his 
diagnosis of current U.S. policy. Part of the problem was that Americans did not even 
recognize that the Third World held a distinctive, coherent ideology. The Third World 
countries’ first act as a bloc, he explained, was the “political” move to establish the Non-
Aligned Movement, but in 1964 they became an economic bloc, too, with the 
establishment of the Group of 77 caucus in the United Nations. By this point “it was clear 
enough that the Third World…was not going communist,” but neither was it going 
liberal. Rather than discouraging this slide toward statism and anti-Americanism, 
Moynihan charged, the United States, through “blind acquiescence and even agreement… 
kept endorsing principles for whose logical outcome it was wholly unprepared and with 
which it could never actually go along.” In a thinly disguised jab at Kissinger, Moynihan 
cited the 1974 World Food Conference (a Kissinger initiative) and responses to the New 
International Economic Order and Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States as 
the latest examples of the State Department’s failure of will. 
There was only one choice for beleaguered American policymakers: “The United 
States goes into opposition. This is our circumstance. We are a minority. We are 
outvoted. This is neither an unprecedented nor an intolerable situation. The question is 
what do we make of it.” He concluded by listing three areas where the U.S. must defend 
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itself against attack—international liberalism, the world economy, and political and civil 
liberties—and called for the U.S. to stand up for liberalism’s political and economic 
achievements in both the UN General Assembly and special organizations. “It is past 
time we ceased to apologize for an imperfect democracy,” Moynihan asserted, not for the 
last time. “Find its equal. It is time we grew out of our initial—not a little 
condescending—supersensitivity about the feelings of new nations. It is time we 
commenced to treat them as equals, a respect to which they are entitled.236 
The article caused the sensation it sought and quickly made its way to Kissinger, 
who allegedly read it straight through an afternoon appointment. When he proposed to 
Ford that Moynihan “head a group about behaving more aggressively at the UN,” the 
President suggested instead that Moynihan lead the U.S. delegation. Kissinger recalled in 
his memoirs that he had recommended Moynihan for the position, but Ford remembered 
differently: “Henry was not in favor of sending Moynihan to the UN and warned that he 
might use it as a political stepping stone.”237 Regardless, Ford was in favor, and in a 
meeting with the new Ambassador and the President, Kissinger agreed, “That 
Commentary article is one of the most important articles in a long time. That is why it is 
essential to have him at the UN.”238 In addition to the preponderance of neoliberal 
economic officials, the Ford Administration now had a powerful representative of another 
trend in the fractured and transitional politics of the time: neoconservatism. 
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Both Kissinger and Ford had doubts about Moynihan. Ford asked if he “would 
carry out orders,” to which Kissinger replied, “You—and the press—would know when 
he disagreed.” One consideration was Moynihan’s views on the Middle East, of which 
Kissinger was already aware. “One major problem you will have is on Israel,” he warned 
the new ambassador. “They are desperately looking for a spokesman and they will work 
on you… I don’t want Israel to get the idea that our UN mission is an extension of 
theirs… We have to show Israel that they don’t run us.” Moynihan agreed: “The 
American Jews have got to be Americans.” Kissinger was wary, but nevertheless 
believed that Moynihan could be managed. “He will give us fits,” he told Ford, “but he 
will do well.”239  
Kissinger’s ambivalence about Moynihan’s appointment was understandable. 
Although his status as a hardnosed foreign policy realist has been challenged, Kissinger 
was certainly not a Wilsonian like Moynihan.240 More important, Moynihan’s call for the 
U.S. to go into “opposition” at the UN ran counter to the more conciliatory approach 
towards which Kissinger had been moving since the World Food Conference. The 
Secretary of State already had the Treasury and Council of Economic Advisors accusing 
him of selling out American economic values and interests to placate Third World statists 
and socialists; why would he risk turning an even more outspoken critic into such a 
public liability, when his own rhetoric had moved firmly in the opposite direction? 
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Podhoretz argued that Moynihan was brought on “to shore up the right flank 
without having to pay too much for it,” since Kissinger believed the UN was essentially 
“harmless.” This is unpersuasive. Kissinger paid unprecedented attention to the United 
Nations from 1975-76, even travelling to Nairobi to address the fourth meeting of 
UNCTAD, making him the only cabinet-level U.S. official to do so until Cyrus Vance 
four years later (this act has not been repeated since). Nor was Kissinger persuaded by 
Moynihan’s account of the Third World’s ideology, which, in an early meeting, he and 
Moynihan agreed was “exaggerated” and “overblown.”241  
Instead, Moynihan was brought on precisely because Kissinger believed that the 
Third World’s ideological offensive at the United Nations was important. “Until the Sixth 
Special Session,” the State Department explained in May 1974, “most LDCs seemed to 
go along with NAGC [Non-Aligned Country Group] political positions and economic 
rhetoric, but to look to [the] Group of 77 for real progress on specific economic aims.” 
However, the New International Economic Order demonstrated a “new-found LDC 
capacity” to ignore political and economic heterogeneity and unite around the 
confrontational tactics of “militant” Third World leaders in OPEC and the Non-Aligned 
Movement. Yes, their resolutions were not binding or enforceable, but the effect of this 
leadership at the UN both muted “more pragmatic LDC approaches to economic and 
political issues” and “isolated increasingly [the U.S.] as [the] apparent protector of [the] 
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status quo on…. self-determination, racial equality, and distribution of global 
resources.”242 
Kissinger did not have to endorse Moynihan’s prescription—“The U.S. goes into 
opposition”—to appreciate his diagnosis, which was that as the composition of the UN 
changed, so too did its politics and significance. When OPEC leaders used arguments 
developed primarily in UN agencies like UNCTAD to justify restrictions on oil 
production, they were drawing on organizations and bodies of knowledge that the U.S. 
had, through its silence, effectively endorsed, back when the oil weapon was seen as an 
empty threat. Its deployment in 1973 demonstrated both the dependence of developed 
countries on Third World resources and, in Western Europe’s subsequent scramble for 
new energy deals with Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and others, the limits of developed 
country solidarity. “We are now living in a never-never land, I am certain,” Kissinger 
despaired in early 1974, “in which tiny, poor and weak nations can hold up for ransom 
some of the industrialized world.”243 
“The Commentary article makes two points,” Moynihan explained to Kissinger 
and Ford upon his appointment: “We are still acting in the same posture we had in the 
past when we had a majority—so we still seek a consensus. The only consensus now is 
screw the United States. The reputation of the US keeps eroding and that reputation is 
important to us.” “We even cooperate in resolutions directed through codewords against 
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us,” Kissinger agreed. “How we are going to behave,” in both the General Assembly and 
specialized agencies like UNCTAD, “is important…. We need a strategy.”244 
 
The Seventh Special Session, September 1975 
    
At the time of Moynihan’s appointment in April 1975, the National Security 
Council was in the midst of a major North-South strategy review. Kissinger’s leadership 
at the World Food Conference in November 1974 was a start, but its gains were undercut 
by, for one, public disputes between USDA Secretary Earl Butz and U.S. Congressional 
delegates over food aid levels. Regardless, the NIEO leadership showed no indication of 
dropping its confrontational strategy in future negotiations and refused to be swayed by 
Kissinger’s argument that a showdown over oil and other commodities would hurt poor 
countries the most.245 
One month after the World Food Conference, the General Assembly met and 
approved overwhelmingly the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 
(CERDS). The “brainchild” of Mexican President Luis Echeverría, CERDS attempted to 
provide some legal context for the NIEO by outlining new “resolutions and codes of 
conduct in relations between the North and South.”246 To Kissinger’s dismay, U.S. 
Ambassador John Scali had “brow-beaten enough Europeans” to vote against the 
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Charter, rather than trying to convince a majority of developed countries to merely 
abstain (as Kissinger had instructed).247 Instead, the U.S. organized a lonely and 
ambivalent opposition around itself without even trying to, angering not only the Third 
World but also its allies, five of which reluctantly joined the small “no” chorus. Unaware 
it was even fighting a battle, the U.S. lost twice. It was no wonder that Moynihan singled 
out these poor diplomatic performances in his Commentary article. 
 Expectations were justifiably low for the producer-consumer conference in 
April. Also known as the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC),248 
it was an attempt by French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing to bring together a 
“Group of 19” developing countries and “Group of 8” developed countries to work out 
some grand bargain on energy outside of global NIEO negotiations in the UN. The first 
preparatory meetings in February were over before they began. Algeria insisted on 
discussing raw materials alongside energy at the conference; the U.S. claimed it had only 
agreed to attend the “prepcon” under the condition that raw materials would be excluded 
altogether. “The French chairman has been a disgrace,” Kissinger told Ford.249 “[The 
                                                     
247 Kissinger-Ingersoll Telcon, “U.N. Vote on Economic Rights Charter,” December 6, 1974. In “The 
Kissinger Telephone Conversations: A Verbatim Record of U.S. Diplomacy, 1969-1977” (hereafter 
“Kissinger Telcons”), The National Security Archive at George Washington University). 
http://search.proquest.com/dnsa_ka/docview/1679092061/3A02D9DCD17047DCPQ/58?accountid=9673.  
248 The CIEC was also referred to as the “Paris dialogue” and, somewhat confusingly, the “North-South 
dialogue.” This dissertation uses its official (CIEC) and primary unofficial (Consumer-Producer 
Conference) names.  
249 Kissinger could hardly claim surprise. “The producers don't want to seem the villain on the economic 
scene,” Giscard warned Ford in December. “They [will] also want to talk about inflation and other raw 
materials.” At an OPEC meeting in January, Algeria proposed a deal for the producer-consumer conference 
that gave guarantees on oil prices for industrial countries in exchange for a wide-ranging development 
package based on the NIEO. When OPEC met two months later in advance of the CIEC, their final 
resolution concerned the conference mixed demands for debt relief, aid, and a Common Fund with 
denunciations of the IMF and World Bank and calls for continued OPEC-LDC solidarity. (For “villain”, 
see Memcon, Ford, Kissinger et al., “Energy Cooperation,” 
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1552887.pdf. For “Algeria proposed,” see Ian 
Seymour, OPEC: Instruments of Change (Springer: 1980), 150. For “When OPEC,” see Giuliano Garavini, 
After Empires: European Integration, Decolonization, and the Challenge from the Global South, 1957-
1986 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 198.) 
130 
 
conference] will break up if we don't cave.” “Damn right,” Ford replied. “You can tell 
[our diplomats] to come home.”250 
 The CIEC’s failure caused a reckoning inside the NSC. “Based on the 
experience of the prepcon,” Robert Hormats wrote to Kissinger, “it is clear that for both 
political and economic reasons the US must more seriously address issues of raw 
materials and development.” To avoid taking the blame for its failure, the CIEC would 
have to be resumed, which meant caving in to Algeria. Refusal to do so would have 
important consequences beyond the Third World; without hope of a conference, Hormats 
worried, Europeans would pull their support for Kissinger’s International Energy 
Agency, already on life support due to continued French ambivalence. “Domestic 
constituencies [in Europe] sensitive to implied confrontation with producers” would 
attack the IEA and the U.S., he explained, “as having sabotaged the consumer/producer 
dialogue and forced other consumers to go along with the treachery.”251 
 Hormats recommended two paths forward. First, Kissinger would continue to 
strengthen North-North cooperation—the subject of Chapter 2. At the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe meetings in July, Ford, Giscard, and German 
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt revived the idea of a formal summit of industrial country 
leaders to discuss a predetermined agenda including trade, energy, finance, North-South, 
and East-West issues. “If an economic conference should take place this year, we 
shouldn’t expect too many results,” Schmidt told Ford and Kissinger. But “if we could 
                                                     
250 Memcon, Ford, Kissinger, and Scowcroft, April 15, 1975. 
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1553028.pdf.  
251 GFPL, Memo, Hormats to Kissinger, “Followup to Consumer/Producer Preparatory Conference,” April 
25, 1975, folder: Utilities, Box 4, White House Central Files (WHCF). 
131 
 
create the impression we intend to work together and coordinate our policies, that will be 
enough.”252 
Second, Hormats insisted, it was “imperative” that the U.S. develops a new 
position on commodities before September, when the General Assembly would meet for 
its Seventh Special Session on Raw Materials and Development. The purpose of the 
Seventh Session was to consider progress made towards realizing the NIEO since its 
announcement at the previous Special Session in May 1974, and expectations were low 
on both sides. By bringing to the Session a “major initiative on commodities,” the U.S. 
could take the lead and set the tone early on. “In so doing we would try to strengthen the 
position of the moderates on commodities and, subsequently, to encourage a more 
reasonable position by the OPEC moderates and developing countries in the [CIEC].”253   
According to Kissinger, announcing U.S. willingness to negotiate new commodity 
agreements would isolate third World radicals and weaken the argument for 
comprehensive global negotiations. Through proposing multiple negotiations on 
commodities instead of one grand package or commission, the U.S. could “break off the 
[Third World] moderates into various associations or groups and get them to join us in 
order to minimize the chances of confrontation.”254 This strategy would also strengthen 
the cohesion of the other developed countries, which could now approve of the new U.S. 
position without losing points in the South. As Kissinger explained to Moynihan: 
Our basic strategy must be to hold the industrialized powers behind us and 
to split the Third World. We can only do that if we start with a lofty tone 
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and a forthcoming stance. That alone will permit us to hold the 
industrialized countries together. Bloc formation in the Third World can 
be inhibited only if we focus attention on practical measures in which they 
have a tangible stake. 
 
By offering “forward-looking” proposals on commodities at the Seventh Session, the 
U.S. would have something to offer to not just developing countries but also to the 
European Community, itself split between a conservative Germany, a moderate Britain 
and Italy, a liberal France and Netherlands, and a socialist Scandinavia. “I don’t want to 
take an ideological stance and simply argue the virtues of the market economy,” 
Kissinger emphasized to Moynihan. “We must speak early in the session and put forward 
specific and progressive ideas—something for our friends to hold on to.”255 
At the beginning of the Special Session on September 1, Moynihan read 
Kissinger’s dramatic two-and-a-half hour speech to the General Assembly. Rejecting the 
“charity and dependency…methods of development assistance of the 1950’s and 60s,” 
Kissinger called instead for new protections for commodity producers, preferential 
treatment for developing countries’ exports, new finance mechanisms in the IMF for the 
“least developed countries,” and increases in public and private financing for Third 
World industrialization. Specifically, he rejected the previous U.S. position (supported by 
the Treasury) of opposing new commodity agreements, agreeing to discuss them on a 
“case-by-case basis”; proposed the creation of a new facility within the IMF to stabilize 
developing countries’ export earnings (as an alternative to price indexation); and 
promised to resume the Conference on International Economic Cooperation with both 
energy and raw materials as discussion topics. Following 15 days of close negotiations 
                                                     




between Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Thomas Enders—Kissinger’s 
economics guru—and Manuel Pérez-Guerrero—the influential former UNCTAD 
Secretary-General and Venezuela’s Finance Minister—delegates unanimously approved 
a 16-page resolution that, Time noted, “contained more than two dozen references to the 
proposals made by the U.S. at the start of the session.” In a notable victory for the U.S., 
in exchange for possible price-stabilizing agreements for specific commodities, namely 
copper and tin, developing countries dropped their insistence on including indexation in 
the resolution.256 
The new U.S. approach to the North-South divide was welcomed across Europe 
and the Third World. Britain’s Ambassador to the UN Ivor Richard declared Kissinger’s 
address “the most significant American speech on economic policy since the Marshall 
Plan,” a comparison Swedish media also made. In France the left-wing Quotidien de 
Paris saw a “profound revision” of U.S. foreign economic policy, and Le Monde noted 
that even hardliners like Algeria were saying that “the Americans for the first time are 
using a language understandable to the countries on the road to development.”257 The 
Nairobi Standard recorded that “the world’s developing and industrialized nations are 
now on the brink of a workable compromise,” and Mexico City’s Novedades interpreted 
it as an endorsement of CERDS. An outlier was Venezuela, which took issue with 
Kissinger’s characterization of oil price rises as “arbitrary and monopolistic.”258 Only the 
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Soviet Union appeared uninterested in the U.S. overtures, continuing its policy of self-
recusal on the New International Economic Order. The overwhelming consensus in both 
North and South was that the Seventh Special Session marked a turning point—the 
beginning of a North-South dialogue. “We have spoken with each other rather than to 
each other,” insisted Jan Pronk, Dutch Minister of Development and Seventh Session Ad 
Hoc Committee Chairman.259 
The results of the Seventh Special Session met all of Kissinger’s objectives. First, 
his speech had brought the U.S. position on commodities much closer to the Europeans’, 
whose negotiating solidarity was needed before resuming the CIEC in December. 
Second, it seemed the engaged and forthcoming U.S. stance had had its intended effect 
on the Third World bloc. “The majority in the third-world group didn’t want an 
ideological showdown or political victories,” one Third World delegate told the New 
York Times. “That’s why the extremists were defeated and we started talking business 
with the Americans.” Also significant was a sense that, in the end, the U.S. had more to 
offer developing countries than OPEC. Even Abdelaziz Boutefilka, the outspoken 
Algerian Foreign Minister and General Assembly president, acknowledged as much, 
telling the General Assembly that the Third World “knows that it must count on the 
understanding and agreement of the major powers for the satisfaction of its most obvious 
rights.”260  
Kissinger did not believe the U.S. could “win” the debate at the Special Session, 
but it could influence the final results to be much more favorable to American interests. 
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“I would like a reasonable outcome in which we are not totally isolated,” he told 
Moynihan in the session’s hectic final days.261 Instead of enabling radicals and isolating 
allies through its defensiveness and hostility—as the U.S. had done with the NIEO and 
CERDS—Thomas Enders and Moynihan worked behind the scenes to ensure a final 
resolution reflecting compromise from both sides. They were helped by Kissinger’s 
proposals, which he correctly expected would change the terms of the debate from a 
grand bargain into several discrete negotiations; as an added bonus, in its inclusion of 
twelve Kissinger proposals, the final resolution showed a significant degree of American 
leadership.262 
Not all of the credit for the Special Session went to Kissinger. Newsweek 
attributed the unexpected “note of civility” at the UN to Moynihan, adding that the 
“highbrow Horatio Alger… has won almost nothing but praise for his patience and 
diplomatic skill.”263 “The diplomatic outcome certainly vindicates Ambassador 
Moynihan’s basic approach,” the editorial staff of the Wall Street Journal proclaimed. 
“Rather than play the European game and swallow as much, and a bit more, of the Third 
World’s demands as the U.S. could tolerate, the U.S. set out to be responsible 
opposition.”264  
 
 “A Fighting Irishman at the UN” 
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As the Seventh Special Session’s discussion stuck to economics, so did 
Moynihan, under Kissinger’s instructions to ensure a “reasonable outcome.” That 
Moynihan did was surprising. In August, the Non-Aligned nations met in Lima to agree 
on a collective agenda for the Session. The NAM’s opening statement celebrating its 
vanguard role in the “struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, [and] 
racism” was boilerplate, and most American diplomats would not have glanced twice. 
Moynihan, however, was particularly troubled by one more “ism” on that list: “Zionism.” 
Not only was this “hardly the substance of economics,” he scoffed. This “talk about 
declaring Zionism to be a form of racism… reeked of the concentration camp and gas 
chamber. No person sensitive to the idea of liberty would want in any way to be 
associated with such language.”265 
Nor was he made hopeful by a spot on a panel discussion with Zbigniew 
Brzezinski. President of the two-year-old Trilateral Commission and soon-to-be Jimmy 
Carter’s chief foreign policy advisor, Brzezinski embodied the “world order” liberalism 
that neoconservatives detested. As the next chapter explains, Brzezinski and other liberal 
internationalists, largely from the Trilateral Commission, would dominate Jimmy 
Carter’s foreign policy team, with the self-appointed mission of “making the world safe 
for interdependence.”266 “The dominant struggle in the world [is] between the West and 
the Third World,” Moynihan paraphrased Brzezinski, “with the Soviets the primary 
beneficiaries.” The policy details were spelled out in dozens of Trilateral Commission 
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reports, but the basic assumption was clear: the U.S. would have to acknowledge the 
Third World’s rising influence in an “interdependent” world and deal with their economic 
demands on that basis.267 
For a brief moment, however, the UN seemed a less divided place. The Special 
Session’s promising conclusion on the morning of September 17 also marked the end of 
the Third World’s control of the presidency of the General Assembly—scheduled to 
begin its thirtieth session that very afternoon. Abdelaziz Boutefilka was out; in his place 
was Gaston Thorn, the centrist Prime Minister of Luxembourg and future European 
Commission President. “French without resentment, and German without guilt, he was 
the best we could have hoped for,” Moynihan recalled. “The auspices had rarely been 
better.”268 
From Algeria to Zaire, delegates opened the General Assembly with praise for the 
“truly historic” and “universal and cooperative process” for global economic dialogue 
established at the Special Session.269 Back from his Middle East negotiations, Kissinger 
also reaffirmed to his fellow foreign ministers the new “spirit of conciliation” in North-
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South relations. Borrowing the rhetoric of his critics, Kissinger declared that there was 
“no longer any dispute” that human rights were now a legitimate concern and standard 
for all governments’ behavior. But he also insisted that it was possible to “fashion unity 
while cherishing diversity,” leaving the definition of human rights—and what action the 
U.S. would take regarding violations—undefined and thus uncontroversial. Conciliation, 
not confrontation, was the clear message: “Let us fashion together a new world order. Let 
its arrangements be just. Let the new nations help shape it and feel it is theirs. Let the old 
nations use their strengths and skills for the benefit of all mankind. Let us all work 
together to enrich the spirit and to ennoble mankind.”270  
Of course, Kissinger sought no such “new world order”; his goal was to hold on 
to the old one, by whatever modifications necessary.  This meant in policy terms 
swallowing U.S. pride and accepting Algeria’s demands that CIEC discussions include 
both energy and raw materials; making concessions on commodity policy, from new 
individual agreements and buffer stocks to eventual endorsement of a Common Fund; an 
International Fund for Agricultural Development funded mostly by the U.S.; billions for 
an IMF “special fund” for developing countries’ balance of payments problems; and 
more. At the heart of it all was the transatlantic alliance, strained by the crises from 
without—high prices for energy and raw materials—and struggling under the crises from 
within—low growth and inflation. “If we insist on theoretical positions [in the North-
South dialogue],” Kissinger explained to Ford, “Schmidt will separate from us on raw 
materials… He will not follow us on a confrontation course with the LDC’s. If he won’t, 
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neither will France, Great Britain, or Japan.”271 North-North economic disharmony also 
threatened critical East-West policy objectives like NATO unity and détente—one of 
several “hard” security issues stressed by interdependence advocates (and future Carter 
officials) Brzezinski and Richard Cooper.272 If insuring against these outcomes included 
aping the Third World’s talk about a “new world order”—and ignoring its rhetoric about 
Western racism, Zionism, and imperialism—then so be it.  
While Kissinger declared his intent to “fashion unity while cherishing diversity,” 
Moynihan took diversity to a different conclusion. In August, he broke with thirty years’ 
practice of U.S. Ambassadors and used his vote on the Security Council to veto the UN 
application of a new nation—the (communist) Democratic Republic of Vietnam. 
According to Moynihan, the State Department’s opposition to his vote was “unanimous”: 
“To do so would outrage the General Assembly, jeopardize everything that was at stake 
in the Special Session, and bring on the expulsion of Israel,” a senior official reportedly 
told him. Ford approved Moynihan’s actions, and State worked hard to minimize the 
expected damage by defanging his final speech. Regardless, in Moynihan’s estimate, his 
“reasonable opposition” strategy had been vindicated: “There was no reaction to our 
veto… If anything, the United Nations seemed to have been reminded of American 
power.”273 
The Vietnam incident was the “opening shot” in Moynihan’s war at Turtle Bay. 
“We would make the connection between the unwillingness to tolerate democracy at the 
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U.N.,” he explained, “and the refusal [by Third World countries] to allow it at home.”274 
That is, if the UN would admit North Vietnam, a communist state that did not allow a 
free opposition, then by that logic it must also admit capitalist non-members like South 
Korea and South Vietnam. For Moynihan, the Third World’s rejection of those terms—
upon which he conditioned his vote—was a perfect example of the “tyranny of the 
majority” he and other neoconservatives routinely decried.275 “We are not about to be 
lectured by police states on the processes of electoral democracy,” he insisted that 
Sunday on Meet the Press.276 
If Idi Amin Dada’s Uganda was not a police state, it was only a matter of 
semantics. So when the unpredictable dictator took to the General Assembly on August 1, 
Moynihan was listening. Amin began with praise for the Seventh Session, including a 
“special tribute to the United States authorities… who approved a change in the 
American attitude and policy towards the third world.” He transitioned into harsh but 
typical denunciations of American imperialism and declarations of support for the Soviet 
Union and China, but he saved his greatest wrath for the state of Israel and its “Zionist” 
supporters in America—who, in their ownership of “virtually all the banking institutions, 
the major manufacturing and processing industries and the major means of 
communication,” Amin claimed, had “colonized” the U.S. government. There was only 
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one solution: Americans must “rid their society of the Zionists,” and the world 
community must ensure the “extinction of Israel as a state.”277 
The State Department was no friend of Amin. After he sent a telegram to UN 
Secretary Kurt Waldheim applauding the massacre of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympic 
Games in Munich, State cancelled a $10 million loan and called his words “deeply 
shocking” and “totally incomprehensible.” But for Moynihan, the State Department 
missed the point. Amin’s comments might have been dismissed as the ramblings of an 
unhinged racist—if not for the fact that, less than two months prior, the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU), of which Amin was Chairman, had passed its own resolution 
likening “the racist regime in occupied Palestine” to the “racist regimes in Zimbabwe and 
South Africa” in their “common imperialist origins.” Amin may have put it most crudely, 
Moynihan concluded, but his was clearly not a minority opinion—and no one but Israel 
seemed to realize the implications of the global community’s implicit endorsement.278 
This was not all. In Commentary Moynihan had insisted that the U.S. must take 
what is said and done in the UN seriously. Kissinger agreed with this assessment, but less 
for the actual language used there by Third World states than for how these expressions 
of collective opposition encouraged similar bloc behavior on other multilateral and global 
issues, namely energy and commodities. Idi Amin was powerful in Uganda but, his 
chairmanship of the OAU notwithstanding, a minor force in Third World politics; as a 
whole Third World states were much more unified around (and capable of) taking action 
on the New International Economic Order than they were on Israel. But for 
neoconservatives such attacks could not be separated: they were part of the same 
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ideological assault on the sacred principles of Western, and particularly American, liberal 
democracy. As Chairman of the OAU Amin “spoke for forty-six African nations,” 
Moynihan charged, “but in truth in that moment he spoke for the authoritarian majority in 
the General Assembly itself.”279 
When the State Department’s initial reaction was silence, Moynihan decided, “It 
was time to create a crisis.”280 He skipped a scheduled dinner for Amin that night and 
instead travelled to San Francisco, where he addressed an AFL-CIO audience gathered by 
George Meany—just the type of “right wing liberals” neoconservatives believed the 
Democrats were abandoning. Few could—and only the delegate from Dahomey later 
did—argue with his characterization of Amin as a “racist murderer.” What angered 
Moynihan’s African colleagues in Turtle Bay was his claim that it was “no accident” that 
Amin was the head of the OAU. Not only was this factually incorrect—the chair rotates 
among member states—but several African diplomats had in fact openly criticized Amin 
for his speech. Some of the continent’s leading newspapers even rivaled Moynihan in 
their rhetoric—for instance, Nigeria’s Daily Star called the speech “the most racist act 
ever seen at the United Nations”—while making “perfectly clear,” as Kenya’s Daily 
Nation put it, “that when he [Amin] speaks about the expulsion of Israel he does not 
represent African opinion.”281 
The reaction to Moynihan’s comments back home was overwhelmingly positive. 
“With a mood of cynicism widespread in America, it doesn’t hurt to be reminded that 
there is a difference between democracy and totalitarianism,” the Wall Street Journal 
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wrote in response.282 A remarkable 70% of Americans approved of the Moynihan 
approach, one poll concluded, while only 16% believed that the Ambassador should “be 
more diplomatic and tactful.”283 Moynihan also received public statements of support 
from Clarence Mitchell, Jr., the NAACP’s head lobbyist who had supported him during 
the “Moynihan Report” controversy, and Bayard Rustin, another influential black Civil 
Rights activist who had already become a major actor in the neoconservative 
movement.284 Moynihan believed that he was speaking truth to power not only at the UN 
but also in Foggy Bottom, telling the New York Times that the State Department 
“machine” was “emasculating” his speeches.285 While President Ford bent to this 
groundswell of public support and told reporters that Moynihan “said what needed to be 
said,” Kissinger did the opposite. Newsweek reported that the Secretary “blew his stack” 
before quickly putting out a statement distancing the State Department from Moynihan’s 
remarks. Not only had Moynihan insulted the OAU; he had also singled out Indira 
Gandhi’s authoritarian lean in India, about which Kissinger had instructed U.S. diplomats 
to keep quiet.286 “The President didn’t know what he was supporting,” Kissinger 
grumbled.287 
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The Amin fiasco was the prelude to one of the most controversial votes in UN 
history: General Assembly Resolution 3379, which declared Zionism a “form of racism 
and racial discrimination” and a “threat to world peace.” The resolution had been in the 
works at least since August, when the Non-Aligned countries simultaneously denounced 
the resistance of the “large consumption economies” to the New International Economic 
Order and celebrated their own resistance to the North’s “imperialism, colonialism, 
neocolonialism, racism, Zionism, apartheid, and any other form of foreign 
domination.”288  
Without Moynihan’s public relations campaign before and after the vote, the 
resolution might have been passed and forgotten about, and indeed this is what Kissinger 
had hoped for. The State Department tried to prevent Ford from giving a statement 
(prepared by Moynihan) about the upcoming vote, arguing that it would neither make any 
difference on the vote nor produce any serious foreign policy benefits.289 Moynihan also 
went to Congress to drum up support for a strongly worded resolution, where, again, 
Kissinger intervened to soften the language. But Moynihan made clear that he had no 
intention of backing down—only that, on November 10, the day the General Assembly 
voted, he would not speak until after the final vote had been taken. All Kissinger could do 
was tell Moynihan to tone it down. “We have been overdoing the defense of Zionism as a 
philosophy and a system,” he insisted that afternoon through a USUN intermediary. “Ask 
[Moynihan] to cut it back. We are conducting foreign policy. This is not a synagogue.”290 
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The General Assembly passed Resolution 3379 with 72 in favor and 35 against, 
with 32 abstentions. The overwhelming majority of support, and sponsors, came from 
North Africa, the Middle East, and the Eastern Bloc. Most parts of Latin America and 
sub-Saharan Africa, however, joined the U.S., Canada, Western Europe, and Australia—
the “large consumption economies”—in voting nay.  
Contrary to Moynihan’s insistence, there were reasons beyond anti-Semitism or 
anti-liberalism for many countries’ votes. “Brazil, seeking Arab oil and investments, 
refused to go along [with the U.S.],” Newsweek reported, while “some Black African 
nations did not want to dilute the [resolution’s] attack on South Africa.”291 Kissinger’s 
staff also saw this brighter side, noting that “among sub-Saharan Black African states 
without a significant Islamic population and not under a politically ‘radical’ influence, 26 
either opposed equating Zionism with racism or abstained, while only 2 in that category 
did link it.” More important for African countries were persistent promises, made at the 
beginning of the oil crisis, that “they would receive far more aid than they actually have 
from the Arabs, in return for breaking relations with Israel and voting sympathetically on 
Arab causes.”292 Still, some delegations—including “several experienced American 
diplomatists”—cited Moynihan’s repeated attacks on the General Assembly and the 
Third World per se as the reason for their support or abstention. As one African delegate 
put it, “All I can tell you is that our vote was mainly against Moynihan.”293 
The American public felt the opposite. After his speech denouncing the “infamous 
act” that had just taken place—a phrasing actually coined by Norman Podhoretz, who 
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with Suzanne Weaver helped write Moynihan’s speech the night before—one poll 
recorded that over 70% of Americans supported both his actions and style.294 “The cheers 
have been coming from both conservatives, who have historically distrusted the U.N., 
and liberals, whose commitment to the organization is not as automatic as it used to be,” 
Time explained in a flattering profile on the “fighting Irishman.”295 On November 12 tens 
of thousands of people gathered for a rally in New York City to protest the vote, which 
over a dozen prominent diplomats, religious officials, and leaders from the labor, Civil 
Rights, and women’s movements called an “outrage,” a “curse,” and an “abomination.” 
Carrying signs like “U.N. Nothing” and “Brazil, You Stink! And You Too Mexico!” the 
New York Times reported, the demonstrators broke out into “applause… every time a 
speaker mentioned Daniel P. Moynihan.”296 
Moynihan’s defiance of Kissinger’s policies did not stop with the Third World. 
Neoconservative intellectuals were also pleased by his public criticisms of détente, which 
they had been describing as “appeasement” since 1972. The first jab was in June, when 
Moynihan appeared at another Meany-organized AFL-CIO dinner, this time honoring 
Soviet dissident Alexander Solzhenitsyn. Fearing that the President’s attendance would 
offend the Soviets just weeks before the Helsinki negotiations, Kissinger persuaded Ford 
to decline Meany’s invitation. The only other cabinet official to appear was Defense 
Secretary James Schlesinger, whom Kissinger openly despised. Neoconservative writer 
Ben Wattenberg recalled a Coalition for a Democratic Majority event from that time: 
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Somehow the dialogue [about the Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements] 
has become very cold and abstract and dehumanized… But it took a CDM 
member, Pat Moynihan, a dues-paying, paid-up CDM member, to remind 
Democrats and Americans what the struggle was really about… What Pat 
said is that we Americans are the leaders of ‘The Liberal Party’ on this 
planet—and it was high time that someone said it with gusto, with vigor, 
with style, and with pride.297 
 
And while Kissinger privately (and to his Soviet counterparts) dismissed the concessions 
to human rights contained in Helsinki’s Basket Three, just days after the Zionism vote 
Moynihan introduced a resolution calling for the immediate release of all political 
prisoners worldwide.  “I am being told if he does not put it forward everyone will know I 
vetoed it,” Kissinger complained. “As far as I know I am being blackmailed to proceed 
with that resolution.”298 When Kissinger denied him State Department resources, 
Moynihan formed an alliance with the human rights group Freedom House, a longtime 
supporter of Eastern Bloc dissidents, to draft a “universal standard for human rights” for 
the UN’s use.299 The proposal went nowhere, but this was beside the point. The “lesson,” 
Moynihan said of the controversy over his OAU comments, “is that if you want an 
audience, start a fight.”300 
This was it for Kissinger. Moynihan was a “laughing stock,” he told Brent 
Scowcroft, his successor as National Security Advisor, and a “disaster in Europe.”301 
With the developed countries still reeling from the previous year’s oil shock and fearing, 
as British Prime Minister Harold Wilson put it at the first G-7 meeting in November, 
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more “phosphate-pecs, bauxite-pecs, banana-pecs, and others,” Moynihan could not have 
chosen a worse time to start a war of words with Third World commodity producers.302 In 
December Ivor Richard, Wilson’s UN Ambassador, compared Moynihan “variously to a 
trigger-happy Wyatt Earp, a vengeful Savonarola and a demented King Lear ‘raging 
amidst the storm on the blasted heath.’”303 Reasoning that Richard would never have 
made his statements without Wilson’s approval, and that Wilson would never have given 
the okay without first running it by Kissinger, Moynihan sniped back. On January 23, he 
sent a memo to all U.S. embassies that included a list of incidents showing that, due to his 
actions, “governments are beginning to think that anti-American postures at the UN are 
not without cost.” Moynihan contrasted these successes with the attitude of “a large 
faction” of the State Department “which has an interest in our performance being judged 
to have failed.”304 The memo was then leaked to the press, almost certainly by 
Moynihan’s office. 
Ford and Kissinger gave measured public statements of support for Moynihan, but 
these were nothing more than polite formalisms for his impending departure. James 
Reston, Kissinger’s preferred source for leaks at the New York Times, explained: 
The reaction from Mr. Kissinger and his department today ran counter to 
repeated private statements made in the past…by senior officials in the 
State Department…that Mr. Moynihan’s outspoken style—which they 
have frequently characterized as demagoguery and a campaign for 
personal power—are seriously damaging United States interests in the 
United Nations. 
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Ford and Kissinger “deplore Moynihan in private,” Reston explained. “Having put him in 
the job, they can neither tame nor repudiate him.”305 On February 2, after just over seven 
months in the position, Ambassador Moynihan resigned. 
“Moynihan has enraged Third World delegates, discomfited his Western 
European colleagues, and brought cheer to the hearts of Americans,” Time summarized 
his last months as the U.S. Representative to the UN.306 Whether liberal Democrats in the 
1960s had abandoned him or the other way around, Moynihan’s attacks on anti-liberalism 
and anti-Americanism at the UN brought him wide esteem from other “right wing 
liberals” alienated by the Democratic Party’s apparent embrace of egalitarianism, 
multiculturalism, and non-interventionism. As Kissinger had suspected, Moynihan 
wasted little time in securing political support for a run for office from Party power 
brokers, namely, “liberal Democrats and black leaders so that [he] could address their 
misgivings about his opinions of socialism and racial issues.” In early June 1976, just 
four months after stepping down, Moynihan declared his candidacy for the Democratic 
nomination for Senator from New York. After narrowly defeating liberal incumbent Bella 
Abzug for the nomination, he easily triumphed in the general election over his 
conservative Republican rival James Buckley—thus making Moynihan “the first 
neoconservative intellectual to be elected to public office.”307 
 
Apartheid and the North-South Dialogue: “Liberation on Two Scales” 
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The deterioration of North-South relations at the UN under Moynihan’s tenure 
coincided with two important developments suggesting a strengthening of the U.S. 
position. As explained in Chapter 3, in 1973 Kissinger set about to rebuild the postwar 
“transatlantic partnership” between the U.S. and Western Europe, at the time mired in 
fallout from Nixon’s New Economic Policy and détente. The oil shock later that year and 
announcement of the New International Economic Order in the spring of 1974 gave a 
greater urgency to these efforts. After a series of discrete but stalled attempts at 
macroeconomic cooperation, in November 1975 the U.S., Britain, France, Italy, West 
Germany, and Japan met in Rambouillet, France to agree upon a coordinated response to 
the interrelated fiscal, monetary, and energy crises. 
The second event was the reopening in December of the Conference on 
International Economic Cooperation. In fact, a major purpose of the Rambouillet Summit 
was to strengthen developed country solidarity before the CIEC as a counter to the 
developing countries’ own—especially after Moynihan’s performances at the UN, which, 
excepting the Seventh Special Session, had weakened the former and strengthened the 
latter. Only after establishing a common stance on energy and commodities—that is, 
forming a developed country bloc—Kissinger explained at Rambouillet, could the U.S. 
and Western Europe negotiate with any sort of credible leverage: 
We should try to break what the Chancellor [Helmut Schmidt] correctly 
called the unholy alliance between the LDCs and OPEC. This can happen, 
and we can achieve our results, if they know that their disruptive actions 
could stop discussions on commodities or that they will pay a price in 
terms of cooperation, or military exports. In this way we can combat our 
dependence with a coherent strategy.308 
 
                                                     




This was the stick; the carrot was a willingness to cut new deals with oil producers 
prepared to abandon the NIEO. “We agree on the need for cooperation with producers,” 
Kissinger insisted. “With cooperation we can separate the moderates from the radicals 
within OPEC, the LDCs from the OPEC countries, and prevent a lot of other ‘PECs.’”309 
Still, two massive obstacles remained for Kissinger’s goal of winning Third 
World “moderates”; both were regionally specific but with global implications. The first 
was the Panama Canal. Chapter 5 explains the role negotiations over the Canal’s status 
(started and stalled in in the Johnson Administration and renewed by President Nixon in 
1973) took in Kissinger’s bid to win the cooperation of influential Latin American 
leaders like Venezuela’s Carlos Andrés Pérez and Mexico’s Luis Echeverría on trade, 
energy, and commodities. “If these [Canal] negotiations fail,” Kissinger told Ford, “we 
will be beaten to death in every international forum and there will be riots all over Latin 
America.”310  
The second obstacle was apartheid. In the Truman and Eisenhower 
administrations South Africa emerged as a reliable supporter of America’s global Cold 
War agenda, and Washington reciprocated by abstaining on anti-apartheid resolutions in 
the UN, sharing scientific and military technology, and promoting investment by U.S. 
multinationals.311 Kennedy and Johnson administration liberals changed some policies, 
voicing support in principle for African self-determination and endorsing a worldwide 
arms embargo, but they still refused to back additional economic sanctions that might 
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harm American businesses. However, the international isolation of Ian Smith’s 
government in Rhodesia in the late 1960s and growing global movement against 
apartheid—as well as the achievements of America’s own Black Civil Rights 
movement—made the U.S. lack of a firm policy an increasing liability, which the Soviet 
Union was quick to exploit in its own relationships with postcolonial African 
governments. The longer South Africa in particular existed as a pariah state, the worse 
the U.S. looked for identifying strategically with the white government’s leadership. “The 
time has come for the U.S. and the European countries with interests in South Africa to 
begin a dialogue with the South African leaders,” Abdelaziz Boutefilka instructed 
Kissinger in December 1974, just days after the vote on the Charter of Economic Rights 
and Duties of States. “You cannot pursue any longer a policy which is in disharmony 
with the rest of the world.”312  
The situations in South Africa and Rhodesia were additionally complicated by 
events elsewhere on the continent. In Angola the departing Portuguese—undergoing their 
own “Carnation Revolution” following the removal of right-wing dictator Antonio 
Salazar in 1974—left opposing nationalist factions to fight their way to power. Each side 
soon received arms: the pro-U.S. National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA) from the 
CIA, and the pro-Soviet Peoples Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) from 
Cuba. It was a classic Cold War proxy battle and, for that reason, an apparent defiance of 
détente.313 
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The State Department’s Africa bureau doubted the benefits of intervention, but 
Kissinger pressed forward. When Congress got wind of the secret program in late 1975 
and banned any additional military aid to the FNLA, the U.S. lost its only bit of leverage. 
Kissinger was caught in a bind. Most African governments opposed U.S. intervention, 
but they also opposed Soviet influence in Angola—the reason why several governments, 
including Nigeria, Ghana, and Tanzania, gave their own aid to the MPLA.314 At the same 
time, the U.S. Embassy in Ethiopia reported, many African governments believed that the 
U.S. and South Africa were in “de facto collusion, if only because both support 
opponents of [the] MPLA regime.”315 The stakes were therefore high for Angola’s 
outcome. “[A] communist victory in Angola would quicken events in southern Africa, 
encourage radicalism and discourage moderates,” Kissinger explained to Ford. “When 
you added to that the Cuban troops and the congressional action preventing us from 
giving further support in Angola, we left our OAU supporters high and dry and all trends 
toward radicalization in Africa were speeded up.316  
Hovering over Angola and apartheid in early 1976 was the North-South dialogue, 
and the inability of U.S. strategists to address each problem discretely was a clear 
demonstration of the new realities of global interdependence. While Latin America took a 
larger share of overall American exports, African commodities—especially coffee, cocoa, 
cobalt, chrome, iron ore, and diamonds—were essential to American industrial 
production and household consumption. “Thirty to sixty percent of our consumption” of 
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those commodities comes from Africa, Kissinger reported to Ford; the figures were even 
higher for Europe.317 As major raw materials producers African states played a 
particularly important role in international commodity negotiations, especially since, 
unlike the Organization of American States, the Organization of African Unity debated 
and developed common positions independently of American input or influence. “There 
are only two states with which we have any major military assistance role, that is, Kenya 
and Zaire,” Kissinger told Congressional leaders. “For the rest of Africa what is needed is 
a sense of direction and a sense of confidence in the United States.”318 That sense of 
direction was expected to come from three new policies: first, clear support for a 
transition to majority rule in South Africa and Rhodesia; second, a withdrawal of 
American arms in Angola; and third, a new commitment to the continent’s economic 
development. In exchange, Kissinger expected African leaders to resist Soviet and Cuban 
interference in Angola, South Africa, and elsewhere, as well as back down from 
confrontational tactics in North-South negotiations.319  
For these reasons, Kissinger planned a multi-country trip to Africa that would 
conclude with a major North-South policy speech, delivered as the keynote for the fourth 
meeting of the UN Conference on Trade and Development in late April. While the 
CIEC’s membership was restricted to a “Group of 19” from the South and a “Group of 8” 
from the North, UNCTAD, which had met every four years since its founding in 1964, 
was a permanent and open UN-affiliated forum where the heterogeneous developing 
                                                     
317 FRUS, Ibid.  
318 GFPL (I), Memcon, Ford, Kissinger, and Congressional leadership, “Report on Secretary’s Trip to 
Africa,” May 12, 1976, folder: Africa, Box 1, International Economic Affairs Staff, NSA.  




countries of the G-77 (their actual count was 111) could organize largely on their own 
terms. “UNCTAD as an organization has special meaning for the developing world,” the 
State Department explained, “having prepared the intellectual foundations of much of the 
New International Economic Order and frequently being the LDC’s preferred vehicle for 
carrying out policies ranging from commodities to technology.”320 In fact, after the U.S. 
agreed to resume CIEC talks at the Seventh Special Session several developing countries 
sponsored a General Assembly resolution “designed to create a link between the CIEC 
and the UN… where they have equal representation, an equal chance to be heard, 
opportunities to coordinate their positions, extensive secretariat support, and the majority 
vote.”321 For these reasons, it was important to ensure that UNCTAD IV concluded with 
as little acrimony as possible. The “alternative,” State warned, would be “a complete 
breakdown in [the] North-South dialogue which would [include] [the] CIEC.”322 
Not only would Kissinger’s presence mark the first time a cabinet-level U.S. 
official visited an UNCTAD meeting; it was also his first official visit to Africa.323 Thus, 
the trip was the subject of a great deal of flurried interdepartmental and 
intergovernmental coordination. In March and April Kissinger held a series of meetings 
with the NSC, Treasury Department, congressional leaders, and 38 African ambassadors 
to solicit input on a strategy. “There are two burning issues in Africa,” Liberia’s 
Ambassador to the US told Kissinger, “first of all independence and majority rule and 
second, economic development.” The Somali Ambassador also emphasized “liberation 
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on two scales” as the “two major ideas” animating the continent. Although Kissinger’s 
own motives and sympathies varied—while he told Ford of his “basic sympathy with the 
white Rhodesians,” he also recognized that “black Africa is absolutely united on this 
issue”324—his framing of the trip to African ambassadors was a clear repudiation of the 
Moynihan/neoconservative approach toward the South in general and Africa in particular: 
The relationship between the developed and developing nations (which is 
one of the crucial problems of our period) must find its reflection—and its 
solution—in Africa…. This cannot be done in an atmosphere of 
confrontation on either side. We are not going there in an attitude of 
confrontation, nor are we going there to tell Africans how to organize their 
internal affairs. We are going there… to see whether we can respond to the 
economic needs of Africa and the political aspirations for majority rule of 
the African peoples. 
 
Where just months prior Moynihan had identified African unity as a shameful enabler of 
anti-Semitism and authoritarianism, Kissinger now praised its central role in bringing 
about human rights and economic development. “We think that the future of Africa can 
best be achieved by Africans,” he repeated, “and for this we believe that African unity is 
essential.”325  
Kissinger emphasized this morally inflected vision of American foreign policy in 
his visits to African capitals. “President Ford has sent me to this continent to witness 
firsthand the aspirations of the peoples of Africa for national dignity, racial justice, and 
economic advance,” he told an audience in Liberia. “America’s own moral values 
summon us to this policy.”326 That policy, he explained in Zambia, now included “the 
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unequivocal commitment of the United States to human rights, as expressed in the 
principles of the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” and U.S. 
“support [for] self-determination, majority rule, equal rights, and human dignity for all 
the people of southern Africa—in the name of moral principle, international law, and 
world peace.”327 Privately Kissinger called human rights “sentimental nonsense,” but the 
speech reportedly brought Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda to tears. After decades of 
U.S. support for white rule, Kaunda remarked, “We could not believe this was a 
Secretary of State from Washington, D.C.”328 
Kissinger also insisted that the U.S. was ready to respond to the Third World’s 
multidimensional vision of rights, in which political independence and economic 
development went hand in hand. Like at the Seventh Special Session, he made sure that 
his own language—if not his actual intentions—matched those of his African 
counterparts. “I have come here to make clear that the United States associates itself with 
the two great aspirations of the independent nations of Africa,” Kissinger stated upon his 
arrival in Nairobi, “the aspiration to human dignity and racial equality and the aspiration 
to economic progress.”329 Thus, the U.S. would work with African governments, he 
insisted in Lusaka, “to help them achieve the economic progress which will give meaning 
to their political independence and dignity to their struggle for equality.” Kissinger then 
promised a series of new measures for African development in particular and Third 
World development in general, which he would reveal at the UNCTAD meeting in 
Nairobi. “This is the first time that an American Secretary of State… [has] come on such 
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a mission,” he emphasized, “reflecting the importance we attach to the economic 
development of southern Africa.”330 
 
UNCTAD IV, April-May 1976 
  
The idea of “liberation on two scales” was front and center when the delegates 
convened at the Kenyatta Centre, at the time Kenya’s tallest building, in late April 1976 
for UNCTAD IV. Over 500 journalists were in attendance as was UN Secretary General 
Kurt Waldheim. The significance of the conference’s location and timing—in addition to 
its temporal proximity to the CIEC talks, it was also the first UNCTAD meeting after the 
NIEO’s announcement—was something which Western delegates were compelled to 
acknowledge. “The achievement of political independence does not represent the end of 
the struggle,” Waldheim told the delegates at the beginning of the conference. “We are 
now engaged upon the achievement of economic decolonization, and upon the creation of 
a new international economic order.”331  
After the developed countries tried to reduce divergence on North-South matters 
at the Rambouillet summit, in February 1976 the Group of 77 met in the Philippines to 
strengthen their own common front before UNCTAD. Two contentious issues emerged 
from the Manila Declaration. First, the G-77 proposed an “integrated programme for 
commodities” that aimed to manage commodity price fluctuations through the use of a 
“Common Fund”—essentially a bank whose task would be to support prices by buying 
and selling a wide range of commodities centrally held in buffer stocks (hence, 
“integrated”). This was not a new proposal from developing countries—they had been 
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calling for a “comprehensive strategy,” including a “central fund to finance a number of 
international buffer stocks,” since UNCTAD II in 1968—but it was the first time that the 
Fund would be seriously discussed post-oil crisis and post-NIEO.332 Second, the G-77 
agreed that their growing debt burdens were not simply the result of high oil prices, as the 
U.S. and others had insisted. Rather, they viewed their debt problems as “springing from 
the system of international economic relations in which they were such unequal and 
disadvantaged partners.” The developing countries therefore called for an international 
debt conference to be held under UNCTAD’s aegis, so that debt could be dealt with 
comprehensively and with equal participation from debtors. Specifically, they argued for 
writing off the debts of the poorest “most seriously affected” (MSA) countries and 
waiving service payments on debts from other MSA’s until the UN lifted the 
appellation.333  
The developed countries—“Group B” in UNCTAD parlance—were by no means 
united on the issue of the Common Fund. The Netherlands and Norway endorsed the G-
77’s approach, which West Germany staunchly opposed. France supported the creation of 
individual commodity agreements, but suggested that “after a while the creation of a 
Central Fund [sic] may reveal itself as convenient.”334 All, however, recognized the 
consequences of a flat-out rejection of the Common Fund and Integrated Programme. At 
CIEC discussions in Paris the 19 developing countries warned that the conference would 
be jeopardized without “substantial results” at UNCTAD; similarly, UNCTAD Secretary 
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General Gamani Corea called negotiations in Nairobi “the first—and perhaps last—test to 
measure the validity of the entire concept of cooperation between producers and 
consumers in terms of commodities.”335  
Kissinger’s new policy on commodities was twofold. First, he accepted the G-
77’s argument that a “piecemeal approach” to commodities was inadequate and agreed 
that some “integrated commodities program was necessary.” But rather than rejecting the 
Common Fund—which, importantly, he never mentioned by name—Kissinger proposed 
his own “comprehensive approach,” the central element of which was an International 
Resources Bank (IRB) for commodity financing. The IRB approached commodity prices 
from a different angle: instead of financing the creation of buffer stocks, as the Common 
Fund proposed, the IRB would “mobilize capital for sound resource development 
projects” by issuing “commodity bonds” for private and public investors. Those bonds 
would in turn be supported by a $1 billion capitalization from OPEC and the developed 
countries and guarantees from the World Bank, with which the IRB would be associated. 
Kissinger did not rule out buffer stocks all together, but suggested that if they were 
necessary, they could fall under the IRB’s aegis.336 Kissinger did not expect to end 
developing countries’ support for the Common Fund, but he did hope that the IRB would 
at least demonstrate that the U.S. took seriously their concerns. The idea was to, as the 
New York Times put it, “[give] an inch to avoid going the mile.”337  
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While the Group B countries showed some flexibility on commodities, they were 
close to united in their opposition to the G-77’s proposals on debt. Although OPEC 
continued to deny responsibility for the sharp rise in the Third World debt, the numbers 
were hard to ignore: by 1976, just two years after the oil crisis, developing countries’ 
public debts had grown from $9 billion to $35 billion.338 It was also true that the volume 
of that debt was relatively concentrated: just ten oil-importing, or “NOPEC,” nations 
accounted for over 64% of developing countries’ public and publicly guaranteed debts.339 
Of course, for every debtor there was a lender, and overwhelmingly those lenders were 
New York, London, and Paris banks looking for higher returns than were available in 
developed country markets for the petrodollars they accumulated from OPEC during and 
after the 1973 shock.340 Again, Kissinger gave an inch, endorsing the idea of an 
“appropriate forum” to “examine problems of acute financing and debt service 
difficulties” but rejecting writing off existing debts or committing to any proposed 
guidelines. “The United States stands ready to help countries suffering acute debt 
services problems with measures appropriate to each country’s needs,” he told the 
conference, but “generalized rescheduling of debts is not the answer.”341 
Secretary-General Corea regretted the conference’s focus on the Common Fund, 
which, he recalled, “dominated the Conference in a manner that was quite without 
precedent.” His own hope was to gain “an acceptance, even if qualified, on the principle 
of a Fund,” so that progress could also be made on other, suddenly more urgent, 
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matters—namely, debt. The Fund came to overshadow debt and other commodity issues 
for several reasons, including an “air of militancy and a disposition to bring matters to a 
head” from developing countries and the fact that few developed countries had come to 
the conference with a definite position on it.342 The official Group B line eventually fell 
back to endorsing commodity price stabilization on a “case-by-case basis,” to which the 
G-77 reacted angrily. “Even a man on a galloping horse,” Ambassador Herbert Walker of 
Jamaica charged, “would see that there was no Common Fund there!”343 
Deadlock over the Common Fund required extending the conference for two 
additional days, during which time a deal was finally hammered out between a select 
group of G-77 and Group B leaders.344 In exchange for Group B formally endorsing the 
Integrated Programme for Commodities and agreeing to begin serious discussions in 
UNCTAD toward establishing a Common Fund, the Group of 77 agreed to refer 
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Kissinger’s counterproposal, the International Resource Bank, to the “permanent 
machinery of UNCTAD for further study.”345 Both of these decisions were reflected in 
formal resolutions at the end of the conference. 
Corea saw a silver lining in UNCTAD IV’s results. “Despite the tension that 
marked its adoption,” he remarked, 
the resolution on the Integrated Program for Commodities marks a 
milestone in the history of international commodity policy and of 
UNCTAD. It signifies the acceptance by the international community of 
an approach to commodity policy that the developing countries and the 
Secretariat had been championing ever since the Second Session of 
UNCTAD. 
 
Although what the developed countries would make of their promise to negotiate a 
Common Fund remained unanswerable, “for the first time, a comprehensive and 
interrelated framework” for dealing with commodity price fluctuations had been 
established. This was meaningful for two reasons. The resolution’s adoption was indeed a 
“reflection of the climate of the times, the new atmosphere created by the goal of a New 
International Economic Order, the change in international economic relations following 
the rise of oil prices, the sense of leverage among the developing countries, and the desire 
of the developed countries for co-operation in North-South relations.”346 In other words, 
Third World advocacy and solidarity since the oil crisis had not been for nothing. But the 
Integrated Programme resolution—and the binding negotiations it promised—also 
marked a culmination of UNCTAD’s efforts since its founding to be more than just an 
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ideas generator and debating forum.347 “Resolution 93(IV) amply fulfilled this goal,” 
Corea maintained, making it a “matter for deep satisfaction.”348 
The same could not be said for debt, about which Corea was “quite frankly… 
disappointed.”349 Although forced to commit to something resembling a Common Fund, 
Group B countries appreciated the consequent lack of focus on debt. “The resolution of 
the confrontation over the common fund combined with Conference schedule pressure, 
resulted in an agreement on LDC debt problems which was far less forthcoming than we 
had anticipated,” lead U.S. negotiator Charles Robinson wrote to Kissinger. The G-77 did 
secure Group B acceptance of a special meeting on debt within UNCTAD, which during 
the Carter Administration led to the cancellation of some of the poorest countries’ debts. 
But this committed the U.S. to nothing beyond the old “case-by-case” policy it had going 
in. “I believe this to be a most favorable result,” Robinson stated, “particularly given the 
determination of the LDCs to achieve a more meaningful concession.”350  
Nor, for that matter, did U.S. officials see themselves as all that committed to the 
Common Fund. From Robinson’s perspective, all that the U.S. delegation had promised 
was that it would attend more meetings: 
Largely as a result of U.S. efforts we finally negotiated a proposed 
resolution which provided for tentative steps toward the common fund and 
individual commodity agreements. However, in these negotiations I 
insisted that all negotiations on commodities or a common fund be 
preceded by a series of preliminary meetings for prior consideration of the 
objectives and modalities. Furthermore, I insisted upon wording which 
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allowed any nation to decide whether or not it could support the agreed 
objective and modalities, and thus, whether or not it would elect to 
participate in the subsequent negotiation. I was even able to gain G–
77 acceptance of a statement in the resolution that there were differences 
of views as to such objectives and modalities. Therefore, I believe that this 
solution did not in any way conflict with basic U.S. principles.  
 
The U.S. had no more committed to establishing a Common Fund on the G-77’s terms, 
Robinson was saying, than the G-77 had agreed to dropping the Fund and adopting the 
International Resources Bank—the resolution for which several G-77 countries had, to 
the Americans’ chagrin, voted against in the final count. Although the U.S. would attend 
the Common Fund meetings, every effort would be made to “bring increasing pressure on 
the G-77 with the objective of gaining support for the IRB,” including in the preparatory 
meetings themselves. 351 Nor was the IRB the Common Fund competitor it had been 
presented as. “The IRB was called a ‘bank’ only to give it more sex appeal with the 
LDCs,” Robinson explained a few months later, “and we agree that we should avoid [the] 
establishment of a new international bureaucracy.”352 With all of this in mind, then, the 
American chief delegate could declare the conference a “reasonable success.” The U.S. 
had set out to prevent the “complete collapse” of the conference, and with it the CIEC—
in other words, it had tried to buy time—and in this it had succeeded.353 
 
Conclusion 
    
In June 1980—exactly four years after the United States and other Group B 
countries accepted the G-77’s Integrated Programme for Commodities and committed 
themselves toward its realization—the participating developed and developing countries 
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signed the final agreement to establish the Common Fund. There were, of course, 
limitations, the most obvious of which was the Fund’s limited capital base—down to 
$400 million for its “First Window” instead of the hoped for $6 billion—which 
diminished its ability to stabilize prices through stockpiling.354 Still, for Gamani Corea, 
who shepherded the Fund’s “long and arduous” negotiation in UNCTAD, “Two facts, 
both highly positive, stand out”: 
First, an agreement was eventually reached to establish, subject to 
ratification procedures, a Common Fund with agreed objectives, capital 
structure, and modes of operation. Second, the agreement was arrived at 
on the basis of a consensus that embraced all the country groups in 
UNCTAD. Such an outcome was, on any reckoning, an outstanding 
achievement. 
 
Considering developed countries’ hard, and after Nairobi, soft opposition to creating the 
Fund; divisions over the Fund’s objectives, importance, and financing within the G-77 
itself; the non-attitude of the Communist Bloc toward the Fund and similar commodity 
initiatives; and, no less crucially, OPEC’s failure to deliver on its promises of massive 
diplomatic and economic support, the Fund’s very existence was indeed an 
achievement.355 
The Common Fund was expected to begin operations no more than two years 
later, but a more urgent issue quickly and dramatically transformed the priorities of North 
and South alike. In August 1982, eleven months after 22 world leaders met in Cancun to 
try to revive what had become a stale and stalled North-South dialogue, Mexico’s finance 
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minister announced that his country was no longer able to service its debt.356 Sensing a 
continent-wide crisis, commercial banks in New York, London, and Paris abruptly halted 
their lending to Latin America and demanded payment on existing short-term loans.357 
The result was a dramatic loss of income, wages, and GNP across the South and in Latin 
America and Africa in particular, the effects of which would make the 1980s “a lost 
decade of development for most of the developing world.”358 
“Regrettably, in the light of the crisis of later years,” Corea reflected, 
“UNCTAD’s lone and prophetic warnings [at UNCTAD IV] on the emerging debt 
situation were ignored by all sides—by developed and developing countries alike.”359 
This assessment is incomplete. In fact, as soon as the Nairobi negotiations concluded in 
May 1976, debt competed with indexation as the top issue for the 19 developing 
countries at the re-opening of the CIEC. “[Former UNCTAD Secretary-General and 
CIEC Co-Chair] [Manuel] Pérez-Guerrero and other G-19 delegates said that the G-19 
now views G-8 acceptance of its demands on these two issues as important tests of our 
‘political will’ in CIEC,” the State Department explained in July, “and that without a 
satisfactory solution the commissions cannot begin their substantive work in 
September.”360 The discussions continued into December but without any meaningful 
progress, and in a General Assembly resolution that month developing countries’ 
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registered their “profound concern at the adverse effect which the failure of the 
conference will have on international economic co-operation.”361 
There was one more reason why the G-19 wanted to postpone discussions: the 
1976 U.S. presidential elections.362 The North-South dialogue per se was not a major 
issue in either the primaries or the general election, but American policy toward the Third 
World certainly was. On the conservative right Ronald Reagan blasted incumbent Gerald 
Ford over his administration’s—really, Kissinger’s State Department’s—efforts to 
renegotiate the Panama Canal treaties. “We built it, we paid for it, it’s ours, and we’re 
going to keep it!” Reagan exclaimed during the Florida Republican primary. In 1975 
neoconservatives, still committed to retaining their influence in the Democratic Party, 
once again rallied around Henry “Scoop” Jackson as their candidate. Coalition for a 
Democratic Majority members Ben Wattenberg and Elliott Abrams ran Jackson’s 
campaign, while the rest of the CDM “did all it could to support him without crossing the 
legal line of open endorsement.” After Jackson’s defeat by the little-known Georgia 
Governor Jimmy Carter, the CDM focused their efforts on rewriting the Democratic 
Party convention platform. “Moynihan, who had just joined the CDM,” Vaisse writes, 
“worked with Wattenberg…. to achieve a moderate platform that would not yield on 
foreign policy issues to pro-Third World leftists… The platform contained no hint of 
American guilt or apology and no mention of moral equivalence.”363  
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Neoconservatives claimed to have seen Carter as a blank slate in 1976 and were 
surprised at his foreign policy positions after the nomination.364 In fact, in the general 
election Carter endorsed several of the neoconservatives’ key themes, such as suspicion 
of détente and support for the human rights of Eastern Bloc dissidents. Carter also 
adopted the neoconservatives’ moralistic language, but his usage suggested an 
interpretation drawn much more from the Party’s new social egalitarianism and world 
order liberalism than from the views of the “right wing Democrats” that had written the 
convention platform. Like Moynihan before him, Carter attacked the Ford 
Administration’s actions during the 1974 World Food Conference. But while Moynihan 
accused the Administration of doing too much to placate the Third World, Carter said it 
had done too little. Instead of being the “arms merchant of the word,” Carter insisted 
during the televised foreign policy debate with Ford in October, America’s “strength 
derive[s] from doing what's right—caring for the poor, providing food, becoming the 
breadbasket of the world.”365  
The neoconservatives should not have been too surprised. As the next chapter 
explains, Carter’s vision in 1976-77 was exactly the one promoted by the prophets of 
world order liberalism at the Trilateral Commission, who had been advising him on 
foreign policy since he began attending Commission meetings in 1974. They were joined 
in the campaign—and after Carter was elected, the Administration—by a number of 
economists, academics, and former foreign policy officials from the Overseas 
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Development Council, the first U.S. think tank devoted entirely to the study and 
advocacy of international development. These groups’ largely shared view of an 
“interdependent” world being shaped chiefly by engagement between the “trilateral” 
countries of the North—the U.S., Western Europe, and Japan—and the developing South 
dominated the interpretation and implementation of Carter’s main foreign policy 
initiatives, especially toward the Third World.  
Their overall approach to North-South policy—a renewed emphasis on “trilateral” 
cooperation with Western Europe and Japan; concessions on trade and increased foreign 
aid to developing countries; and the resolution of “symbolic” global issues like apartheid 
and the Panama Canal—was not substantially different from Kissinger’s after the 
Seventh Special Session.366 But the decision to make human rights a serious 
consideration in the making of U.S. foreign policy—to at last define the political, 
economic, and strategic roles and limits of human rights—produced major distinctions 
that would open up new possibilities in the North-South dialogue while closing off older 
ones. As we will see in Chapter 5, humanitarian goals such as access to food, shelter, 
health care, and other “basic human needs” were elevated, while action on global 
structural issues like the Common Fund and debt repayment were not. Those decisions 
would have profound consequences for the course of international development, finance, 
and trade in the 1980s, during which UNCTAD’s “lone and prophetic warnings” about a 
looming crisis would come to fruition. 
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When Governor Jimmy Carter announced his candidacy for the Democratic 
nomination for President at the end of 1974, even the leading newspaper in his home state 
of Georgia couldn’t resist poking fun at his chances: “Jimmy Who is Running for 
What!?,” its headline read the next day.367 Six months later, Carter’s name recognition 
registered at 2% nationally.368 Nevertheless, absent any clear front-runner, the one-term 
governor and born-again Christian played up his “outsider” status to defeat well-known 
Democrats like California Governor Jerry Brown and Senators Frank Church and Henry 
Jackson for the nomination. 
Carter continued to play the role of Washington outsider in the general election, 
running as a reformer against unelected insider Gerald Ford. He persistently associated 
Ford with the network of corruption surrounding Richard Nixon, and Ford’s pardon of his 
predecessor shortly after taking office provided Carter with a powerful symbol. 
Throughout 1976 Carter directed his attacks at the “Nixon-Kissinger-Ford” style of 
foreign policy, which, he explained, meant neglecting allies in Western Europe and 
Japan, selling out human rights in the Soviet Union for détente, and failing to engage the 
developing countries in a cooperative and mutually productive dialogue. More potent 
were the moral charges. The “Nixon-Kissinger-Ford” moniker deliberately placed the 
Secretary of State in the middle: “The President is not really in charge,” Carter’s talking 
points for an October debate read. “Our policies are Kissinger’s ideas and his goals, 
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which are often derived in secret.” This “covert, manipulative, and deceptive” foreign 
policy ran “against the basic principles of this country, because Kissinger is obsessed 
with power blocs, with spheres of influence.”369 Rather than secretly aiding Nixon-
Kissinger-Ford’s “friendly dictators,” Carter promised instead “a government that is as 
honest and decent and fair and competent and truthful and idealistic as are the American 
people.”370 
Carter indeed began his campaign as an outsider in all senses. Unlike his 
competition, he grew up on a farm in a small, segregated town; he did not attend an Ivy 
League college or law school; he had spent relatively little time in Washington; and, most 
of all, he lacked fluency in the politics, history, and vocabulary of foreign policy that his 
more experienced rivals had picked up through decades of experience in the Capitol. The 
Ford campaign and many in the press frequently cited his inexperience in national and 
foreign affairs and called his emphasis on morality in foreign policy naïve, even 
dangerous. 
Carter’s ambitious and righteous rhetoric surely contrasted with the carefulness 
and occasional dark humor that Kissinger normally fed to the press, but under the surface 
was a set of policies informed by some of the very best and brightest of the liberal 
internationalist establishment. This chapter focuses on two influential foreign policy 
networks, the Trilateral Commission and the Overseas Development Council, which 
together provided Carter with a coherent, if abridged, education in foreign affairs during 
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the campaign (as well as dozens of highly educated and experienced staff for his 
Administration).  
Both of these groups were formed in reaction to aspects of Nixon’s foreign policy, 
which they thought inadequate to deal with the increasing challenges of economic and 
political interdependence. Both were also transformed by the twin events of 1973-74—
the first oil crisis and the campaign for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). To 
them, these events globalized the challenges of interdependence and demanded new and 
comprehensive global solutions for the poverty they believed was destabilizing and 
radicalizing the South. During the Carter Administration, their policies were supposed to 
transform both the North-South dialogue and America’s relationship with the Third 
World. As we will see, their gains were uneven, as Carter officials proved unable to 
translate progress on human rights, the Panama Canal, and foreign aid into moderation on 
the NIEO and other global economic issues.  
 
Carter, Interdependence, and the Trilateral Commission 
 
The most central concept to Carter’s foreign policy before and during his 
presidency was interdependence. In its initial and most basic meaning, interdependence 
referred to the interaction between traditional security objectives (especially in Europe) 
and foreign economic policy. The term gained currency within the study of international 
relations with the publication in 1968 of a book by Richard N. Cooper, who later served 
as one of Carter’s main foreign policy advisors. Cooper was concerned about the growing 
divide in transatlantic relations during the 1960s, as the Johnson Administration shifted 
attention and resources toward Southeast Asia and away from Western Europe.  He 
identified economic disagreements between the industrial countries—the U.S. and Japan 
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on textiles, the U.S. and European Community on agriculture, France and Germany on 
monetary policy—as the greatest threat to the Western alliance, an essential pillar of 
world stability that successive American administrations had taken for granted during 
two decades of economic growth and political consensus.371 
By the early 1970s most of the foreign policy establishment accepted 
interdependence as a useful conceptual device, though its precise meaning varied. In 
1969 President Nixon suggested to the United Nations that interdependence meant 
greater burden sharing on defense—a jab at the “free-riding” Europeans who refused to 
back the U.S. war in Vietnam.372 By 1973 Nixon’s thinking was closer to Cooper’s. In 
September Nixon voiced “[concern] about the foreign policy repercussions” of America’s 
agricultural policy, particularly with Europe but also with the developing countries.373 
Transatlantic relations had been neglected by Nixon-Kissinger initiatives in pursuit of 
détente with the Soviet Union, normalization with China, and peace with North Vietnam, 
and in early 1973 Kissinger set out to renew that partnership. In his “Year of Europe” 
speech Kissinger kept his references to interdependence mostly within the Atlantic 
framework, suggesting that a “new Atlantic Charter” would renew the alliance and 
promise global stability. But the growing energy crisis in late 1973 and NIEO declaration 
in May 1974 pushed Kissinger to acknowledge a “new age of interdependence,” in 
which, he told the UN General Assembly in September, “inflation and the threat of global 
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decline hang over the economies of rich and poor alike.”374 By the time Carter launched 
his campaign for the Democratic nomination, it was not just the U.S. and Europe who 
were interdependent. Both developed and developing countries now spoke of a world that 
was interdependent in a newly profound way between rich and poor, North and South. 
Before Nixon and Kissinger pivoted back to the West, a network of transatlantic 
elites from business, academia, and government organized around the idea of reasserting 
U.S.-European-Japanese cooperation in global affairs. The Trilateral Commission was 
launched in 1972 as an initiative of David Rockefeller, then CEO of Chase Manhattan 
and Chairman of the influential foreign policy organization, the Council on Foreign 
Relations. Like other establishment internationalists, Rockefeller was a staunch 
Atlanticist concerned with the effects of Nixon’s foreign economic policy on the 
“trilateral” alliance of the U.S., Western Europe, and Japan. David’s brother Nelson, a 
former governor of New York, was a longtime patron of Henry Kissinger, whom he 
valued as a brilliant scholar with fresh views on maintaining transatlantic relations. 
However, David Rockefeller was disturbed by Nixon’s willingness to dismantle the 
Bretton Woods system, impose economic controls, and introduce tariffs without 
consulting other trilateral leaders. Kissinger’s well-known aversion to international 
economics—his overwhelming focus in academia and government had been on 
security—and preoccupation with Southeast Asia and China did not suggest a sudden 
change in priorities. Thus, two years before finance ministers from the U.S., Britain, 
Germany, France, and Japan began informal “Library Group” discussions at the White 
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House—the precursor to the formal G-7 summits between trilateral heads of state—
Rockefeller institutionalized his own forum bringing together trilateral elites to confront 
the “growing interdependence” of their countries’ economic and foreign policies.  
To help with the project, David Rockefeller selected a young Columbia 
University professor and noted Sovietologist, Zbigniew Brzezinski. Like Kissinger, 
Brzezinski was a brilliant immigrant from Europe who believed that his adopted country 
had a special role to play in ensuring global stability. Both were also deeply affected as 
young men by witnessing the rise of the Nazi Party: Kissinger as a middle class Jew in a 
small town in Bavaria, Brzezinski as the son of a prominent Polish diplomat posted in 
Berlin. After receiving his undergraduate degree at McGill University in Montreal, 
Brzezinski moved to Harvard for his Ph.D., then to Columbia in 1961 where he led their 
new Institute for Communist Affairs. At this time Brzezinski joined the Council on 
Foreign Relations, where he and Kissinger became friendly rivals.375 
In 1970 Brzezinski entered the interdependence debate with the publication of 
Between Two Ages: America’s Role in the Technetronic Era. Its focus on new 
transnational forces changing the parameters of states’ economic and political autonomy 
fit with the conclusions of other scholars writing on interdependence, such as Cooper, 
Charles Kindleberger, and Raymond Vernon, though it also contained a great deal of 
futurist speculation bordering on eugenics that Brzezinski soon dropped; the book was 
out of print by 1976. What caught David Rockefeller’s attention was a section on a 
developing “planetary consciousness” among transnational elites. Because of the U.S.’s 
strength, Brzezinski argued, rivals (friendly or otherwise) will unite in blocs to challenge 
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America from a position of collective strength. Europe was already doing it, but current 
American foreign policy threatened the orientation of the elites behind the project, who 
might continue with the kind of regionalism and economic nationalism that leads to a 
world of closed economies, technologies, and societies. Still, Brzezinski expected that 
with U.S. leadership, a new class of “transnational elites… highly internationalist or 
globalist in spirit and outlook” would form a genuine and self-conscious “community of 
the developed nations” to manage collectively the challenges of global economic and 
technological transformation.376 
The Trilateral Commission began operations in 1972 with the explicit intention of 
fostering that community. “The more Atlanticist part of the American foreign policy 
community” behind the Commission, Foreign Affairs noted, believed that “the relative 
balance of economic strengths had so changed [under Nixon] that the United States could 
no longer play the role of [sole] economic leader.”377 Such pro-Altanticists who joined 
included future Carter campaign advisors and Administration officials Richard Cooper, 
Fred Bergsten, Henry Owen, Gerard Smith, Richard Gardner, Cyrus Vance, Harold 
Brown, and of course Brzezinski, the Commission’s first Executive Director; many other 
future Carter officials, such as Robert Bowie and Samuel Huntington, contributed to 
Commission reports. 
For the Commission at its founding, managing interdependence was an 
overwhelmingly Northern problem and responsibility. “Persons from other nations,” 
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members agreed in July 1972, would only be “brought into the work of the Commission 
at appropriate times.” In these early meetings some talked about new Marshall Plans and 
Monnet Plans for the trilateral countries, and even “a new ‘conception’ of the 
international order as fresh as that once posited by Keynes.”378 The reference to Keynes 
and Bretton Woods was apt: as in 1944, few of the representatives considered what that 
order would mean for the developing countries, and none spoke of the developing 
countries’ participation in shaping this “new ‘conception.’” 
This changed in 1973. Just as it had done with Kissinger, the oil shock and NIEO 
(and subsequent “unholy alliance” of the developing countries and OPEC) transformed 
the priorities of the Trilateral Commission. “There are critical turning points in history 
when the lives and fortunes of large numbers of human beings hang upon the decisions 
by a small handful of national leaders,” Richard Gardner wrote in July 1974, in the 
Commission’s third report. 
The oil embargo—the fourfold increase in fertilizer prices—the higher 
costs and severe shortages of food and fertilizer—the unprecedented 
concurrence of acute inflation and recession across the industrialized 
world—these events have gravely strained the fabric of international 
economic relations. In particular, they have detonated an explosion in 
North-South economic relations that has been building up for years… In 
short, they have raised the most troubling questions about the world’s 
ability to manage its interdependence through peaceful international 
cooperation.379 
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Over the next two years, eight of the first 12 reports of the Commission’s “task forces” 
reported on North-South issues, including energy, commodities, trade, finance, 
international institutions, and Law of the Sea negotiations. 
Despite some fresh ideas, the task forces’ rhetoric largely matched that of 
Kissinger’s. They recognized the need for a “general restructuring of North-South 
relations” including a mutual recognition of interdependence, “cooperation instead of 
confrontation,” and “burden-sharing between the Trilateral world and the OPEC 
countries.” Though their concern for development may have been less cynical than 
Kissinger’s, their solutions were fairly similar, if more ambitious. The first North-South 
report focused on the most immediate effects of the oil crisis in the developing world, 
namely, the “some thirty low-income countries of the ‘Fourth World’ who have been 
particularly hard hit by skyrocketing costs of oil, food, fertilizer and industrial goods.” In 
particular, the Commission recommended “an extraordinary act of cooperation” between 
the trilateral countries and OPEC, in which both would contribute $1.5 billion to a special 
action fund to meet the emergency needs of the resource-poor Fourth World in 1974-
75.380 
The Commission’s multipurpose, multilateral development fund did not happen. 
Instead, at the World Food Conference in November 1974, Kissinger called OPEC’s bluff 
on their concern for oil-importing developing countries. Together they negotiated a 
significantly more limited and less-capitalized fund, the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development. The IFAD would not come into existence until 1977, after the 
worst effects of the immediate crisis had passed (in part due to the UN’s Emergency 
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Fund, approved by the General Assembly during the Sixth Special Session announcing 
the NIEO). Thus, in a follow-up report, also written by Gardner, the Commission directed 
attention to “the problem of North-South development beyond the emergency period,” 
that is, 1976-80, the next president’s term. The “much more formidable” problem was 
how to increase Official Development Aid by $6 billion a year, per the recommendations 
of World Bank Governor Robert McNamara. More formidable indeed, since, the report 
pointed out, from 1963-73 OECD citizens’ real incomes grew by 60%, while the real 
value of OECD aid declined by 7%. Aid from the trilateral countries was getting smaller 
during times of plenty; there was even less appetite for more aid in a time of scarcity and 
uncertainty. As Kissinger had argued to Ford’s economic advisors when they opposed his 
initiatives at the World Food Conference, the report concluded that only increases in real 
aid levels would give the trilateral countries “any credibility in aid discussions with 
OPEC members.”381 But even if the $3 billion could be raised in the North, OPEC was 
not likely to match it. The World Bank estimated the combined GNP of OPEC countries 
(excluding Nigeria and Indonesia) for 1980 at just 6% of the combined GNP of the 
trilateral countries. Under any formula, relative to ODA-to-GNP levels in the North, 
OPEC was already doing more than its share.382 
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The Commission’s solution was “another major act of cooperation between the 
Trilateral countries and the OPEC countries” for long-term development financing. By 
1975 Kissinger had largely abandoned this course, choosing instead to focus on 
outmaneuvering the G-77 at their preferred forums—the UN Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) and the upcoming Conference for International Economic 
Cooperation (CIEC)—but the prophets of interdependence at the Commission remained 
optimistic. Their “wholly new approach” involved recycling OPEC’s financial surplus, 
sitting in New York, London, and Paris commercial banks, through a “Third Window” 
facility in the World Bank that would lend on terms in between its regular lending 
operations (the Bank’s “First Window”) and those of the International Development 
Association (the “Second Window”). Basically, the Third Window’s managers in the 
World Bank would borrow the estimated $3 billion from OPEC at 8% interest and it lend 
it to the Fourth World at 3%; the $3 billion would be raised by bonds in OPEC 
governments and Trilateral capital markets where OPEC funds were held.383 The World 
Bank did take up the idea and established the Third Window facility in 1975. It began 
operations once sufficient funds were received from the Netherlands, Canada, Britain, 
and France in the North, and Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Venezuela in the South, but the 
Ford Administration declined to contribute. By 1977 it appeared not to be lending at 
all.384 
This substantial but low-key focus on technical issues of finance in U.S.-
dominated institutions, rather than confronting the South head on at the UN and CIEC, 
                                                     
383 Ibid, 13-14. 
384 A. van de Laar, The World Bank and the Poor, Institute of Social Studies Series on the Development of 
Societies, Vol. 6  (Boston, The Hague, London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishing, 1980), 30-1.  
182 
 
matched the recommendations of other Commission task forces. A report on the reform 
of international institutions, authored by future Carter Assistant Treasury Secretary C. 
Fred Bergsten, advocated this approach for the IMF and GATT. International economic 
upheaval, the report began, had brought a “renewed emphasis throughout the world on 
national sovereignty” in especially the South but also the North. Reducing this tension—
“between the imperatives of interdependence and the quest to retain adequate degrees of 
national autonomy”—required committing more political and economic resources to 
institutions that, while multilateral, were also weighted toward U.S. thinking. Bergsten 
advised: 
Politicization of issues is better avoided in functionally specific 
institutions [like the IMF and GATT] simply because of the consensus that 
such institutions are the best, perhaps only, places where serious business 
could be done. The same countries which will indulge in fanciful rhetoric 
in a broad, multipurpose organization (such as various UN agencies) will 
often be negotiating seriously and cooperatively in another organization 
(such as GATT) on the same issue at the very same time. The more 
technical focus, and lesser public awareness, of such organizations 
promotes such a result.385 
 
The UN had a “quite different role to play,” that of “legitimizing broad concepts” about 
international economic reform and arrangements. In other words, the General Assembly 
could call for a New International Economic Order, but it would not be allowed to 
legislate one. Only by downgrading key global forums operating as a “Committee of the 
Whole” (like the UNGA and UNCTAD) and focusing resources on Northern-dominated 
multilateral institutions and arrangements (like the IMF and GATT), could the trilateral 
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countries meet the Commission’s ambitious task: “to make the world safe for 
interdependence.”386  
It is unlikely that the technical details of commodity agreements and petrodollar 
recycling contained in these and other Commission reports would have been of great 
interest to Governor Carter. However, the Commission was interested in him. “We 
wanted a forward-looking Democratic governor who would be congenial to the trilateral 
perspective,” Brzezinski explained, and he invited Carter to an early meeting. Both left 
impressed. “I became an eager student,” Carter recalled, “and took full advantage of what 
Brzezinski had to offer…. We got to know each other well.”387 Brzezinski remembered 
discussing Carter’s membership with Gerard Smith and George Franklin, the 
Commission’s Secretary for North America. Carter’s interest in expanding trade between 
the state of Georgia and the Common Market, as well as his reputation as “courageous on 
civil rights and reportedly a bright and upcoming Democrat,” made Carter an attractive 
candidate for membership. “Well, he’s obviously our man,” Brzezinski told Franklin, and 
Carter accepted their offer.388  
Brzezinski became the single most important influence on candidate and President 
Carter’s foreign policy. His intellect and ability to “express complicated ideas simply,” 
especially the “broad historical trends affecting the industrialized nations,” helped Carter 
understand and speak about interdependence in a way that distinguished him from 
Kissinger, whose own strategy emphasized short-term measures to diffuse conflict with 
OPEC over long-term North-South collaboration.389 “What we would be saying [to 
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OPEC],” Kissinger explained his strategy for the World Food Conference, “is that if you 
cooperate [on oil], we won't have to talk about food.”390  
After Carter declared his candidacy for the Presidency, Brzezinski reached out to 
offer him advice, and Carter accepted.391 While still directing the Commission, 
Brzezinski worked as Carter’s main foreign policy advisor and speechwriter throughout 
the Democratic primaries and then the race against Ford. During the campaign, Carter 
recalled, “I would study [Brzezinski’s] position papers on foreign affairs in order to 
develop my answers to those questions all candidates had to face.” Brzezinski became “a 
frequent visitor to Plains” and accompanied Carter to his national security debate with 
President Ford.392  
Carter’s association with the Commission was also a powerful signal to the 
foreign policy establishment that the Georgia governor was to be taken seriously in 
foreign affairs. He accompanied Brzezinski to a Commission meeting in Kyoto in June 
1975, after which he asked Brzezinski to appear with him at an upcoming press 
conference with American newspapers. “I was a little surprised at the time,” Brzezinski 
said, “but concluded that he probably wanted to show the newspapermen that his 
candidacy was being taken seriously and that he could count on expert advice in the 
campaign.” Although as president he downplayed his association with the Commission, 
which became an obsession of the far right and far left for its “globalist” rhetoric and 
Wall Street connections, during the campaign Carter played up this connection to the 
press. “Service on the Trilateral Commission,” he insisted in a widely-publicized 1976 
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autobiography promoting his candidacy, “gave me an excellent opportunity to know 
national and international leaders in many fields of study concerning foreign affairs.”393 
The Commission association also gave Carter the credibility and support of its other 
prominent members. Men like Richard Cooper, Richard Gardner, and Fred Bergsten were 
widely recognized and respected in foreign policy circles for their scholarship on 
international economics and interdependence; it made sense to bring this brain trust into 
State, Treasury, and the NSC following the election. There, they could (and did) attempt 
to work out the recommendations they made in Commission reports in order to “make the 
world safe for interdependence,” with Brzezinski filling in the big picture. 
Brzezinski crafted the big picture’s frame in December 1975, when Carter asked 
him “to develop for me the outline of a basic speech/statement on foreign affairs… I 
agree with your order of priorities.” Brzezinski replied with three interrelated priorities, 
recommending that: 
(1) as the first priority a stable inner core for world affairs, based on closer 
collaboration among the advanced industrial democracies (open-ended 
trilateralism); (2) secondly, to shape on the above basis more stable North-
South relations, which means (i) more cooperation with the emerging 
Third World countries (the richer and more successful), through such 
devices as the tripartite Paris conferences,394 etc.; (ii) compassionate aid to 
the Fourth World, which the U.S. should grant as a matter of conscience as 
well as interest, but in which it ought to also engage other states on a 
multilateral basis; (3) thirdly, to promote détente with the Soviet Union 
and to court China. 
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These priorities matched the hierarchy developed by the Trilateral Commission during 
the 1973-74 crisis. Brzezinski placed the highest emphasis on trilateral cooperation; from 
that could come better North-South relations, which would require making some 
concessions, but which would also be different from the past. “Compassionate aid” would 
be directed toward the poorest countries with the worst humanitarian problems, while the 
U.S.’s standing in the North-South dialogue would be improved through cultivating 
bilateral ties with “the richer and more successful” developing countries, who had the 
greatest stake in preserving international economic stability. Since they were relatively 
stable and not as much of a threat to interdependence, U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Chinese 
relations were comparatively downgraded. “Détente, of course, is desirable but it ought to 
be more reciprocal,” Brzezinski concluded. “Moreover, since the element of rivalry 
remains a reality, it cannot be the basis for coping with global problems.”395 
Carter approved this “skeleton,” and Brzezinski and Richard Gardner went to 
work on a speech that Carter would deliver to the New York Foreign Policy Association 
on June 23, 1976, where Kissinger had spoken on North-South relations two months 
earlier. “The speech was Carter’s major statement on foreign policy,” Brzezinski wrote, 
“and it foreshadowed many of his actions and concerns as President.”396  
Aside from a few personal additions—against Brzezinski’s recommendation, 
Carter insisted on the phrase “’Lone Ranger’ foreign policy” to describe the “Nixon-
Ford” Administration; Brzezinski apologized for his opposition after a positive response 
from the press—the speech matched Brzezinski’s initial framework, progressing from 
trilateral relations, to North-South, to East-West. Carter also included the Commission’s 
                                                     




plans for OECD-OPEC cooperation on increased multilateral aid, as well as a “World 
Development Budget” inside the World Bank, which would become a feature of G-7 
discussions in his administration.397  
The reorientation of aid toward the poorest countries—“those in direct need”—
was also a feature of Brzezinski’s framework, but further elaboration of this idea came 
from elsewhere. The “basic human needs” approach to development was the contribution 
of another influential group advising Carter during his campaign, the Overseas 
Development Council (ODC). Emphasizing aid for food, shelter, and education 
channeled directly to the “bottom half” in developing countries allowed Carter to call for 
increased foreign aid while also providing a counter to public and Congressional criticism 
that U.S. aid rarely reached those for whom it was intended. As Carter was fond of 
saying, “I’m not in favor of taxing the poor people in our rich country to send money to 
the rich people in poor countries.”398 Basic human needs promised a multilateral solution 
that would avoid both politics in the donor country and rent-seeking in the recipient 
country; the reality, of course, was much more complicated. 
 
Carter, Basic Needs, and the Overseas Development Council 
 
The Overseas Development Council was founded in Washington in 1969 by 
James P. Grant, a former US Agency for International Development (USAID) 
administrator. Its founding mission was to increase support among the U.S. public and 
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Congress for more multilateral development aid, at a time when U.S. contributions were 
in steep decline. The ODC was well-connected with the liberal internationalist 
establishment: like the Trilateral Commission, it was supported by the Ford and 
Rockefeller Foundations, and counted David Rockefeller and a number of other notable 
internationalists as board members.399 
The ODC began its work at a hinge moment in international development. In 
1961 President Kennedy announced a “decade of development” at the UN, and new 
institutions like the UN Development Program, the Inter-American Development Bank, 
the Alliance for Progress, USAID, and the Peace Corps soon followed. These and other 
aid programs were informed by an intellectual paradigm, modernization theory, that 
prescribed an evolutionary path to liberal capitalism through investment in large 
infrastructure and industrial projects, importation of foreign technology and capital, and 
strengthening of the bureaucratic apparatus of the state, as well as the encouragement of 
Western cultural values, standards of behavior, and modes of thought. Countries would 
proceed through a set of “stages of development” toward a gradual withering away of 
economic controls, more and more varied economic activity, the creation of a consumer 
society, and full participation in the international economy. Equally important, its 
proponents in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations believed, modernization would 
prevent Third World societies—in the throes of a “revolution of rising expectations”—
from turning to communism, which promised its own accelerated path to 
industrialization. It mattered that the theory’s most important text, MIT economist and 
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Johnson advisor Walt Rostow’s The Stages of Growth, was subtitled An Anti-Communist 
Manifesto. 
Although this approach dominated thinking inside the World Bank and White 
House throughout the 1960s, it also had a critical Third World corollary—dependency 
theory. Dependency theorists did not reject modernization theory per se; the two shared 
more or less the same state-based model of growth. Their criticism focused on the West’s 
overemphasis on domestic factors of production and lack of appreciation for external (or 
“structural”) barriers to development, which, they held, rich countries created and 
maintained for their own benefit. Inspired by the writings of Argentine economist Raúl 
Prebsich and German economist Hans Singer, they saw an international economic 
system, or division of labor, rooted in centuries of unequal political relationships set 
against the interests of commodity producers (largely in the South) and for those of 
industrial producers (largely in the North). Their side of the “terms of trade” debate 
alleged a secular decline in the prices of commodities against rising prices for 
manufactured goods, meaning that as the industrial countries got richer (benefitting from 
cheap imported commodities) the developing countries got poorer (receiving less for their 
exports while prices for industrial imports increased). Third World development would 
never succeed, dependency theorists argued, until the rules of global trade and finance 
were renegotiated on an even playing field.  
Many elites in newly decolonized countries were attracted to dependency theory’s 
implicit anti-imperial message and emphasis on global structural barriers to development. 
Support for its basic tenets was widespread in governments across countries with wildly 
different capital endowments (some had oil, others had valuable minerals, still others, 
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nothing), labor forces (some had relatively high levels of education, while in others the 
majority could not read or write), and historical ties (some had endured hundreds of years 
of colonialism, others had remained independent). The leaders of these countries also 
spoke the language of dependency theory in the United Nations, where decolonization 
had changed the balance of the General Assembly and other UN forums. Dependency 
theory dominated the politics of the developing country’s UN caucus, the Group of 77, 
which argued on their behalf at UNCTAD (Prebsich was its founding Secretary General, 
serving from 1964-69).  
Dependency theory’s international agenda included various measures of reform to 
global trade and finance, ranging from support for commodity prices and debt 
forgiveness to increasing the economic decision-making powers of the UNGA. 
Domestically, many of the theory’s supporters urged Import Substitution Industrialization 
(ISI), essentially a more statist form of modernization theory, which promised reduced 
dependence on imported industrial goods through heavy state investment and high tariffs 
in select industries. It was expected that eventually those industries would become cost-
effective and internationally competitive, but as various ISI experiments (particularly in 
Latin America) would show, high government subsidies protected inefficient firms and 
other rent-seekers, accelerated inflation, and prompted excessive foreign borrowing to 
meet current account deficits.400 ISI was not uncritically supported by all dependency 
theorists; Prebisch himself warned against taking ISI too far, which he correctly 
                                                     




speculated would leave Latin American countries in massive debt.401 Nevertheless, in one 
form or another, modernization theory—in its Northern liberal or Southern statist 
variant—defined international development for most of the 1960s. 
By 1968, the core premise of modernization theory—that national economic 
growth would alleviate poverty, lessen inequality, and promote stability—was under 
attack from many sides, but especially in the North. Attitudes toward the aid programs 
that funded these efforts were one indicator: in the U.S., support for foreign aid remained 
consistently high in the first half of the decade, with well over half the country in favor; a 
few years later, that support, along with the U.S. foreign aid budget, had significantly 
declined.402 There are many explanations, including tight government budgets and 
inflation due to President Johnson’s War on Poverty and “bitch of a war” in Vietnam. 
Congress, frustrated with the failure of aid to produce foreign policy results, demanded 
cuts, and many Americans questioned, perhaps for the first time, whether “they” really 
wanted to be “just like us.” American forces in Vietnam were winning battles but not the 
war; their economic development and aid programs seemed capable of winning neither.  
Vietnam was an especially potent example of modernization theory’s weaknesses. 
Johnson Administration development programs, such as plans for a “TVA on the 
Mekong,” were taken straight out of Rostow’s playbook, promising to save Vietnam from 
communism in the way the New Deal once saved American capitalism from itself. Thus, 
when the most important non-military effort in America’s most expensive war failed, it 
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was, in one scholar’s words, “a body blow to the consensus on development.”403 Public 
disillusionment with aid was matched by scathing critiques from conservative economists 
like P. T. Bauer, who attacked modernization theory’s statist premises and susceptibility 
to corruption.404 Modernization’s unintended consequences for population and the 
environment produced additional critiques, with the “Green Revolution” in agriculture 
coming under particular fire. At the UN, developing countries united against the 
developed countries’ inattention to external barriers to development, amplifying their 
arguments in the General Assembly, UNCTAD, and the International Labor 
Organization. In the mainstream development community, there was a pervasive sense of 
crisis—in the words of development officials at a 1967 meeting, “a clear and present 
danger, an emergency,” and a “paralysis of leadership.”405 
Robert McNamara stepped into this paralysis at the World Bank in April 1968, 
two months after his painful resignation as Johnson’s Secretary of Defense. Surveying 
the hostility toward aid among the U.S. Congress and public, criticism and confusion in 
development circles, and a growing economic and political divide between developed and 
developing countries, McNamara concluded to the Bank’s Board of Governors that the 
will to provide aid “was never lower.”406  
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Two contrasting initiatives emerged during McNamara’s first year in office. One 
was the publication in 1969 of the Pearson Report, named for its chairman, former 
Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson. Shortly before McNamara joined the World 
Bank, his predecessor, George Woods, had called for a “grand assize” to assess just what 
had gone wrong under the Development Decade. The report acknowledged new 
problems—it recognized that growth had limits for a society’s overall welfare, and that 
developing countries faced certain external constraints to development—but offered no 
novel solutions.407 “The Pearson Report,” Business Week commented, “is neither very 
dramatic nor very fresh. Its primary recommendations are for a doubling of the amount of 
aid funneled through such multinational organizations as the World Bank, and for 
developed countries to boost their infusions of official and private capital to the 
developing lands to 1% of their Gross National Product by 1975.”408 
A second initiative came from outside the World Bank. Two years before the 
Pearson Report was published, concerned members of the U.S. foreign aid community 
proposed the formation of a “Development House” that would be formally independent 
from the U.S. government and international organizations.409 The Ford and Rockefeller 
Foundations took the lead in funding the new organization, soon incorporated in 
Washington, D.C. as the Overseas Development Council. The ODC board was filled with 
members of the “development establishment,” including former Tennessee Valley 
Authority administrator David Lilienthal, former World Bank President (1948-63) 
Eugene Black, former USAID Director David Bell, Harvard economist Edward Mason, 
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and David Rockefeller.410 Father Theodore Hesburgh, President of Notre Dame 
University, was the board’s first chairman until he left to serve as Carter’s ambassador to 
an important North-South event, the United Nations Conference on Science, Technology, 
and Development. James P. Grant, a high-ranking USAID administrator with extensive 
on-the-ground experience in China and Southeast Asia—his last job was leading AID’s 
failing programs in Vietnam—was President. 
“Authoritative, widely respected,” Hesburgh’s biographer writes, “the ODC was 
one of the most effective institutions in the United States as a source of information about 
Third World countries.” It used its status to critique the development consensus that, 
regardless of widespread acknowledgement of its failure, was being upheld by U.S. 
government and World Bank policies. McNamara “really believes that aid promotes 
economic growth which promotes stability, democracy, and good international behavior,” 
one critic of the Pearson Report observed. “None of the links can be proved.”411 Despite 
rapid economic growth in developing countries, by the end of the 1960s income 
inequality between North and South had only widened; despite large increases in food 
production from the Green Revolution, most developing countries were still highly 
vulnerable to price shocks. “If we are to develop a firm deterrent to anarchy and 
subversion in two-thirds of the world seized by the revolution of rising expectations,” 
Grant wrote in 1971, “something more fundamental than [US]AID is required.”412  
Grant and the ODC argued for a rethinking of development policy that looked 
beyond GDP figures, industrialization, and other measures of “modernization” and 
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towards more basic, people-oriented indicators like access to health care, education, 
shelter, and food. In doing so the ODC matched other efforts, at the time largely outside 
of the World Bank, beginning to push for a “basic human needs” (BHN) approach to 
development. Advocates believed that a BHN approach would not only benefit a larger 
share of the population than traditional development projects, but would also enable 
greater overall productivity by freeing individuals from the constraints of meeting their 
immediate social and economic needs. Sussex University’s Institute for Development 
Studies was one new group that debated the “meaning of development,” and it 
collaborated with the International Labor Organization (ILO) on a series of country 
reports from 1970-75 in which the BHN idea was further refined.413 The ILO project also 
included prominent development economists Amartya Sen, Dharam Ghai, and Hans 
Singer—one half of the “Singer-Prebisch” terms of trade hypothesis—and their 
recommendations became the basis for the ILO’s definition of BHN at the 1976 World 
Employment Conference in terms of food, clothing, housing, education, and public 
transportation.414  
The ODC did not singlehandedly invent basic human needs, but it did distinguish 
itself through its powerful network in American political, business, and academic circles. 
“[Grant] used his post at the ODC to cultivate ideas gaining credibility internationally,” 
Ekhbladh explains.415 The ODC enlisted support from a variety of critical development 
experts, promoting Barbara Ward’s essay “A ‘People’ Strategy of Development,” and 
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according to the World Bank the ODC “engineered” the collaboration between Edgar 
Owens and Robert Shaw, authors of the influential 1972 book, Development 
Reconsidered.416 “A major rethinking of development concepts is taking place,” Grant 
observed, “compelled by a single fact: the unparalled growth rates achieved by most 
developing countries during the 1960’s had little or no effect on most of the world’s 
people, who continue to live in desperate poverty.” By favoring large landowners, civil 
servants, and skilled industrial workers, he argued, the development process empowered 
interests with a disincentive for large-scale redistribution, while countries that had 
introduced massive welfare programs could no longer pay for them. A “new development 
strategy” would increase the poorest half of the population’s position in the development 
process, by supporting small farmers and entrepreneurs, making best use of scarce capital 
and technology, and ensuring the availability of basic education and health care.417 
The ODC also cultivated members of Congress like Minnesota liberal Donald 
Fraser, who participated in several ODC meetings in the early 1970s while serving as 
Chairman of the House Subcommittee on International Organizations.418 (Fraser’s wife 
later edited an ODC publication on women and basic needs.)419 With the ODC’s help, in 
1973 Fraser introduced the “New Directions” legislation for U.S. foreign aid.420 Also 
known as the “Basic Human Needs mandate,” the legislation intended to redirect aid 
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toward rural development, nutrition, family planning, health, and education. Though 
initially hailed as a “significant departure” from the 1960s development consensus, its 
long-term impact is less clear, with successive administrations (Carter included) dipping 
into BHN funds when bilateral aid was needed for security objectives.421 
Like the Trilateral Commission, the events of 1973-74 transformed the ODC’s 
conceptualization of development and interdependence. Both groups saw those years as, 
in the words of one ODC report, “A point in time when actual choices will shape the 
future of relations among states and peoples for years to come.422 In its first few years the 
ODC pressed for “people-based” development, but, in the absence of a global 
organizational framework, their recommendations mostly involved immediate changes to 
the administration of development policy within Northern governments and institutions. 
Its first Agenda for Action in 1973 “had as its central theme the growing interdependence 
of nations”; its second “evaluated the economic shocks of 1973-74—energy, food, and 
inflation—and foretold their tragic toll on… the ’Fourth World.’” The authors “urged 
[the developed] nations not to set aside long-term work on the root problem of human 
poverty” in the face of mounting economic difficulties at home and “outlined a series of 
measures to repair the damage done by the economic crises of the moment.”423 
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When the ODC published its 1975 Agenda, the evolving North-South dialogue 
had already transformed the stakes of the crisis and the possibilities for action. “It is only 
within the past 18 months [since the NIEO’s announcement],” Grant and Hesburgh 
explained, “that a new search for economic equality has opened in earnest.” With 
economic prospects in the North worsening and confrontation with the South increasing, 
“The world [was] on the verge of one of the great economic, social, and political 
discontinuities in history… it is as if the molecular structure of the world order were 
changing.” In contrast to its first two reports, the “greatly intensified efforts of the nations 
of the South to secure more equality” demanded a rethinking of interdependence that 
“includes, but goes beyond [its] immediate consequences”: 
Interdependence among nations is evolving to the point where the salient 
factor in our relations with developing countries should no longer be 
premised on paternalistically helping them with ‘their problem’ of 
underdevelopment. Now the dependence of each nation on jointly 
managed international systems is so great that their lack of development 
frequently becomes our problem—just as our waste, pollution, and 
deepening recession often become their problem. Increasingly their 
problems and our problems are becoming common problems that can 
afflict the whole world and that can best be treated by joint action. 
 
In other words, interdependence could not be managed by the trilateral countries alone; 
the South’s challenge, and the global inequalities motivating it, required a serious and 
sustained joint response. Implementing a strategy of basic human needs would have to 
proceed together with North-South collaboration to redesign international institutions and 
agreements, “with such ingenuity that all parties gain.” The “too frequent U.S. view of 
that challenge as a ‘zero-sum game,’” Grant and Hesburgh wrote, “must be laid aside in 
favor of a broader vision.”424 
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During these crucial years for international development, the ODC expanded its 
ties to the Democratic Party, particularly to the new chairman of its 1974 Congressional 
and Gubernatorial Campaign Committee, Governor Jimmy Carter. At Carter’s request, 
Georgia lawyer Stuart Eizenstat (later Carter’s Chief Domestic Policy Advisor) compiled 
a list of position papers critical of Nixon for use in the 1974 midterms. “I collected a 
small file cart box-full of names of people like Brzezinski and Henry Owen and people 
that later came into the administration who agreed to do papers for us,” Eizenstat 
recalled.425 In addition to supplying papers from him and other Trilateral Commission 
members, following the NIEO’s announcement in May Owen reached out to the ODC’s 
Jim Howe, lead author of the annual Agenda series, for a lengthy report for Carter on 
current U.S. development policy.426 By the time Carter announced that he was seeking 
the Democratic nomination for president, he had already developed a close friendship 
with the ODC’s Father Hesburgh. Shortly after, Hesburgh sent Carter his correspondence 
with President Ford regarding U.S. policy at the 1974 World Food Conference.427  
Not surprisingly, the charismatic clergyman exerted a pronounced influence on 
Carter, and arguably, the country. Probably the most visible American theologian of the 
1970s, Hesburgh was also the ODC’s “political executive,” giving speeches, writing 
articles, and going on television to explain the stakes and scope of global economic 
inequality. Hesburgh translated the ODC’s policy objectives into a moral language that 
Americans could understand and relate to, while also inspiring them to demand action 
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from their representatives. When asked on the “Today Show” why Americans should 
give aid to poor countries, he replied simply, “[We] ought to do it because it’s the right 
thing to do. It’s being human; it’s being Christian… [It’s] doing the kind of thing that 
human beings ought to do, being compassionate toward one another.” Contrasting the 
South’s food crisis with the North’s energy crisis, he said in another well-publicized 
speech, “If you run out of gas, you can’t go on a picnic in the country, but if you run out 
of food, you die.” Hesburgh’s moralism—he asked Americans for “a little moral 
leadership” on the food crisis, calling it “the moral imperative of our day”— appealed to 
Carter’s own emerging emphasis on morality in foreign policy, as well as his desire to get 
Americans to realize that the world’s resources—and America’s right to them—are not 
unlimited. When asked in spring 1976 what he would like the two presidential candidates 
to say, Hesburgh responded, “I’d like them to speak to the idealism of the American 
people and demand some sacrifices.” He then cited a study saying that in 1974 
Americans spent $3.3 billion on flowers, seeds, and potted plants, and just $3.4 billion on 
foreign aid.428 
ODC work for the Carter campaign accelerated in 1976, as James Grant worked 
with Trilateral Commission members Richard Gardner and Henry Owen to write Carter’s 
speeches on interdependence, North-South relations, and human rights. On this last 
subject Hesburgh was particularly influential for Carter. “He was preaching the need for 
international human rights long before Congress or President Jimmy Carter discovered 
it,” Hesburgh’s biographer argues, “and he strongly endorsed Carter’s human rights 
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campaign.”429 At the Ford-Carter foreign policy debate in October 1976, less than a 
month before the election, Gardner and Grant urged their candidate to connect Ford’s 
North-South and human rights records, characterizing both as interrelated consequences 
of Ford-Kissinger amoralism; their long statement, adapted by Carter at the debate, 
echoed Hesburgh’s persistent linking of human rights and development. They accused 
Ford, Kissinger, and Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz of a “lack of morality” and 
“moral leadership” in failing to commit the U.S. to more food aid at the World Food 
Conference, while also alleging that Ford did not forget to “help out his friendly dictators 
in Chile, South Korea, and the Southeast Asian countries.”430 Instead of being the “arms 
merchant of the word,” Carter insisted during the debate, American “strength derive[s] 
from doing what's right—caring for the poor, providing food, becoming the breadbasket 
of the world.”431 
Hesburgh saw human rights as inseparable from development, and he saw 
development through the morally inflected paradigm the ODC had been pushing since its 
founding, basic human needs. He wrote a few years later that 
We in the northern part of the globe worry about overproducing Ph.D.’s; 
many children in the Southern Hemisphere never enter a school. We speak 
of heart and kidney transplants; they never see a doctor from birth to 
death. Half the children already born in the poorest countries will die 
before the age of five. We are often overfed and overweight; they are 
undernourished from birth…. We spend more annually on foolish 
armaments, devilishly devised to destroy human life, than they have 
annually available to maintain life. 
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“Early in his administration,” Hesburgh’s biographer writes, “President Carter was an 
unabashed supporter of Fr. Ted, seeking his counsel, offering him a place in the State 
Department, and appearing at Notre Dame three times in slightly more than a year.” In 
return, Hesburgh defended Carter against his critics, calling them “cynical” and insisting 
that the United States had always been a country of idealists. “And for the first time in 
ages,” Hesburgh explained to the press, “Americans are giving young people around the 
world a new ideological choice they cannot get from Communism—mainly freedom and 
respect for human rights. It may be troublesome at times, but so was the Declaration of 
Independence.”432 
It was for good reason, then, that Carter delivered the first major human rights 
speech of his presidency at the commencement for Notre Dame’s Class of ’77. Carter 
explained to the new graduates how the end of colonialism had “transformed… the daily 
lives and aspirations of most human beings,” who, “freed from traditional constraints… 
have been determined to achieve, for the first time in their lives, social justice.”  The 
developed countries could not ignore these demands, for both strategic and moral 
reasons: under the new interdependence, “traditional issues of war and peace” were 
inseparable “from the new global questions of justice, equity, and human rights.”  
After reaffirming “America's commitment to human rights as a fundamental tenet 
of our foreign policy,” Carter laid out his policy toward the developing countries: 
More than 100 years ago, Abraham Lincoln said that our Nation could not 
exist half slave and half free. We know a peaceful world cannot long exist 
one-third rich and two-thirds hungry. 
Most nations share our faith that, in the long run, expanded and equitable 
trade will best help the developing countries to help themselves. But the 
immediate problems of hunger, disease, illiteracy, and repression are here 
now. 
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The Western democracies, the OPEC nations, and the developed 
Communist countries can cooperate through existing international 
institutions in providing more effective aid. This is an excellent alternative 
to war. 
We have a special need for cooperation and consultation with other 
nations in this hemisphere--to the north and to the south. We do not need 
another slogan. Although these are our close friends and neighbors, our 
links with them are the same links of equality that we forge for the rest of 
the world. We will be dealing with them as part of a new, worldwide 
mosaic of global, regional, and bilateral relations.433 
 
This formulation combined the approaches of the ODC and Trilateral Commission. First, 
Carter downgraded the developing countries’ insistence on global structural inequalities 
in favor of meeting the “immediate” (and less political) problems of basic human needs. 
Second, Carter brought back the Trilateral Commission’s optimistic plans for OECD-
OPEC joint funding for development, which had largely failed when Kissinger tried it. 
Third, Carter promised to transcend the North-South dialogue by rejecting “another 
slogan” and instead improving regional and bilateral relations, especially with the richer 
countries in Latin America. In short, Carter’s approach at Notre Dame was basically the 
Brzezinski-Gardner speech for the New York Foreign Policy Association, plus the Grant-




Governor Jimmy Carter pitched himself as an outsider to the foreign policy 
establishment, but it was a certain wing of that establishment that gave him the 
background and support he needed to win the 1976 Presidential election. When Carter 
announced his candidacy, both the world and America’s place in it were undergoing their 
most profound transformations since World War II. Carter was able to cast the “Nixon-
                                                     




Kissinger-Ford” administration as not only unable to deal with the strategic complexities 
of interdependence, but also its moral dimension. “In food, population, freedom of the 
seas, international trade, stable monetary systems, environmental quality, access to 
commodities and energy and so forth,” Carter told a crowd in Louisville, Kentucky, 
“we've got to be part of [the solution].” Instead of “military might… political power… 
[or] economic pressure,” he insisted, U.S. foreign policy “ought to be based on the fact 
that we are right and decent and honest and truthful and predictable and respectful; in 
other words, that our foreign policy itself accurately represents the character and the 
ideals of the American people.”434 
Zbigniew Brzezinski and the Trilateral Commission provided Carter with a 
comprehensive hierarchy of foreign policy imperatives intended to distinguish him from 
Ford but especially Kissinger, the real target of his charges. “Our neighbors in this 
hemisphere feel that they've been neglected; the Japanese feel that we’ve ignored their 
interests; the European nations feel that our commitment to them is suspect,” Carter told 
Time in May 1976, “plus there's no attitude of respect or natural purpose toward the 
developing nations.” The Ford Administration’s foreign policy “is primarily comprised of 
Mr. Kissinger's own ideas, his own goals, most often derived and maintained in secrecy,” 
he repeated. “I don't think the President plays any substantial role in the evolution of our 
foreign policy.”435 
Carter’s charges of cynicism and amoralism had some weight, but they also 
obscured Kissinger’s actions over the last two-and-a-half years, which more or less 
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adhered to the Trilateral Commission’s guidelines. Against the objections of Ford’s 
economic advisors (and with Ford’s support), Kissinger led efforts to establish and 
institutionalize the G-7 summits among transatlantic leaders; encouraged fiscal stimulus 
and the “locomotive theory” for world recovery; attempted to organize OECD-OPEC 
multilateral aid; pushed for a greater U.S. aid commitment at the World Food 
Conference; publicly accepted that the NIEO voiced legitimate concerns, if illegitimate 
demands; recommitted the U.S. to the Conference on International Economic 
Cooperation after talks broke down in the planning stage; and became the first cabinet 
official to address UNCTAD, where he rejected apartheid in South Africa and linked 
human rights to development. Carter’s National Security Council admitted as much in a 
February 1978 review of the administration’s North-South policies. Kissinger’s 
“conciliatory” speech at the UN Seventh Special Session on Development in September 
1975, the NSC’s Guy Erb (a former ODC official) conceded, “ended the rhetorical 
fireworks at the UN, led to the creation of [the] CIEC, and, in effect, bought nearly three 
years for the beleaguered OECD countries.”436 
A genuine belief in human rights was where Carter most distinguished himself 
from Kissinger. Kissinger could talk about human rights in the Third World, which he did 
only in the last year of the Ford Administration, but his reputation and record made it 
impossible to take him seriously. In 1975 the State Department did establish a new Office 
of Humanitarian Affairs—the consequence of a 1973 resolution introduced by Donald 
Fraser—but Kissinger made it clear to subordinates that human rights would remain 
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largely at the level of rhetoric.437 “Tell Popper to cut out the political science lectures,” he 
remarked upon learning that the U.S. Ambassador to Chile had raised human rights 
concerns with Augusto Pinochet’s Defense Minister.438 In June 1976, shortly before 
Kissinger was scheduled to speak on human rights at a meeting of the Organization of 
American States, he assured Pinochet in private, “Your greatest sin was that you 
overthrew a government that was going communist…  We wish your government 
well.”439  
For Carter, this was exactly the lack of “respect or natural purpose toward the 
developing nations” that sowed distrust in North-South relations. Even more important 
for Carter, it was a betrayal of basic American values and unworthy of a country destined 
to lead the world by example. Like Hesburgh, Carter frequently boiled the pursuit of 
human rights down to individual conscience and basic Christian principles. “You don't 
plot murder and I don't plot murder,” Carter told the Atlantic one month after Kissinger 
lightly admonished Pinochet in his OAS speech, “so why should our government plot 
murder against some foreign leader?” “We have set a different standard of ethics and 
morality as a nation than we have in our own private lives as individuals who comprise 
the nation,” he said on another occasion, “and that ought to be changed.”440 While Carter 
also insisted that his human rights policy would not be governed by “rigid moral 
maxims,” statements like the above defined the public’s perception of that policy during 
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the campaign—as well as fueling criticism when strategic concerns overrode human 
rights with allies like Indonesia, Iran, the Philippines, and South Korea.441   
Carter’s commitment to trilateralism was never controversial, but the tension 
between moral maxims and strategic imperatives ensured that his human rights policy 
would be. Congressional supporters of human rights, such as Donald Fraser and Tom 
Harkin, introduced legislation requiring the U.S. to use its power in international 
financial institutions to vote against loans to “serial abusers.” Though not necessarily 
endorsing those abusers, many developing countries objected to what they viewed as the 
politicization of development aid—a fair point when the Administration inconsistently 
applied the new guidelines and sought to water them down in Congress.  
Further, Carter was not the only one connecting human rights and development. 
For years, Third World leaders had been advancing their own conception of economic 
rights in conflict with Carter’s prioritization of basic human needs. In December 1974, 
half a year after the NIEO’s announcement, Third World states voted overwhelmingly in 
the UN General Assembly for the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. The 
Charter was presented as a legal foundation for the NIEO by G-77 leader and President of 
Mexico, Luis Echeverría, who had helped draft it two years before at UNCTAD III in 
Santiago, Chile.442 In contrast to Carter’s emphasis on the individual, the Charter and the 
NIEO were “a competitor vision of universal justice” in which “the central object was an 
augmentation of the southern state, deploying the internationalist language of rights and 
solidarity to enhance the status not of the citizen but of the sovereign.” To the dismay of 
American feminists like Gloria Steinem and Arvonne Fraser, Third World representatives 
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turned the proceedings of the 1975 World Conference for the International Women’s 
Year into a pro-NIEO rally. Echeverría asked women delegates “to look at the true origin 
of the problem,” which was not governments’ disrespect for the individual rights of 
women, but the international system’s disregard for the economic rights of states. He and 
other delegates employed their own interdependence logic, arguing that “the problems of 
the role of women in society, food, population, environment, human settlements, health 
and education are not single problems … Each is a component part of the complex 
system.” In other words, ensuring economic sovereignty, and through that economic 
development and modernization, were the preconditions for ensuring political and social 
rights and meeting the basic needs of citizens. “It is not possible to postulate in realistic 
terms the universal triumph of human beings,” Echeverria charged, “as long as we do not 
give form to a New International Economic Order.” A U.S. diplomat summarized the G-
77 position: “Problems of women are the problems of society … problems of society … 
are caused by unjust world economic order; therefore to improve the situation of women 
we must first achieve … [a] new, more just and equitable economic order.”443 
Competing conceptions of justice and rights—political or economic; the citizen or 
the sovereign—would play a major role in determining the content and direction of 
North-South politics during Carter’s presidency. The “equity” issue proved particularly 
divisive, as the Carter Administration emphasized equal opportunity of individuals via 
basic human needs over the equal opportunity of states via global structural reform 
pushed by the G-77. The South “ridiculed” this approach, Roger Hansen, an official in 
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the NSC’s North-South “cluster” and contributor to ODC reports, explained in 1980, “as 
an attempt to interfere with developing country sovereignty, to limit the process of 
Southern industrialization by stressing such goals as rural development, basic education 
and preventive medicine and to dismiss further consideration of the need for the broader 
structural reforms desired by the South.” In turn, the North “caricatured the Southern 
stress on structural reform as nothing but an attempt to rig markets and mechanisms.”444 
Problems emerged early in Carter’s term, as the NSC and State Department found 
themselves working at cross purposes to define Carter’s North-South, human rights, and 
Latin America policies for the next four years. Success in the North-South dialogue was 
increasingly equated with watering down the South’s proposals—such as the limited 
version of a Common Fund for Commodities agreed upon at UNCTAD V in 1979—
thereby defining progress in mostly negative terms. Some Carter officials, especially 
those from the ODC, found a lack of momentum frustrating after so much buildup during 
the campaign. It was one thing to declare that the world and its problems were 
interdependent; it was another to put together a coherent response while also attending to 
numerous bilateral and regional initiatives. The next chapter details the process within the 
Carter Administration to define its North-South policy in the context of its most public 
first priority: reshaping America’s relationship with Latin America, where human rights, 
democracy, development, and the North-South dialogue intersected more directly than 
anywhere else in the world.   
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Chapter 5: Debt, Development, and Human Rights:  
The Dialogue in Latin America, 1974-81 
 
Kissinger’s “New Dialogue” 
 
Jimmy Carter was not the first president to rethink U.S.-Latin American relations 
in the 1970s. In 1969, Richard Nixon told the Inter American Press Association that the 
time had come for a “more mature partnership” between the U.S. and Latin America, “in 
which all voices are heard and none is predominant.” Drawing from the 
recommendations of Nelson Rockefeller, who had a long-time interest in Latin American 
affairs, Nixon called for reducing trade barriers, increasing multilateral aid, and elevating 
Latin America’s importance in the State Department’s portfolio.445 
The “Nixon approach” was short-lived. The new Treasury Secretary, John 
Connolly, opposed giving Latin America any kind of preferential treatment in trade and 
blocked efforts by National Security Council staff to send the required legislation to 
Congress. Matters were made worse by Connolly’s abrupt introduction of Nixon’s “New 
Economy Policy” in August 1971, which called for a 10 percent reduction in foreign aid 
and a 10 percent surcharge on imports. Like the U.S.’s allies in Western Europe, Latin 
Americans were angered at the Administration’s failure to consult with them before 
announcing the policy, as Nixon had promised in his speech two years prior.446 
As we have seen, the twin crises of 1973-74—OPEC’s oil embargo and the New 
International Economic Order (NIEO)—sparked a major rethinking of U.S. global power 
in American foreign policy circles. The first energy crisis showed that the U.S. could no 
longer assume developed country solidarity in the face of the Third World’s economic 
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demands. During the Yom Kippur War, France and Germany declined to allow U.S. 
planes on the way to resupply Israel to refuel in their countries; by the end of 1973, 
Britain, France, Germany, and Japan had each signed or promised separate oil deals with 
Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, and Algeria.447  In consequence, restoring 
the unity of the developed countries was Kissinger’s lead priority following his 
promotion to Secretary of State. 
Kissinger also sought to improve the other “special relationship,” that is, with 
Latin America. “One [reason],” Kissinger wrote in his memoirs, “was the growing 
insistence of developing countries on bringing about a redistribution of the world’s 
wealth by votes in international forums.”448 Latin Americans had been at the center of 
these efforts throughout the 1950s and 60s. The UN Economic Commission on Latin 
America (ECLA) was established in 1948 as a mechanism to encourage regional 
cooperation on development. Argentinian economist Raúl Prebisch—whose “terms of 
trade” hypothesis formed the basis of dependency theory449—was ECLA’s Executive 
Secretary from 1950 to 1963, when he departed to head the UN Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), the General Assembly’s new forum to study development 
issues largely from a Third World perspective. These efforts culminated in the adoption 
of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, developed at UNCTAD in 1972 
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and presented to the General Assembly by Mexican President Luis Echeverría shortly 
after the NIEO’s announcement in May 1974. 
Kissinger’s strategy toward the NIEO was to use targeted concessions and 
bilateral appeals to break the “unholy alliance” of developing countries with oil (namely, 
OPEC) and developing countries without. Latin America represented this nexus better 
than anywhere else. Venezuela—one of the most advanced, democratic, and from the oil 
shock, cash-rich Latin American countries—used its status to promote the South’s agenda 
for trade and development in both global and regional forums. Finance Minister Manuel 
Pérez-Guerrero had been a delegate at both the Bretton Woods and San Francisco 
conferences and served as Secretary-General of the UN Conference on Trade and 
Development (replacing Prebisch in 1969) and as co-chair of the 1975-77 Conference on 
International Economic Cooperation.450 Others, such as Mexico and OPEC’s newest 
member Ecuador (it joined in 1973), also used their status as oil-boom beneficiaries to 
promote OPEC-LDC solidarity on issues of trade and finance.451  
On September 24, 1973, two days after being sworn in as Secretary of State, 
Kissinger pledged to the UN General Assembly that the U.S. would “give new vigor to 
our policy of partnership in the Western Hemisphere.”452 A week later, he informed Latin 
American foreign ministers of his desire to foster “a new dialogue… based on equality 
and on respect for mutual dignity.” Kissinger made clear the reason behind his sudden 
attention to Latin America, citing the “revolution of [the world’s] patterns” of trade, 
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energy, and food that brought the problems—and thus the demands—of developing 
countries to the front of the developed countries’ agenda: 
And the basic problem we face is whether we will choose the road of 
nationalism or the road of cooperation, whether we will approach it from 
the perspective of each party trying to get the maximum benefit for itself, 
or whether we can take a common view based on our common needs. And 
this is why our relations in this hemisphere are so crucial for all of us in 
this room and for all the rest of the world as well. 
 
The future of North-South relations—or more specifically, the potential for the South to 
win concessions from the North—Kissinger was arguing, would depend in large part on 
how cooperative Latin Americans would be with the U.S. in international forums. “So if 
the technically advanced nations can ever cooperate with the developing nations,” 
Kissinger reiterated, “then it must start here in the Western Hemisphere.”453 
The following day the State Department Bureau of Inter-American Affairs 
provided an outline of its “new conceptual approach” to Latin America. A policy of 
“Pan-Americanism,” the report explained, “has guided U.S. policy towards the countries 
of Latin America for over a century.” This system had worked well into the postwar 
period, by providing “a philosophical rationale as well as a juridical basis for what was in 
fact a hegemonic power system with the U.S. at its head.”454  
The problem, the Bureau argued, was regionalism: whereas bilateral relations 
were still “quite satisfactory,” multilateral relations had sharply deteriorated, to the point 
where even the friendliest of Latin American countries sided with the “radicals” against 
the U.S. in the UN and elsewhere. This was exactly the kind of regionalism that Zbigniew 
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Brzezinski described the same year in Between Two Ages, in which he predicted that the 
increasing unity of the European Community would spread to other regions.455 “Farthest 
along in Europe,” the State Department explained, “the regional bloc concept is taking 
hold in Latin America as well,” where the “Latins [sic]… slavishly attempt[ed] to imitate 
Europe and form a common market.” As with the EC, the U.S. had to accept the 
“inevitable,” that is, that the U.S. could no longer seek to participate in Latin American 
multilateral politics “on an equal footing with all of the other countries.” Only through 
limiting paternalistic assumptions of diplomatic compliance and mutuality of interests, 
which had harmed in the past both U.S.-Latin American relations and North-South 
relations more broadly, could the U.S. hold on to a diminishing regional hegemony, the 
deterioration of which was having increasingly global consequences. “There would be 
‘linkage’ but not 100% membership,” the report concluded. “The relationship would not 
be unlike the one we are seeking to establish with Western Europe.”456 
There were some similarities with transatlantic relations. Both regions had taken 
on a new importance at the outset of the Cold War, and in both cases the U.S. developed 
new mutual defense treaties—in Europe, NATO; in Latin America, the Rio Pact—
intended to deter foreign (namely, Communist) attacks on signatories. The U.S. claimed a 
“special relationship” in each instance that justified greater involvement in domestic and 
regional political developments, and the U.S. used economic and military aid to foster a 
firm anti-communist consensus and discourage Soviet interventionism.  
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However, the State Department’s comparison obscured crucial differences, dating 
back to the 1820s. “Of the 50 times the United States sent troops outside North America 
during the nineteenth century,” one scholar notes, “43 instances were in Latin America 
and the Caribbean.” The U.S. economic presence expanded side by side, so that by the 
end of World War I more than half of all U.S. foreign investment was in Latin America 
and the Caribbean—as well as more than 60 percent of American diplomats stationed 
abroad.457  
Due in part to President Franklin Roosevelt’s “Good Neighbor” policy, most 
Latin American countries were reliable partners during World War II as suppliers of 
commodities to the Allied powers.458 However, the outbreak of the Cold War quickly 
brought a reassertion of American power throughout the region. The 1947 Rio Treaty 
applied NATO’s Article V obligation of mutual defense to Latin America and was 
formalized the following year with the establishment of the Organization of American 
States. Socialist governments and even electorally competitive communist parties were 
tolerated in Western Europe, but in the case of Latin America their presence led to CIA 
interventions (Guatemala, 1954; Cuba, 1961) and even the landing of U.S. troops 
(Panama, 1964, Dominican Republic, 1965-66).459 
At the same time that the U.S. claimed extraordinary powers for intervention, it 
also pledged a special obligation to Latin America’s economic development. A first step 
was the establishment in 1959 of the Inter-American Development Bank, a sort of mini-
World Bank for Latin America; like the World Bank, the U.S. retained an effective veto 
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power. In 1961, President Kennedy proposed a ten-year development program for Latin 
America, the Alliance for Progress, designed to prevent the spread of “Castroism” by 
promoting economic growth, social and institutional reform, and democracy.  
The Alliance’s high hopes for economic growth and democratic stabilization ran 
into the same contradictions as other U.S. development projects. By 1963 Kennedy 
Administration officials predicted that the goals of development and democracy would 
prove incompatible in several Alliance countries; the Johnson Administration confirmed 
this in 1964 when it sent U.S. naval support to right-wing military officers in Brazil 
seeking to overthrow the left-leaning nationalist government of João Goulart.460 The 
contradiction was obvious: “The U.S. had promised change through another democratic 
revolution while training the armies to prevent it.”461  
The economics of the Alliance was subject to its own inconsistencies. The focus 
on foreign investment was not lost on the American business community, which 
convinced the U.S. Congress to place strict limits on any competitive imports and to 
ensure that those countries could only use Alliance funds to buy American-made capital 
goods.462 Further, despite meeting the Alliance’s target of 2.5% annual growth in regional 
output per capita, social indicators like income distribution, land reform, and wage levels 
were relatively unaffected.463 Because the majority of Alliance investment was channeled 
through American corporations, only $1.9 billion of the $7.1 billion in income received in 
private investment between 1961 and 1968 was reinvested in Latin America, the 
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remaining $5.2 billion repatriated to the United States. What was left was sent to pay off 
growing public debts, which by 1966 had climbed to over $12 billion; servicing those 
debts amounted to about 90 percent of total public and private grant disbursements. At 
the same time, due to Congressional restrictions on competitive imports, between 1960 
and 1968 U.S. merchandise imports from Latin America fell from 27.2 percent to 15.8 
percent, lending support to arguments made by Latin American economists in ECLA and 
UNCTAD about North-South terms of trade. “When you look at net capital flows and 
their economic effect, and after all due credit is given to the U.S. effort to step up support 
in Latin America,” U.S. Ambassador to the Organization of American States William T. 
Denzer confessed to Congress in 1969, “one sees that not much money has been put into 
Latin America after all.”464 
These unbalanced and heavy-handed efforts to foster a Pan-American consensus 
on security and trade contributed to the regionalism identified by Kissinger’s State 
Department. American governments had always asserted a natural harmony of interests 
with Latin Americans, and indeed American markets were essential to Latin American 
producers and vice versa. However, the U.S. resisted lowering its own tariffs to any 
competition from Latin American-produced industrial goods, the production of which 
had picked up rapidly under Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) policies in the 
1930s and 40s that U.S. policy tolerated as the price of access to raw materials. Merwin 
L. Bohan, a member of the U.S. delegation to the 1945 conference establishing the Inter-
American Economic and Social Council, admitted at the time: “The United States has 
promoted the industrialization of Latin America not only as a matter of general policy, 
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but specifically through lending capital and technical assistance. However, when the 
governments of Latin America take measures to protect the industries thus created, there 
is a disposition to frown on all forms of protectionism.”465 
Thus, contrary to the State Department’s analysis, regionalism was not simply the 
consequence of paternalistic rhetoric or a desire to “slavishly imitate” the EC. Informed 
by the theories of the new UN Economic Commission for Latin America and its leader, 
Raúl Prebisch, in the 1950s Latin American governments understood economic union as 
the only way to continue industrialization in the face of U.S. and European protectionism. 
In 1960 the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) was established with seven 
members and was soon expanded to eleven; in the same year, five Central American 
countries created a Common Market (CACM) to promote free trade and establish a 
uniform Central American tariff. Seven years later Latin American leaders pledged to 
establish a full Latin American Common Market by 1985, which would integrate LAFTA 
and CACM. This was followed by further efforts at Caribbean integration in 1968 and the 
formation in 1969 of the Andean Common Market (or Andean Pact) by Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador, and Peru.466 Regional economic integration gained an international component 
in 1971, when the Latin American members of the Special Latin American Coordinating 
Commission (CECLA)—established in 1969 to form collective bargaining positions in 
external economic affairs—joined with the European Community to announce a 
“permanent dialogue” to coordinate bilateral and regional trade relations, as well as to 
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consult on Latin American economic policy in international organizations.467 “Either we 
must achieve the integration of Latin America,” Carlos Andrés Pérez announced after 
committing his country to the Andean Pact in 1973, “or the transnational companies will 
do it for us.”468 
Despite several setbacks—in 1968 LAFTA was “deadlocked” over intercountry 
trade disputes, and in 1969 the CACAM was “wrecked” by conflict between El Salvador 
and Honduras—integration continued alongside Kissinger’s New Dialogue 
discussions.469 On October 17, 1975, all 25 Latin American and Caribbean governments 
announced the creation of the Latin American Economic System (SELA). SELA was 
intended to bring together Latin American regional and international economic 
objectives, which suffered from the proliferation of sub-regional organizations during the 
1960s. The establishment of SELA in 1975 was critically important because, as the 
North-South dialogue developed, pro-NIEO leaders like Pérez and Echeverría were able 
to use it to foster regional and global solidarity in new negotiating forums like the 
Conference on International Economic Cooperation.  
SELA’s formation was also a reaction to the U.S. Congress’ 1974 Trade Reform 
Act, which included a provision excluding all OPEC members from the Generalized 
System of Preferences granting developing nations special tariffs—despite the fact that 
Venezuela had continued to ship oil to the United States during the 1973-74 OPEC 
boycott. Throughout 1974 Pérez had been defending OPEC against Ford’s charges at the 
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UN that “wealthy” oil producers were gouging consumers, including developing 
countries, for their own benefit.470 In response to Ford’s UN remarks, in September 1974 
Pérez took out a full page ad in the New York Times to explain the developing countries’ 
position: “Each year we, the countries which produce coffee, meat, tin, iron, copper, or 
petroleum, have been handing over a larger amount of our products in order to obtain 
imports of machinery and other manufactured goods, and this has resulted in a constant 
and growing outflow of capital and [the] impoverishment of our countries…. Great 
countries have created the economic confrontation by denying equal participation to 
developing nations who need to balance their terms of trade.”471 
Regardless of the actual economic impact of the Trade Act’s anti-OPEC 
provision—90 percent of Venezuela’s exports already entered the OAS tariff-free, the 
U.S. delegate to the OAS remarked—Pérez quickly organized a regional response. At a 
special OAS session in January 1975, delegates from 20 Latin American countries 
denounced the measure as “discriminatory and coercive,” and several even said that the 
issue was serious enough to call off Kissinger’s New Dialogue, on which there had been 
much talk but no specific policy changes. Their final resolution, approved by all 
delegations except the U.S., expressed “deep concern over the deterioration of inter-
American solidarity cause by the [Act’s] provisions… [which] run counter to the 
fundamental provisions of the charter of the OAS.”472 Inspired by this act of unity, two 
months later Echeverría hosted Pérez in Mexico City, where they agreed on the need for 
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an omnibus organization—SELA—that would represent Latin American regional 
interests within the context of global solidarity with the developing countries.473  
After the OAS resolution, Venezuela and Ecuador announced that they would not 
attend the upcoming New Dialogue foreign ministers meeting in Buenos Aires; Mexico 
and Chile dropped out shortly after, and the meeting was cancelled. With one fell swoop, 
the New Dialogue—never on firm ground anyway—was over. “Ironically,” Kissinger 
concluded, “the Trade Act had managed to unify Latin America to a far greater degree 
than the New Dialogue.”474 
Kissinger’s main goal in the New Dialogue was to diffuse Latin American 
regional support for the NIEO, organized primarily by Pérez and Echeverría and 
supported by left-leaning governments in Peru, Ecuador, and elsewhere. “In conception,” 
he explained, 
the motive was at the same time defensive and constructive. It was 
defensive because we were seeking to prevent a coalition of commodity 
producers whose objective would be a general rise of commodity prices; it 
was constructive in the sense that the special relationship was designed to 
create an alternative to the confrontational policy urged in Third World 
forums. 
 
Regardless of pat rhetoric of mutual respect and meeting as equals, the alternative that 
Kissinger proposed was unacceptable to Latin Americans, mainly because there was not 
much “new” about it. “The Europeans are forming blocs,” Kissinger insisted to Treasury 
officials: “We are the only multilateralists left and that plays into the hands of the 
countries that are forming blocs.” The New Dialogue pledged to recognize Latin America 
as an independent bloc, but Kissinger refused to abandon the concept of a natural 
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hemispheric “community” with mutually compatible interests, an idea that American 
policymakers had asserted all the way back to Henry Clay. Was it a proposal for a new 
institution, Venezuela’s foreign minister wondered at the February 1974 New Dialogue 
meeting of foreign ministers in Mexico City, or was it a new word for existing 
arrangements?475 It was, in fact, the latter: as Winston Lord, head of Policy Planning at 
the State Department, put it to Kissinger in January 1975, the New Dialogue was simply 
“old wine in new bottles.”476 
After the fallout from the OAS resolution, the State Department examined the 
failure of its regionalist strategy. One problem was the fundamental “ambiguity” of the 
special relationship. Another was the growing diversity of Latin American countries. 
Despite the proliferation of sub-regional and regional efforts at economic integration, 
several Latin American countries had incomes matching or exceeding some in Western 
Europe. These countries were also the most vocal and influential supporters of Third 
World economic demands in international organizations. Yet, because of 1) their new 
wealth and 2) a protectionist American Congress, the U.S. lacked bilateral leverage just 
where it needed it the most. “The three countries where our interests are greatest: Brazil, 
Mexico and Venezuela, are rightly no longer eligible for concessional AID programs, just 
as they have received no grant military equipment since 1968,” Winston Lord and 
William P. Rogers, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs wrote to 
Kissinger in September 1975. Nor had the U.S. been responsive “to their clamor for 
‘trade, not aid,’” due to “competing domestic and international pressures.”477 In other 
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words, if the U.S. could or would not lower its trade barriers, why would Latin 
Americans endorse Kissinger’s emphasis on “reciprocity” and give up the regional and 
international influence they possessed as some of the South’s lead economic negotiators? 
Kissinger had better success on another longstanding problem in U.S.-Latin 
American relations. Ever since its signing by an unauthorized representative of the 
Panamanian government, the 1903 Hays-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, establishing permanent 
American rights over the Panama Canal zone, played a major role in defining U.S.-Latin 
American relations. American control over the Canal Zone was a powerfully enduring 
example of Yankee imperialism, and was consistently opposed by not just successive 
Panamanian governments but virtually all Latin American governments, friendly or 
otherwise. After violent riots over the Canal in 1964, the Johnson Administration began 
negotiations with Panamanian representatives to find a mutually acceptable agreement for 
a continued American presence. Talks fell apart in 1968 following two changes of 
government, one through elections, the next, eleven days later, through a military coup.  
The new government was led by General Omar Torrijos, a Panamanian military 
officer who had received training at the notorious anti-communist American military 
institute, the School of the Americas. Torrijos, who positioned himself as a left-leaning 
nationalist, soon expressed interest in re-opening the negotiations. In 1973 Richard Nixon 
appointed Ellsworth Bunker, a respected diplomat who had served as U.S. Ambassador to 
the OAS under Lyndon Johnson, to represent the new American position, which was to 
ensure permanent American use of, rather than control over, the Canal.478  
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Kissinger placed great emphasis on the negotiations and established a personal 
relationship with Torrijos based on the mutual interest both had in reaching a new 
agreement. In 1974 few Americans had any knowledge whatsoever of the Canal; the 
“small minority” who did, he explained to Torrijos, was “violently opposed to the 
agreement, but no group is really for it.”479 But the Canal was tremendously important for 
Latin Americans, and therefore, for Kissinger’s goal of reducing Latin American support 
for developing countries’ strategy of confrontation at the UN. “If these [Canal] 
negotiations fail,” Kissinger explained to Ford in 1975, “we will be beaten to death in 
every international forum and there will be riots all over Latin America.”480 Torrijos also 
had to tread carefully. “There is a large group of people [in Panama] whose mission it is 
to see to it that there is no agreement,” he told Kissinger. “They live off this problem.”481 
Nevertheless, negotiations proceeded slowly throughout 1975, and it was clear that even 
if both sides reached agreement on a new treaty, neither would risk bringing it to the U.S. 
Senate during an election year. The final negotiations and signing of the treaty would 
have to wait for the next President, Jimmy Carter, whose administration had its own idea 
of what Latin Americans really needed from the United States. 
 
The Carter Approach: A Global Policy for Latin America 
 
Kissinger’s private efforts could not prevent Panama Canal negotiations—a 
relatively bipartisan, if low-key, issue up to that point—from becoming a part of the 1976 
Presidential elections. Ronald Reagan, Gerald Ford’s challenger for the Republican 
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nomination, used opposition to the negotiations as a way to fire up the Republican base. 
“We built it, we paid for it, it’s ours, and we’re going to keep it!” Reagan thundered 
during the Florida Republican primary. Even Carter was unwilling to take a strong stand 
in favor of a new agreement. “The Panamanian question is one that’s been confused by 
Mr. Ford,” Carter alleged during their foreign policy debate in October 1976. “He had 
directed his diplomatic representative to yield to the Panamanians full sovereignty over 
the Panama Canal Zone at the end of a certain period of time.”482 Here, Carter was the 
one confused. Although neither wanted to admit it, both candidates supported—and 
Carter eventually signed—agreements returning the sovereignty of the Canal to Panama 
at a later date, in exchange for a guarantee of permanent American access: the same 
conditions under which Ellsworth Bunker had begun negotiations in 1973.  
Despite Carter’s reticence during the campaign, concluding the Panama Canal 
treaties was the first official policy decision to emerge from his National Security 
Council’s inaugural meeting. Just as Kissinger had emphasized to Ford, Secretary of 
State Cyrus Vance and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski both urged Carter 
to settle the negotiations as the necessary first step in reshaping U.S.-Latin American 
relations.483  The implications were especially important for U.S. relations with “regional 
influentials” like Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela, who, in addition to their role in the 
North-South dialogue, together accounted for almost 70 percent of all U.S. trade with 
Latin America and over half of all U.S. investment in the hemisphere.484 “Latin America 
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has become our primary LDC market for machinery, consumer goods, and chemical 
products—almost as large, in fact, as the entire European Common Market, and larger 
than Japan,” the State Department wrote in early 1977. “Venezuela (for its huge financial 
reserves) and Brazil (one of the world’s largest economies) have global roles that match 
or exceed many of the Western European countries.”485 The treaty’s urgency was 
confirmed during the transition by a joint cable sent from the Presidents of Venezuela and 
Mexico describing it as “the crucial test of the degree of sincerity of a good inter-
American policy of the United States.” “The Panamanian cause is no longer the cause of 
that nation alone,” they insisted. “Its intrinsic merits have made it the cause of all Latin 
America.”486 
Carter was also urged to make the Canal a priority by the conclusions of the 
independent U.S. Commission on Latin American Relations, or Linowitz Commission. 
The Commission took its name from its chairman, Sol M. Linowitz, a former business 
executive who left his job running the Xerox Corporation to replace Ellsworth Bunker as 
U.S. Ambassador to the OAS. Other members included future Carter Administration 
officials W. Michael Blumenthal, Richard Gardner, Samuel Huntington, and Father 
Theodore Hesburgh, as well as several former U.S. government officials and scholars.487  
The Linowitz Commission issued two separate reports in 1974 and 1976, both of 
which called for an end to the “paternalism and so-called ‘special relationship’” that had 
guided U.S. policy in the past. The authors of the second report recognized that Kissinger 
                                                     
485 JCPL, RAC, NLC-24-65-3-8-9, “Review of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America,” undated, but matches 
other documents from  February-March 1977. 
486 Robert A. Pastor, “The Carter Administration and Latin America: A Test of Principle,” the Carter 
Center, July 1992, 12-13, http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/1243.pdf.  
487 Commission on United States-Latin American Relations, “The United States and Latin America, Next 
Steps: A Second Report,” Center for Inter-American Relations, December 20, 1976. 
227 
 
had initiated a “more appropriate and effective policy,” but determined that its largely 
defensive nature missed the point: 
This Commission believes the new administration should focus early 
attention on improving U.S. relations with Latin America not because of 
hidden dangers but because of latent opportunities. Latin America 
represents the United States with a good chance to fashion a coherent and 
constructive approach to the fundamental issues of North-South relations 
more generally. 
 
Instead of a regional approach that sought to co-opt a Latin American “bloc” in global 
forums, the authors recommended a new strategy that focused on pressing global issues 
with regional implications, such as commodity policy, debt, food, technology, arms sales, 
and human rights. “The primary aim of United States policy in the Western Hemisphere,” 
they explained, “should be to work with Latin American countries in dealing with this 
broad global agenda.” First, however, the U.S. had to resolve the “smoldering dispute” 
over the Canal, “unquestionably… the most urgent issue” in Western Hemispheric 
relations.488 
After the election Linowitz sent a copy of the report to Vance, and Vance brought 
it to Brzezinski and the President. In early December, Brzezinski asked the 29-year-old 
Executive Director of the Commission, Robert A. Pastor, to join the NSC staff as head of 
Latin American affairs. (Linowitz was also brought on as Ellsworth Bunker’s co-
negotiator.)489 
Pastor’s first task was to draw up two Presidential Review Memorandums 
(PRMs), on Panama (PRM-1) and Latin America (PRM-17). Pastor finished PRM-1 
quickly and Carter signed it on January 21, 1977. PRM-1 was essentially a refinement of 
                                                     
488 Commission on United States-Latin American Relations, Ibid, 3-5.  
489 Pastor, “The Carter Administration and Latin America,” 9-10. 
228 
 
the original U.S. negotiating terms pursued by Kissinger and Bunker. It specified that 
U.S. negotiators should seek to retain control of the Canal for “the longest possible 
period, to terminate not earlier [sic] than December 31, 1999,” and to a “right in 
principle” to continue defense operations for 50 years (though negotiators were permitted 
to go down to 20). Additional terms were set for possible expansion and access to certain 
water and land areas along the Canal. The negotiations were to remain confidential, but 
State and Defense would be in regular consultation with Congressional leaders to build 
support for ratification of a treaty.490 
Negotiation was difficult on both sides but Linowitz and his Panamanian partners 
reached a final agreement on August 10, 1977, six months after Linowitz’s appointment. 
Two separate treaties resulted from the negotiations. The first Panama Canal treaty 
required the U.S. to eliminate the Canal Zone, its “state within a state,” and transfer all 
property and responsibility for the Canal by the year 2000, when Panama would be in full 
control. The “Treaty on the Permanent Neutrality of the Canal,” meanwhile, gave the 
U.S. and Panama joint responsibility to defend the Canal and keep it open.491  
Carter was determined to put his own stamp on the Canal treaties. He decided that 
the signing ceremony would be held not at the White House, as Torrijos had wanted, but 
at the OAS headquarters. And instead of inviting the four democratic governments that 
had advised Torrijos during the negotiations, as Pastor and Brzezinski recommended, 
Carter decided to invite all Latin American heads of state, including dictators Augusto 
Pinochet and Anastasio Somoza. “The point of the ceremony,” Carter explained, “was for 
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the American people to see that the treaties enjoyed complete support by all the countries 
in Latin America and the Caribbean.”492 He stressed this in his speech at the Treaty’s 
signing. “This opens a new chapter in our relations with all nations of this hemisphere,” 
Carter declared. “We do not have to show our strength as a nation by running over a 
small nation.”493  
Pastor’s second task was PRM-17. He quickly ran up against the State 
Department bureaucracy, eager to protect the powers and interests of its embassies. “The 
main conceptual issue,” Pastor recalled, “was whether the United States should assert a 
‘special relationship’ with Latin America or adopt a single global policy for the 
developing world that could be adapted to the unique characteristics of the region's past 
relationship with the United States.” Pastor and the NSC advocated the global approach 
recommended by the Linowitz Commission, while the State Department’s Bureau of 
American Republic Affairs favored the special relationship.494 When Brzezinski 
wondered if “we need a Latin American policy,” Pastor said “no”: 
Your question struck at the heart of the issue. The idea of ‘Latin America’ 
as a region is a myth. It is composed of extremely diverse economies and 
polities, which can manage to form a collective negotiating position only 
when there is a symbolic need to confront the U.S., such as in the Trade 
Act of 1974 (GSP/OPEC provision). The most important business of the 
governments of this hemisphere is dealt with bilaterally or globally. 
 
“The policy that we should seek,” he explained, “is one which will help us move from a 
special policy toward the region to a global North-South policy.” Regardless, Pastor 
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conceded that because of Carter’s “special” emphasis on the region, any new approach 
would reflect in part the language and assumptions of the old one. “We cannot move 
from our current policy—which is indeed a ‘special one,’” Pastor acknowledged, “to no 
policy in a single step.”495 
Pastor’s analysis shared important similarities with that of Kissinger’s State 
Department following the failure of the New Dialogue. In September 1975, Winston Lord 
and William P. Rogers recommended to Kissinger that in the New Dialogue’s place   
we should approach individual countries and groups of countries in Latin 
America in a differentiated fashion, placing greater emphasis on bilateral 
and sub-regional relationships, and attempting whenever possible to 
implement our global economic policies in a way that will engage Latin 
America’s new middle powers in productive commercial relationships and 
contain the inevitable conflicts their global emergence will entail. 
 
Although vague on the specifics—two of their three recommendations involved stressing 
the importance of Kissinger’s initiatives at the UN Seventh Special Session to Latin 
America—their main conclusion could have been lifted straight from a Trilateral 
Commission or Linowitz Commission report: “Interdependence and trade rather than 
special relationship and aid.”496  
Pastor later admitted that a truly global policy was wishful thinking. “The debate 
had an unrealistic, theological quality,” he recalled, “because one could argue that in the 
postwar period the United States always tilted global policies to favor Latin America, and 
this did not change.” Nevertheless, he recommended that Carter place economic issues at 
the forefront of his approach to Latin America, in which all major developing country 
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concerns—“trade, finance, investment, science and technology, aid, human rights, arms 
transfers and nuclear proliferation”—would be formulated “according to global criteria.” 
At the same time, the U.S. should also pledge non-interventionism in Latin American 
affairs and tolerance of political diversity—except in the case of gross violations of 
human rights, where Carter should seek to isolate the worst offenders through bilateral 
and multilateral pressure. Since “North-South economic issues are [Latin America’s] 
principle preoccupation,” however, Pastor recommended global trade policies that 
reflected the existing economic diversity of the so-called Third World: “This means 
concessional assistance for the poorest countries, and increased trade prospects and 
improved and coordinated debt management for the middle-income developing countries, 
which are most of the Latin American countries. Trade, not aid.”497  
Carter consolidated Pastor’s initiatives in a speech to the Organization of 
American States on Pan-American Day, April 14, 1977. After an introduction in Spanish, 
Carter acknowledged Latin America’s role as a “driving force” in North-South relations, 
citing as examples Raúl Prebisch’s work at ECLA and UNCTAD and Pérez-Guerrero’s 
current role as co-chair of the Conference on International Economic Cooperation. In 
place of Kissinger’s attempts to separate Latin America from the G-77, Carter pledged 
“not [to] seek to divide the nations of Latin America one from another or to set Latin 
America apart from the rest of the world.” His three point approach included respect for 
Latin American sovereignty; support for human rights and democratic governments; and 
progress on the North-South dialogue through “global policies [that] are of particular 
interest to other American states.” As recommended by Pastor, those policies included 
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supporting the creation of a Common Fund for commodities; redirecting bilateral aid 
toward the poorest countries; increasing contributions to multilateral lending institutions 
for more advanced developing countries; “flexibility” on new rules for foreign 
investment; support for regional and sub-regional economic integration; and special 
treatment for developing countries in GATT negotiations. Carter also stressed reductions 
in conventional weapons and arrangements for nuclear fuel sharing as an element of 
North-South cooperation, the latter issue being of particular concern to Brazil.498 
Almost by definition, the most important economic initiatives of Carter’s “global” 
approach to Latin America would take place outside of specifically inter-American 
forums. The developed countries formally consented to negotiations for the Common 
Fund during the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC), which 
concluded in June 1977; subsequent negotiations over the Common Fund were carried 
out over the next two years under an UNCTAD special committee. Support for basic 
human needs became enshrined in the State Department’s definition of human rights, 
which Secretary of State Cyrus Vance announced in speeches throughout 1977, but 
effective implementation would be held up both by Congress and the Administration 
itself when political developments in Africa, South Asia, and Latin America produced a 
reassertion of Cold War priorities. The Administration had the most success in the 
conclusion of the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations in 1979, where the Generalized 
System of Preferences was formalized in the GATT charter. 
Instead, the Carter Administration’s North-South policy played out in Latin 
America largely as Kissinger had predicted in 1975: through bilateral, sub-regional, and 
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occasionally multilateral, diplomacy. Carter used bilateral relationships with key Latin 
American countries—namely, Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil, and Jamaica—to encourage a 
common position on human rights, economic development, and the Panama Canal 
negotiations. Carter and Vance gave new purpose to the multilateral Organization of 
American States—which both Pastor and Kissinger had declared essentially dead—in 
order to enhance the positions of the region’s most advanced economies (as well as its 
few emerging democracies, often one and the same) and to isolate its worst human rights 
offenders. First Lady Rosalynn Carter travelled to Jamaica, Peru, Ecuador, and Brazil to 
reiterate the themes of his OAS speech, and Carter met several times throughout 1977-79 
with the Presidents of Mexico, Venezuela, and Jamaica to solicit their cooperation in 
cooling North-South tensions. Additionally, President Carter gave special attention to the 
Caribbean. In a sign of good faith, he surprised Caribbean governments in May 1977 by 
meeting with the region’s major sugar producers to consult with them before taking any 
measures to protect domestic sugar producers; the following day, he announced that the 
U.S. would pursue new international sugar agreements.499 Carter’s Ambassador to the 
UN, Andrew Young, also became personally involved in the creation of the Caribbean 
Group for Cooperation in Economic Development, a sub-regional development bank 
launched in 1977 with World Bank support. 
 
Human Rights and the North-South Dialogue in Latin America 
 
A real human rights policy was the Carter Administration’s most visible legacy in 
Latin America, and arguably, the world. “Nothing the Carter Administration has done has 
excited more hope, puzzlement, and confusion than the effort to make human rights a 
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primary theme in the international relations of the United States,” historian Arthur 
Schlesinger, Jr. wrote in 1977. Time has hardly cleared this confusion. Historian Tony 
Smith reflects one enduring and conflicting consensus on Carter’s human rights policy. 
While “Carter’s “abiding concern for human rights abroad” was his “finest legacy to the 
post-cold war world,” Smith writes, his moralism and “naïve failure to understand” the 
realities of global politics ensured his ultimate failure.500 
Not everyone backing Carter during the campaign embraced human rights as 
much as he did. For most of Carter’s interlocutors at the Trilateral Commission, including 
Brzezinski, human rights was one of several aspects of the new interdependence, and 
even then it ranked below the need for trilateral economic coordination, energy 
cooperation and conservation, and moderating the North-South dialogue. “I shared in 
[Carter’s belief in human rights], up to a point,” Brzezinski explained. “Indeed, later on, 
when a choice between the two had to be made, between projecting U.S. power or 
enhancing human rights (as, for example, in Iran), I felt that power had to come first.”501 
For Carter, a human rights policy implied not only ending the “Nixon-Kissinger-
Ford” policy of supporting anti-communist governments regardless of their human rights 
records, but also actively using America’s bilateral leverage to push its non-democratic 
partners toward openness and reform. This failure, he believed, contributed to developing 
countries’ dissatisfaction with an American-led world order, in which an otherwise false 
coalition of Third World states united around the common denominator of American 
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hypocrisy. Kissinger’s conciliatory speech at UN Seventh Special Session in 1975 was a 
start, but such gestures were undermined by the rest of the Ford Administration’s policies 
toward the Third World, including its intervention in Angola and tacit approval of 
Augusto Pinochet’s regime in Chile. Here, Brzezinski agreed. “I was concerned that 
America was becoming ‘lonely’ in the world,” he explained in his memoirs. “I felt 
strongly that a major emphasis on human rights as a component of U.S. foreign policy 
would advance America’s global interests… [in] the emerging nations of the Third 
World.”502 In other words, the U.S. could not have it both ways: in order to credibly align 
itself with progressive and democratic reform in the Third World, it had to match its 
criticism of other states’ human rights records with improvements to its own. 
The task of defining a human rights policy fell to an inter-agency commission 
chaired by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher. The group worked largely 
from the template Carter had laid out in his Notre Dame speech, and the results reflected 
the importance he had given there to meeting basic human needs.503 PRM-28 defined 
three areas of human rights: first, “the right to be free from governmental violations of 
the integrity of the person,” such as torture and lack of fair trail; second, “economic and 
social rights,” namely, “the right to be free from government action or inaction” which 
inhibits individuals from meeting “basic needs” like health care, education, and shelter; 
and third, “the right to enjoy civil and political liberties.” There was unanimous support 
for including the first group, Christopher wrote, but “considerable discussion” about the 
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second and third. However, Carter and Vance “expressly included them” because of their 
relevance for North-South relations. “A policy which subordinated these rights would not 
only be inconsistent with our humanitarian ideals and efforts,” Christopher explained, 
“but would also be unacceptable in the Third World where the tendency is to view basic 
economic and social rights as the most important human rights of all.”504 
Although PRM-28 defined all three groups as central to the Administration’s 
human rights policy, the Administration suggested that priority would be given to the first 
set of violations. Civil and political liberties were a “long term goal” that required 
building strong democratic institutions, while social and economic rights were “primarily 
a matter of helping to stimulate economic development.” However, “in countries where 
the first group of rights is denied or threatened, the protection of those rights has obvious 
priority.”505  This was especially relevant for U.S. policy in Latin America, home to both 
the most advanced developing economies that no longer qualified for the kind of basic 
needs assistance that USAID would provide, and the most blatant and well-publicized 
violations of “the integrity of the person” prioritized in PRM-28. 
There were other important reasons why a human rights policy was implemented 
first—and pretty much exclusively—in the Western Hemisphere. The two countries in 
which the U.S. had the greatest economic stake, Mexico and Venezuela, were 
functioning, if imperfect democracies, and despite their leadership of the NIEO, in both 
instances the U.S. retained good bilateral relations. In the military dictatorships of Chile, 
Argentina, and Uruguay, the U.S. had few interests beyond shared anti-communism, and 
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the only real admirers of these regimes were other sitting or aspiring military dictators. 
“Venezuela’s interests are not the same as ours,” the State Department noted, “but they 
are closer to ours than any other regional power.” Of Pérez’s goals, only “high prices for 
oil and OPEC solidarity… directly conflicts with our own.” Pérez had “a much larger 
role to play” than other Latin American heads of state, from Canal negotiations to human 
rights to regional economic development. Cooperation with Pérez—the leader of the most 
important developing country in the most important region of developing countries—on 
human rights and development, State decided, “would be a model for similar projects in 
other developing countries.”506 
Carter’s goal of creating inter-American solidarity around human rights received 
an early victory at the June 1977 meeting of the Organization of American States in 
Grenada. Intent to send a signal, within months of taking office Carter reduced military 
aid to Argentina and Uruguay, two of the worst abusers of the first category of human 
rights, violations of the person. Two weeks later, Vance himself traveled to the OAS 
meeting, with the intention of multilateralizing what was still only bilateral pressure. 
With the democratic governments of Venezuela, Costa Rica, and the Caribbean, the OAS 
passed a resolution declaring that “there are no circumstances that justify torture, 
summary execution, or prolonged detention without trial contrary to law.” Attempts by 
Argentina and Chile to include an amendment justifying extreme actions in the face of 
“terrorism” were subsequently rejected by the other members.507 
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The State Department viewed the OAS session as a major step forward. “We now 
have hard evidence that human rights concerns have genuine support in Latin America,” 
with “half of Latin America, including the entire Caribbean, lined up behind us.” 
However, there was a caveat: “The Grenada Assembly put us clearly on notice that we 
cannot escape the economic dimension of human rights.” The human rights resolutions 
were passed, but narrowly, while a resolution from Colombia calling for the promotion of 
human rights through economic development was “carried by acclamation” from all 
delegations. The rhetoric on development had been delivered by the President, the First 
Lady, and Vance; now, action was needed to ensure that human rights was not seen as a 
smokescreen for avoiding “the aspect of human rights emphasized most in Latin culture, 
socio-economic well-being.” “Progress on economic issues,” State concluded, “will be 
critical to allay fears that we are defining human rights narrowly to divert attention from 
basic North-South issues of growth and equity.”508 
That action would be hard to effect. In fact, it would have been easier if the 
Administration’s slogan—“trade, not aid”—were reversed. “A decade ago,” the State 
Department pointed out, “aid was our major tool, and the Executive Branch could take 
most of the decisions.” But the President now had less authority, explicit or otherwise, to 
negotiate on trade and finance. “Decisions on trade are shared with Congress and 
critically influenced by domestic pressure-groups,” while for capital and technology 
transfers, “which come right after trade for the Latins… private firms and banks call the 
tune, not the U.S. government.”509 These constrictions on the making of foreign 
                                                     
508 JCPL, RAC, NLC-24-61-3-5-9, Memorandum for Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Follow-up to President 
Carter’s Pan-American Day Speech and Mrs. Carter’s Trip,” July 19, 1977, pp. 2-3. 
509 JCPL, RAC, NLC-24-65-3-8-9, “Review of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America,” undated. 
239 
 
economic policy might have increased in the U.S. and other developed countries since the 
world was awakened to its growing interdependence at the beginning of the 70s, but the 
same analysis could be applied to the corporate- and interest group-dominated Alliance 
for Progress legislation in the 60s. As Carter would learn in his meetings with Latin 
American leaders, they would find this defense self-serving at best. 
 
Debt, Development, and Human Rights: The Case of Venezuela, 1977-79 
 
Venezuela had long occupied a unique position in Third World politics. “At 
minimal risk of inciting U.S. retaliation,” one scholar explains, “Caracas could express a 
Third World solidarity and sometimes defy cold war policies.” During the Alliance for 
Progress, the progressive Romulo Betancourt was the Kennedy Administration’s chosen 
partner, sharing both a commitment to social and economic reform and regional anti-
communism. Like other U.S. allies Betancourt condemned Cuban guerrillas and defeated 
his country’s own insurgents by force, but he also allowed Marxist political parties to 
operate freely, believing “from experience… that a policy of tolerance and flexibility 
could divide and weaken the communist left.” Pérez continued Venezuela’s policy of 
resisting Castro’s adventurism in the Hemisphere but also pursued a cautious 
rapprochement, opening diplomatic relations with Cuba in 1974. He also expanded 
Betancourt’s democratic progressivism into a strident Third World internationalism, 
though he distrusted the Non-Aligned Movement due to Castro’s ambitions for pro-
Soviet leadership. Pérez preferred instead to use the United Nations to advocate for 
developing countries, where they had the best chance for both solidarity and 
credibility.510  
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Pérez also used his international advocacy to build support for his government at 
home. Venezuelan television networks showed his UN speeches live, and newspapers 
celebrated Venezuela’s outsized role in global politics. However, unlike many other 
countries in a Third World leadership position—especially their OPEC brethren—
Venezuela abstained from the infamous 1975 UN resolution equating Zionism with 
racism. Instead, Venezuelan diplomats like Pérez-Guerrero and Simon Alberto Consalvi 
were widely respected for their approach to international economic issues in UNCTAD 
and the General Assembly.511  Venezuela’s insistence at the UN on a link between the 
arms race and global poverty also matched the beliefs of Jimmy Carter and many other 
liberal internationalists in the West. Pérez received support for his efforts from the 
leaders of several Christian Democratic and Social Democratic parties, including West 
German Chancellor Willy Brandt, who made the link a main theme of the 1980 “Brandt 
Commission” report, North-South: A Programme for Survival.512  
Pérez had been elected President in March 1974, just as human rights abuses in 
Latin America were becoming the focus of concerted international attention and activism 
in the U.S. and, especially, Western Europe.513 He especially welcomed Carter’s focus on 
Southern Cone dictators like Pinochet, whom he held responsible for the death of his 
friend, Salvador Allende. Following Pinochet’s seizure of power, Pérez “opened his 
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country to a flood of [Chilean] exiles,” turning Caracas into “a central meeting place for 
UP [Unidad Popular] and Christian Democratic leaders, some of whom moved 
clandestinely back and forth from Chile.”514 
From the beginning of his administration Carter wrote to Pérez regularly, 
describing him as his “counselor” on North-South and Latin American issues. Pérez, 
impressed with Carter’s sincerity and commitment to human rights, praised his 
counterpart as “a voice [rising] from a great nation to tell the world that human values are 
paramount.”515 In their first official meeting in Washington, two weeks after the OAS 
resolution against the Southern Cone, Pérez joked to Carter that “coordination of policies 
might be too easy,” given their mutual interest in human rights, democracy, and 
development. Indeed, as they ran through bilateral and regional issues—human rights, 
terrorism, Caribbean development, Cuba—Carter and Pérez were mostly in agreement. 
Where disagreement existed, such as Pérez’s decision to reopen diplomatic relations with 
Cuba, both sides appeared understanding of their varying domestic and international 
pressures. On human rights, Pérez proposed that they issue a Joint Declaration and take 
additional measures to strengthen the Inter-American Commission of the OAS following 
the resolution at Grenada.516  
Pérez continued to support Carter’s human rights policy throughout 1977. He 
publicly supported Carter’s non-proliferation and arms control agendas, increased 
contributions to the OAS Inter-American Human Rights Commission, and backed a 
Carter Administration proposal to grant the Commission “automatic, on-site investigation 
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of alleged abuses in individual countries.”517 Yet, State Department fears about the 
“economic dimension of human rights” persisted, for good reason. In past years, the U.S. 
had not come close to meeting the 0.7% of GDP target for Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) recommended by the UN, and in fact rejected the target as unfair since 
the U.S. gave more aid in absolute terms than any other country.518 Most important, in 
June 1977, the much-hyped CIEC, co-chaired by Pérez-Guerrero, concluded with modest 
results.  
As Kissinger had done at UNCTAD IV,519 Secretary of State Vance delivered a 
well-received opening speech at the CIEC committing the U.S. to a new era of North-
South cooperation. The U.S. delegation generally held to the positions advocated by the 
ODC and Trilateral Commission during the campaign—which, in fact, were not far off 
from Kissinger’s stance in 1975. U.S. officials agreed to a Common Fund, but left its 
content and capitalization ambiguous; they supported a Special Action Program for the 
Fourth World worth $1 billion, with the U.S. contribution at $375 million (subject to 
Congressional approval); and they pledged to increase ODA aid to multilateral agencies, 
with Vance promising to double bilateral and multilateral assistance within five years—
also, of course, subject to Congress. No substantial agreements were reached on energy—
the most important issue for the U.S.—and debt—the most important issue for 
developing countries. “At the Conference’s last plenary meeting,” the IMF’s Executive 
Director reported in Foreign Affairs, “a hastily drafted, and uncommonly bland, report 
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was presented for adoption to a glum and exhausted audience.” The report was “approved 
but not applauded by the delegates.”520  
The State Department was “reasonably satisfied” with the CIEC’s results, in that 
blandness, not acrimony, dominated its concluding resolutions. The real failure was in the 
persistence of bloc politics, “on which the state of bilateral relations between the U.S. and 
particular countries has had only a rough bearing.” For instance, Iran and Saudi Arabia 
were “helpful” at the CIEC, namely because any major plan for debt relief would 
negatively impact their own status as creditors. “Mexico and Venezuela,” two countries 
especially attuned to the growing debt problem in Latin America—the result of excessive 
lending of Arab petrodollars from the Washington, London, and Paris banks who held 
them—“were not [helpful].”521 
In fact, CIEC discussions had been postponed near the end of the Ford 
Administration for this very reason. “Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina” and others, the NSC 
remarked, “all indicated that their support for postponement was based on expectations 
that the new Administration will soften the U.S. position on LDC debt.”522 By 1977 the 
debt problem had eclipsed the Common Fund as a priority for more than just the oil-
importing developing countries. In the 1970s Washington banks saw oil-rich Venezuela 
as a safe bet, and under Pérez the country’s external debt expanded from just $0.7 billion 
in 1974 to $6.1 billion in 1978.523 Venezuela, Nigeria, and other indebted oil exporters 
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argued that action on debt at CIEC would greatly improve the climate of future North-
South discussions at UNCTAD, UNCLOS, and the GATT.524 
However, instructions from the State Department made it certain that no 
substantial agreements would be reached at CIEC. “Because of its temporary nature and 
restricted membership,” State explained, “it is not a forum for negotiating binding 
commitments. It should not be expected, therefore, that CIEC will provide final answers 
to any of the outstanding North/South issues.” The CIEC could provide “general 
guidelines” on issues underway in other forums, like commodities (UNCTAD), basic 
human needs (World Bank), external financing (IMF), and trade (GATT), but on debt, 
negotiators had no instructions beyond opposition: “We see no prospect of action in 
CIEC or elsewhere on generalized debt relief.”525 
In March 1978, Carter made his third official trip to Venezuela to consult on 
human rights and the North-South dialogue. After a series of press conferences, Carter 
gave a major speech on the North-South dialogue to the Venezuelan Congress, in which 
he recommitted the U.S. to the (limited) agreements reached at the CIEC, emphasized 
meeting basic human needs, and proposed new cooperation on science and technology 
sharing.526  
North-South issues again dominated Carter’s private meeting with Pérez. Despite 
their harmony on human rights, a serious divide had emerged on the future direction of 
the dialogue. “Since [the CIEC] virtually nothing has happened,” Pérez complained, 
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adding that he felt “pessimistic” about the future. “What worries us is that the North-
South dialogue has stagnated.” Pérez-Guerrero, the former UNCTAD Secretary General 
and CIEC co-chair, explained why: 
We have the impression… that even the U.S. at times was more inclined 
to defend the status quo than create new solutions. There seemed to be at 
times those who looked to poverty as the problem rather than to structural 
changes. But while poverty and the need for aid should be attended to, a 
change in the rules of the game to permit nations to develop more 
equitably was also important.  
 
“Concern over the poor is understood,” Pérez added, “but poverty is a symptom not a 
cause.”  
Venezuela’s criticisms of the U.S.’s emphasis on basic needs and poverty over the 
developing countries’ structural agenda for trade and finance put Carter on the defensive. 
He blamed the G-77 for wanting “all or nothing” in the North-South dialogue and being 
unaware of the “practical limitations that exist,” especially in the U.S. Congress. In a 
way, Carter’s criticisms of the Nixon-Kissinger-Ford style of foreign policy had painted 
him into a corner.  Kissinger and Ford had been “prepared to cooperate more with the 
developing world than Congress,” Carter explained, whereas he had pledged closer 
cooperation and consultation with Congress on foreign policy. Carter also blamed the 
lack of progress on the diversity of the developing countries’ coalition, which lead to an 
“inability for the DC’s to negotiate with any semblance of order or mutual understanding 
with 90 different nations.” He and Vance recommended “smaller groups” to work out 
proposals on issues like commodities and debt, and UNCTAD did establish a body to 
work through the Common Fund as agreed to at the CIEC. But without a commitment 
from the U.S. to back a specific forum for dealing with debt, nothing substantial could 
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occur. On debt, the U.S. was prepared to do exactly what Pérez-Guerrero suspected, and 
what Vance had indicated behind the scenes at the CIEC: defend the status quo.527  
The Carter Administration’s decision on debt would have profound consequences 
for both Latin America and the South in general. If not exactly blameless, Pérez was the 
first to fall. He entered office with an unprecedented 48.7% of the vote, a plurality not 
seen since Betancourt’s victory in 1958, and his Acción Democrática party controlled 
both houses of Congress. Pérez used this mandate to nationalize Venezuela’s oil and iron 
industries, giving his government control over the massive revenues flowing in from a 
global commodity boom.528  
As part of his “Great Venezuela” program, Pérez embraced a populist social 
policy, subsidizing education, health care, and a nationalist industrial policy involving 
large subsidies to existing and new state-owned enterprises. By 1978 Pérez’s government 
had managed to reduce the poverty rate to 10% and unemployment to 5.5%, and 
Venezuela had a per capita income equaling that of West Germany.529 With an eye to 
rising inflation, Pérez established the Venezuelan Investment Fund to reinvest oil profits 
in various regional development projects and to provide aid to Latin American and 
Caribbean oil importers.530 
The boom did not last. Efforts to “sow the oil” through industrial policy, such as 
an attempt to build up a Venezuelan auto industry, required far more investment than 
could ever be expected in profits. Pérez ended up putting more money into industry and 
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infrastructure than social programs, dedicating 15% less to spending on education, health, 
housing, and government services than his predecessor.531 The focus on industrial policy 
left other critical sectors behind: by the end of Pérez’s term, dependence on foreign 
foodstuffs had increased to 70 percent and food prices had risen by 16 percent, leading 
the government to subsidize basic foodstuffs in addition to industry.532 His strategy also 
suffered from the vast web of patronage and corruption encouraged by ready money and 
lack of adequate oversight. Public corruption became the focal point of opposition to his 
government, including within Acción Democrática, which began to block his spending 
proposals in Congress.533 Falling oil prices in 1976-77 did not help, leading Pérez to seek 
outside loans to meet his large domestic and foreign commitments. 
In December 1978 Pérez and Acción Democrática were defeated by the Christian 
Democratic Party. The new President, Luis Herrera Campins, quickly “liberated” 
domestic food prices and virtually eliminated automobile production. “I inherited a 
country mortgaged by debts,” Herrera explained to Venezuelans on the day of his 
inauguration.534 His meetings with U.S. officials were dominated not by the North-South 
dialogue and human rights, but by concerns about falling oil prices and new energy 
cooperation measures with the United States and Mexico, which had just discovered large 
oil and gas reserves off its coast.  
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Like Herrera, José López-Portillo— Echeverría’s successor in Mexico—was 
“expected to moderate Mexico’s flamboyant advocacy of Third World positions.” 
Echeverría’s leadership in the North-South dialogue had become “an irritant” in its 
bilateral relations with the U.S. and had worried both American and Mexican investors, 
Carter Administration officials explained.535 Calming investor fears was essential for the 
success of López-Portillo’s plans for a gas pipeline to the United States, which involved a 
complicated interplay of inviting but also containing U.S. influence in the project.  
López-Portillo would not return to the North-South dialogue in a significant way 
until 1981, when he agreed to host a North-South summit in Cancún attended by the new 
conservative leaders of the U.S. and Britain, Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. That 
North-South summit—expected to revive what little spirit of generosity the North had left 
after a second oil crisis, even more inflation, and the return of East-West tensions—
would be the last. Less than a year later, López-Portillo’s finance minister announced that 
Mexico was defaulting on its foreign debt, kicking of a regional debt crisis culminating in 
La Década Perdida—the Lost Decade of development for Latin America. 
 
Security Crises and the End of the Global Approach, 1979-80 
 
Changes of government in Venezuela and Mexico were one reason why North-
South issues virtually disappeared from the U.S.’s Latin America strategy by 1979. 
Another was a series of global and regional security crises, which would overturn 
fundamental assumptions about human rights and democracy central to the Carter 
Administration’s “post-Cold War” vision. 
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Many scholars have noted a “second half” of the Carter Administration, in which 
a series of international crises overtook its lofty goals for world order and cooperation.536 
Much of this centers on a Vance-Brzezinski split, in which Carter sided with the hawkish 
Cold Warrior Brzezinski over the more dovish Vance.537 In fact, most of the impetus for 
a tougher stance on security came from Carter, who, frustrated with the State 
Department’s failure to speak out on Soviet-Cuban interventions in Angola and 
Afghanistan, instructed Brzezinski to take the lead.538 
The first, and most serious, crisis in Latin America was Nicaragua, which had 
been run since the 1930s as a family dictatorship. By the mid-1970s the Somoza family 
had alienated virtually every group outside of its inner circle with its blatant corruption 
and repression. In September 1977 Anastasio Somoza, under pressure from the Carter 
Administration, permitted a political opening, but soon reversed course when he realized 
the full scope of opposition to his regime, which included not just the lower and middle 
classes but also the leaders of the Nicaraguan business community. Following the 
assassination of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, a prominent opposition leader and newspaper 
editor, the business community called for a general strike that shut down the capital. 
However, their leadership during the strike was eclipsed when members of the Sandinista 
National Liberation Front (FSLN), a group of Cuban-inspired guerrillas founded in 1961, 
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seized control of the palace in August 1978, signaling the end of nearly five decades of 
family dictatorship. 
“Caught between a dictator it refused to defend and a guerrilla movement that it 
would not support,” the Carter Administration sought a multilateral solution through the 
Organization of American States. After Somoza rejected OAS calls for a national 
plebiscite, the Carter Administration introduced sanctions on his regime but declined to 
support the FSLN, which despite representing an increasingly broad coalition proclaimed 
a revolutionary Marxist ideology. However, the Administration’s allies in Panama, Costa 
Rica, Mexico, and Venezuela supported the FSLN, as did Cuba, which supplied the 
guerrillas with much-needed arms. With help from Panama, Mexico, Venezuela, and 
others, the OAS rejected a U.S. proposal designed to limit the FSLN’s representation in a 
transitional government. Without support from his democratic friends, Carter decided 
against a unilateral solution, and on July 19, 1979, a Marxist government took power in 
Managua. With his country’s fortune in tow, Somoza fled first to Miami, but unlike the 
ailing Shah—who spent his final days in Minnesota receiving treatment for terminal 
cancer—the Carter Administration denied him entry. Somoza found his final residence in 
Paraguay, where he was assassinated one year later.539  
The crisis in Nicaragua marked the turn back to Cold War worries in the Western 
Hemisphere, and away from the global approach urged by Robert Pastor and the Linowitz 
Commission. When the Marxist New Jewel movement seized control in Grenada in 
March 1979, Carter again asked the Latin American democracies for advice. This time, 
they recommended neither helping nor confronting the increasingly pro-Cuban, pro-
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Soviet regime. Instead, the U.S. supported democratic governments in the Caribbean by 
increasing its aid programs, including the Caribbean Group for Cooperation in Economic 
Development (CG), promoted by UN Ambassador Andrew Young. Support in the U.S. 
Congress for Carter’s Caribbean development policy, never on firm ground, took another 
hit when the U.S. “discovered” a Soviet brigade off the coast of Cuba during the 1979 
Non-Aligned Summit in Havana. According to Pastor, “Castro thought the United States 
had concocted the entire incident to embarrass him at the Summit, but the incident was 
more embarrassing and politically costly to the Carter administration. As with each of the 
strategic confrontations in Cuba, the Soviet brigade issue had almost nothing to do with 
Cuba and almost everything to do with the perceived balance of power between the 
Soviet Union and the United States.”540 
There was one bright spot in the Caribbean. Since the “quite successful” start to 
the CG, Brzezinski reported hopefully to Carter, “the political winds in the Caribbean are 
definitely blowing in a moderate direction.”541 But this was too little, too late. According 
to Pastor, there was “no question” that the greatest failure of the Administration’s policy 
was economic. “We have been criticized most vigorously not for what we have failed to 
do, but for what we have done,” including doubling sugar duties, dumping tin, holding 
back funds from development banks, giving preferences on meat to Australia and New 
Zealand but not Latin America, and imposing countervailing duties against Brazilian 
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exports. “These decisions do not seem terribly important to us, but each has provoked a 
bitter response in Latin America, and they have a cumulative effect.”542  
Mexico was one example. The U.S. had failed to reduce trade barriers against 
Mexico during the negotiations over López-Portillo’s proposed gas pipeline. The conflict 
on trade expanded to disputes over border policy and weapon sales, and Carter’s 
unfortunate public comment on having contracted “Montezuma’s Revenge” while 
visiting Mexico in March 1979 compounded López-Portillo’s sense of disrespect, 
unnecessarily prolonging the important gas negotiations and straining U.S.-Mexico 
relations.543 When López-Portillo refused to admit the Shah into Mexico after his 
operation in the U.S., reasoning that it would hurt his standing in the Third World, Carter 
was “outraged.” “By the end of 1980,” Pastor concludes, “the relationship that Carter had 
hoped to build with Mexico had become a casualty to miscalculations, divergent 
perceptions, and some policy differences.”544 
All of the economic policies listed by Pastor had one thing in common: they were 
determined primarily by Congress. There was scarce public or Congressional support for 
liberalizing American trade with developing countries when Carter entered office; but as 
Kissinger had learned with the 1974 Trade Act, the one factor uniting the diverse 
governments of Latin America—Marxist, leftist, democratic, capitalist, liberal, 
nationalist, or authoritarian—was U.S. trade policy. Outside of GATT negotiations, the 
only real tool the President had to change trade policy was to convince Congress and the 
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American people that it was in their interests to do so. But the domestic effects of 
interdependence—in the form of surging energy crises, stagflation, and unemployment—
contributed to support for protectionism in the U.S. not seen since the 1930s. Considering 
too the strong precedent of American corporate influence over economic legislation 
affecting Latin America, even a direct appeal to the American people would probably 
have had little positive effect (and almost certainly a great deal of backlash).  
Carter’s call for increased economic and political cooperation with the Third 
World proved persuasive enough in 1976, but his seeming inability to deal effectively 
with multiple security crises in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East, and 
Central Asia—as well as a stagnant economy impervious to the tools of the old 
Keynesian playbook—exhausted public support for development before his 
Administration could really get started. Nor, however, did he continue to make the case 
for it to Americans after the first few months of his presidency, a fact not lost on officials 
in the NSC’s North-South cluster.545 As two public opinion analysts put it, the American 
public “felt bullied by OPEC, humiliated by the Ayatollah Khomeini, tricked by Castro, 
out-traded by Japan, and out-gunned by the Russians.” When the second oil shock hit in 
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July 1979, the same month the Sandinistas took control of Nicaragua, Carter’s popularity 




Despite claims to a global approach, the Carter Administration’s strategy in Latin 
America never really extended beyond regionalism. It was not without its successes—the 
amount of violations to the first human rights “basket,” the integrity of the person, 
declined significantly in the Southern Cone, and Carter would leave a powerful legacy in 
U.S. foreign policy that would be drawn upon by both Republicans and Democrats, 
sometimes for opposite purposes. However, a global approach based on changing U.S. 
trade policies for advanced developing countries, and a basic human needs strategy for 
poorer developing countries, were impossible without support from Congress, which 
Carter neither had nor sought.  
Instead, the NSC’s Thomas Thornton explained, Congressional protectionism was 
running opposite to “the open trade policies that the situation requires.” As for the basic 
needs approach, not only was it “seen as patronizing, if not interventionist, by most of the 
poorer countries with whom we deal,” it “reflected a condescending American attitude 
and was therefore especially ill-suited to mesh with a key aspect of our North-South 
strategy—the attempt to cultivate regional influentials.”547 Key developing countries 
remained unconvinced that Carter’s emphasis on basic needs was not a tactic to avoid 
discussion of structural issues. Thus, Pérez’s characterization of poverty as a “symptom” 
of international economic relations, rather than a “cause” in itself. 
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If the global approach never really happened, then the bilateral or regional 
approach was also failing to translate to other areas, namely, functionally specific forums 
like CIEC and UNCTAD. According to the NSC, these forums constituted the “soft” 
plane of North-South bargaining, and were the only places where the U.S. confronted the 
South as a whole. Despite warm relationships with several Third World leaders, “there is 
no effective link between our bilateral concerns with specific developing countries and 
the implementation of international economic policy on the one hand,” Guy Erb wrote to 
Brzezinski, “and [soft] ‘North-South’ encounters on the other.”548 This made sense when 
considering the generally conservative position taken by the U.S. in each of the soft 
forums; as Manuel Pérez-Guerrero told Carter, developing countries saw the U.S. as 
“more inclined to defend the status quo than create new solutions.” These 
contradictions—between Carter’s rhetoric and bilateral relationship-building, and his 
diplomats’ conservatism in UNCTAD and the CIEC—produced a strategy that was 
“fragmented and limited,” causing division in both North-South relations and North-
North relations. 
Nowhere was division more likely in soft forums than on debt. From the 
beginning of the North-South dialogue, U.S. proposals on debt focused almost 
exclusively on the poorest “Fourth World” countries. However, since then official debts 
had skyrocketed in the 14 “upper-tier” developing countries, whose annual interest 
payments were estimated at $7 billion and whose annual payments on principal were 
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expected to reach $16 billion by 1979, a 45 percent increase from 1976 and nowhere near 
the modest amounts the U.S. had pledged for the Fourth World.549 
If the U.S. was not prepared to act on debt, it would at least have to allow more 
exports from debtors—which it was also not prepared to do. “Without an adaptation to 
that need,” Erb foreshadowed, “we run the risk of threatening the viability of the 
international financial system.” The outlook for UNCTAD V in May-June, 1979 was not 
good: “The US position for the forthcoming UNCTAD meeting on international debt is 
currently so modest that strains within the OECD group and a confrontation with the 
developing countries appear inevitable.” Within the OECD, the U.S. was viewed by 
France, Britain, and Germany “as a conservative force whose defense of economic 
principles will prevent the adoption of measures that some European countries are willing 
to accept,” and by progressive Nordic countries like Sweden and The Netherlands “as an 
obstacle to real progress in the North-South Dialogue.”550 
Erb then outlined three strategies that the U.S. could take. One, the U.S. could 
continue to “muddle through” soft forums, with the hope that G-77 disunity would 
prevent confrontation. Two, the U.S. could “buy some time” with “a long list of 
initiatives,” as Kissinger had done in his speech at the UN Seventh special Session: 
“Such a policy might buy some time, but our credibility would be immediately 
questioned, and we would be correctly perceived as retreating from stated objectives.” 
Third, the U.S. could embrace the theme of shared cooperation from Carter’s speech to 
the Venezuelan Congress. Such an approach would include stressing the “hard choices” 
limiting U.S. policy, such as Congressional pressure and other domestic concerns, 
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“coupled with a serious effort to move toward mutually beneficial policy initiatives 
wherever possible,” especially in science and technology, food, and energy. This 
approach would also emphasize U.S. actions in the UN and functional organizations like 
the IMF, World Bank, GATT, and especially UNCTAD, in which the U.S. was most 
apart from both the G-77 and the OECD. 
Option three would not resolve the North-South divide by itself, but it “could 
break the deadlock in which the OECD countries and Group of 77 now find themselves,” 
while also helping to “clear the air” in U.S. bilateral or regional relationships.551 
However, it would require a substantial change in the State Department’s conservative 
position in soft forums. “We approach these economic negotiations individually without 
any grand strategy,” Thomas Thornton elaborated. 
What we need to do is find some areas where we need not be defensive. 
The only way to force [Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs] 
[Richard] Cooper and Company to do this is to make them show their 
entire hand on the full range of North-South negotiations. They have a 
very good case to make on each individual point. The poverty of their 
position seen as a whole, however, will be so evident that Vance or the 
President will tell them to do something.552 
 
“Firm implementation of this option would entail some bureaucratic upheavals,” Erb 
concluded, “but without a commitment to take that risk I see little prospect that our 
North-South policies will be any different in 1980 than they are now.”553 
Brzezinski approved option 3, and put Pastor, Erb, and Thornton to work on an 
outline for a new U.S. strategy for the North-South dialogue. But would they succeed 
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against bureaucratic resistance, a hostile Congress, and a skeptical public at a moment of 




Chapter 6: Basic Needs and Appropriate Technology, 1977-81 
 
Towards a North-South Strategy, 1977-78 
 
The Path to PRM-8, 1977 
 
National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski liked to tell reporters that, in 
contrast to Henry Kissinger and Gerald Ford, he and Jimmy Carter sought “architecture” 
over “acrobatics” for managing America’s global responsibilities.554 As he informed 
Carter in April 1977: “Your [foreign] policy… places emphasis not so much on 
maneuver, but on building new structures—new relationships with friends, with 
adversaries, with the developing world, even with the whole world—that we hope will 
have a measure of permanence. It is, therefore, an optimistic policy—we hope to build a 
better world—not simply survive in a hostile one. It is a policy of constructive global 
engagement.”555 
Carter’s team entered office determined to move U.S. foreign policy beyond Cold 
War binaries, and North-South relations immediately became its most ambitious—and 
scattershot—area of policymaking. In its first year the Administration successfully 
pursued its “political” goals in the Third World, most importantly the resolution of 
Panama Canal negotiations, but failed to secure an agreement with developing countries 
on energy at the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC). Outside of 
North-South economic negotiations (the “North-South dialogue”), Carter and Secretary 
of State Cyrus Vance devoted significant attention to reforming U.S. foreign assistance: 
evangelizing the concept of “basic human needs” at home and abroad, working with 
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Congress to redirect aid away from large-scale development projects and toward anti-
poverty programs, and setting up a world hunger initiative that declared as U.S. policy 
“[a] basic minimum level of health, nutrition, and family planning services should be 
available to the world’s poor, whether they live in rural areas or urban slums.”556 At the 
G-7 summits in London (May 1977) and Bonn (July 1978), Carter and his counterparts 
pledged to increase world development budgets and resist protectionism at home, but low 
growth and rising unemployment left summiteers unwilling to commit to numbers. 
Carter’s hopes to work with Europeans on reducing the global arms trade and the spread 
of nuclear technology ran into firm resistance from France and West Germany, both 
unwilling to risk offending Third World countries with whom they had signed major 
arms and nuclear fuel agreements.557 
Administration officials were well aware of this conceptual incoherence. “We 
have not devised an overall economic or political strategy,” the NSC’s new “North-South 
cluster” concluded in its first annual report. “Much of our policy has appeared to be in the 
form of isolated initiatives rather than part of a more general perspective.”558 The White 
House had spent the better part of 1977 working through three “Tracks” of “PRM [Policy 
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Review Memorandum]-8,”559 an attempt to set medium term (12 months) and long term 
(4-8 years) policies for reforming North-South political and economic relations, and 
morale was low. Roger Hansen, an expert on North-South relations at Johns Hopkins and 
Senior Fellow at the Overseas Development Council (ODC) whom Brzezinski had 
brought on to help with Track II, nearly quit as a result of bureaucratic turf wars and 
personality clashes between the State Department, the Economic Policy Group (headed 
by the Treasury Department), and the North-South Cluster.560  “I have wasted your time 
and mine,” Hansen despaired to Brzezinski in July, “and it appears that no constructive 
purpose has been served.”561 
In October 1977 Carter finally received and signed a Presidential Directive for 
North-South relations that declared “trade, access to capital markets, and foreign 
assistance the leading edge of our strategy, since these policies maximize the role of 
market forces and most efficiently promote development.” The document also pledged to 
“pursue multiple objectives in the Third World relating to our security, economic, and 
humanitarian concerns,” including “policies which restrict arms transfers and control 
                                                     
559 PRM-8 was one of the first studies called for by the NSC, of just 7 others in January 1977. A CIA 
analysis noted: “Of the first 24 PRMs assigned by the NSC… fully 15 dealt at least in part with ‘southern’ 
matters—e.g., human rights, military base rights in key LDCs, Southern Africa, and nuclear weapons 
proliferation prospects in such countries as India, Pakistan, Brazil, Argentina—an indication of the 
importance accorded issues affecting U.S. relations with the LDCs by the new administration.” (JCPL, 
RAC, NLC-29-42-4-10-9, CIA Studies in Intelligence, vol. 21, no. 4 (Winter 1977), “Anatomy of PRM-8”.  
560 “It has taken three weeks to get thoughtful people from key agencies to believe that this was a serious 
exercise,” Hansen wrote to a Brzezinski aide. “There is deep skepticism, much of it stemming from the fact 
that the EPG is seen as the ‘operative’ group on the issue.” (JCPL, RAC, NLC-133-225-2-4-8, NSC 
Memorandum, Hansen to Aaron, “My ‘Resignation,’” April 11, 1977). Hansen was not alone. The same 
day, Robert Pastor wrote to Brzezinski’s deputy on “The Atomization of the North-South Cluster,” 
complaining that “[it] is a unit only in name.” (JCPL, RAC, NLC-24-59-2-3-5, NSC memorandum, Pastor 
to Aaron, April 11, 1977).  
 
*Although few of his colleagues were probably aware, Hansen suffered from severe depression. After his 
tragic suicide in 1991, aged 55, college friend Calvin Trillin wrote a moving and insightful book on 
Hansen’s life, his struggles, and their meaning, titled Remembering Denny. 




nuclear technology,” encouraging Communist countries “to make a more constructive 
contribution to the amelioration of poverty,” and addressing “the basic human needs of 
poor people in developing countries.” In terms of the North-South dialogue—that is, 
discussions in the UN General Assembly and UNCTAD, which would hold its fifth 
meeting in June 1979—the Administration’s position was dismissive if not hostile. “[W]e 
will make an effort to channel negotiations, particularly on technical issues, in more 
specialized, functionally specific institutions where the environment is less politicized,” 
the authors emphasized. “[O]ther issues—such as commodities and official debt—are of 
political importance to LDCs frequently out of proportion to their potential economic 
significance.”562 
 
Problems and Prospects, 1978 
 
Southern leaders did not hesitate to register their disappointment at the 
Administration’s less than forthcoming stance on global negotiations. At the CIEC’s 
conclusion in June 1977, U.S. negotiators had replayed the Kissinger card of accepting a 
Common Fund “in principle” while resisting proposals for a new forum to deal with 
developing countries’ rising sovereign debts.563 “Since [the CIEC] virtually nothing has 
happened,” President Carlos Andrés Pérez of Venezuela told Carter when he visited 
Caracas in March 1978. “What worries us is that the North-South dialogue has stagnated. 
We have talked about ways of moving the dialogue forward in the UN. The G-77 has 
                                                     
562 JCPL, RAC, NLC-24-101-8-2-2, Presidential Directive/NSC, “U.S. Policies Toward Developing 
Countries,” undated. 
563 The expectation that the Administration would “soften the U.S. position on LDC debt” was the main 
reason Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, Nigeria, and others postponed reconvening the CIEC in the second 
half of 1976. (JCPL, RAC, NLC-24-59-2-4-4, Telegram, State to Embassies, April 1977.) 
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pressed for an open forum. No decisions have been made to carry out the limited 
agreements of [the] CIEC.”564  
Carter received similar feedback that summer, when he, Brzezinski, Deputy 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and UN Ambassador Andrew Young met with the 
heads of several Latin American countries to discuss, in Jamaican Prime Minister 
Michael Manley’s phrase, the “primordial issue of the North-South dialogue.” Speaking 
for the group, Manley listed the Common Fund, resource transfers, IMF reform, and debt 
rescheduling as the “four components” necessary to move the dialogue forward. Without 
renewed attention to the dialogue, Pérez added, “the President is likely to hear screams 
instead of rhetoric” from the South.565 
Two months after the Manley meetings, the Carter Administration underwent its 
second major North-South strategy review. The most consistent observation was that the 
Administration’s progressive but disparate actions had done no more to change the 
dialogue’s agenda than those of its predecessors. “Since 1974 we have been on the 
defensive,” Undersecretary for Economic Affairs Richard Cooper wrote to Vance. “To a 
great extent this is inherent in the character of the debate, since the G–77 are the 
demandeurs, and we are the defenders, if not of the status quo at least of the essentials of 
the existing international economic system.”566  
                                                     
564 JCPL, RAC, NLC-24-47-2-11-9, Memorandum of Conversation, President Carter and President Pérez of 
Venezuela, March 29, 1978. 
565 FRUS, 1977-1980, Vol. 3, Foreign Economic Policy, doc. 306 
(https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v03/d306).  
566 FRUS, 1977-1980, Vol. 3, Foreign Economic Policy, doc. 315 
(https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v03/d315). The North-South cluster’s Guy Erb 
described the Administration’s “defensive” position another way: “containment”: 
We seek to contain first those developed countries that wish to adopt more forthcoming 
approaches to negotiations with developing countries; and second, the leading developing 
countries, whose proposals are seen as a challenge to an economic system that has served 
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Another problem, the NSC’s Thomas Thornton pointed out, was that the 
Administration lacked, if not the capital for “a different distribution of the world’s 
resources and power,” as the South insisted, then any “strong base of public and 
Congressional support for [such] policies.”567 But that support had to be cultivated—and 
in a sustained and realistic way. The Common Fund was one prominent example. “The 
developing countries see the Fund as the touchstone of industrial countries’ attitudes 
toward their aspirations and our support for it as an important indication of our 
commitment to a constructive North/South dialogue,” Vance told Carter in August 1978, 
and, reminding him of his commitments at the London and Bonn summits on that issue, 
urged the President to begin a strategy to secure its eventual ratification before the U.S. 
Senate.568 “Even this modest version (with a provision that excluded mandatory U.S. 
contributions)” Treasury Secretary Blumenthal warned Carter at the time, “may not be 
acceptable to the Congress without your heavy personal involvement.”569 However, 
Carter never did speak to Congress in support of the Common Fund agreements and, after 
the conclusion of negotiations in July 1980, would not risk sending them to the Senate 
during election season. To no one’s surprise, the Reagan Administration declined to 
submit for Congressional ratification the agreements signed by Carter, and the Common 
Fund finally become operable in 1989 without any U.S. support. 
                                                     
our interests well and could also serve the interests of developing countries if given a 
chance.  
(Ibid, doc. 295, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v03/d295)  
567 FRUS, 1977-1980, Vol. 3, Foreign Economic Policy, doc. 320 
(https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v03/d320).  
568 FRUS, 1977-1980, Vol. 3, Foreign Economic Policy, doc. 314 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v03/d314.  
569 FRUS, 1977-1980, Vol. 3, Foreign Economic Policy, doc. 313 
(https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v03/d313). Emphasis added.  
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In August, Cooper proposed to Vance “A Possible Orientation for North-South 
Strategy in 1979” that would address both problems by focusing U.S. strategy on two 
unique “strengths”: “[O]ur leadership in moral and humane values (in particular, our 
commitment to freedom of the individual and our defense of his rights against the state 
and other large impersonal entities) and our technological prowess.” Unlike resource- and 
power-transfer items like the Common Fund—which U.S. officials had a difficult enough 
time selling to each other, let alone Congress and the American public—new American 
proposals for combating poverty and sharing scientific knowledge could be promoted as 
examples of U.S. leadership consistent with individualistic values about markets and 
human rights.  
Carter was fond of Biblical logic—and what was technology transfer but teaching 
a man to fish? Further, Carter and Vance had already done a good deal of legwork getting 
the word out on basic needs, naming the approach as official U.S. policy in several 
speeches throughout 1977, including Vance’s landmark human rights speech at the 
University of Georgia that declared “the right to the fulfillment of such vital needs as 
food, shelter, health care, and education” to be an essential human right.570 “The 
President’s early emphasis on the importance of human rights as an element of American 
foreign policy, and the shift of emphasis in our aid program to basic human needs, have 
both helped us to regain the initiative in the area of moral and humane values,” Cooper 
continued. “Not all developing countries will like this position, but in my view it provides 
                                                     





the only possible basis for building and sustaining broad-based support for foreign 
assistance with the American public.”571 
 
Negotiating the Stalemate at UNCTAD, 1979 
 
1979 was a fateful year for world order. The People’s Republic of China began 
opening its economy to the West, while the Soviet Union pursued a strategy of outright 
aggression in Afghanistan. Communist Vietnam invaded Communist Cambodia, where 
the U.S. and others ignored genocide until the very last minute. In Nicaragua a right-wing 
dictator fell to leftist revolutionaries; in Iran, a pro-Western autocracy was turned 
practically overnight into an anti-Western theocracy. The developed countries’ oil bill 
spiked once again, as did inflation and unemployment. Economic growth suffered, and so 
did Carter’s approval rating. 
It was also a fateful year for the North-South dialogue. Ongoing Common Fund 
negotiations excepted, North and South had not returned to the table since the failed 
CIEC in 1977. That summer’s series of conferences—most importantly the fifth meeting 
of UNCTAD in May and the UN Conference on Science and Technology for 
Development (UNCSTD) in August—were highly anticipated by both sides. However, in 
their expectations for what the dialogue could—or should—achieve, North and South 
could not have been farther apart. 
 
The South Prepares for UNCTAD V 
 
In September 1978, representatives from the three G-77 “groups” (Latin America, 
Africa, and Asia) began meeting to prepare an agenda for UNCTAD that reflected shared 
                                                     




priorities and reinforced group solidarity. In their first presentation in December, the 
ministers made clear that they expected movement on the proposals for global structural 
reform that North and South had been kicking back and forth since 1974. “The North-
South dialogue has moved from the era of declaration to the era of negotiation,” they 
announced in a group statement to the press. Indeed, this was why UNCTAD V was 
meeting three and not four years after UNCTAD IV: the G-77 wanted to ensure that the 
U.S.’s negotiating capacity would not be constrained by an election year.572  
In February 1979, G-77 ministers met for the fourth time in Arusha, Tanzania, 
after which they released to the press their agenda for UNCTAD V. In addition to a 
comprehensive “Framework of Negotiations,”573 which would be used at UNCTAD V 
more or less verbatim, the lengthy “Arusha Programme” also contained a strongly 
worded “Plan for Collective Self-Reliance.” Its “Action Plan” called for, in effect, the 
establishment of a set of alternative international trade agreements, designed by 
UNCTAD experts and governed by and for the South.574  
The Action Plan was, on its face, unrealistic, involving the creation of dozens of 
new organizations and agreements that the “Group B” developed countries could not 
                                                     
572 Robert K. Olson, U.S. Foreign Policy and the New International Economic Order: Negotiating Global 
Problems, 1974-1981 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), 36, fn. 12.  
573 The framework proposed eight negotiating groups, including:  
1) structural changes and the way UNCTAD could be strengthened 
2) abolishing Group B protectionism 
3) revisiting North-South terms of trade 
4) more debt relief and fewer conditionalities for loans 
5) technology transfer 
6) special treatment for Least Developed Countries (LLDCs) 
7) trade between developing and socialist countries 
8) economic cooperation among developing countries.  
(Stephen Taylor, "Note of the Month," The World Today 35, no. 8 (1979): 311-15.) 
574 The Action Plan included a global system of exclusionary trade preferences among developing 
countries, cooperation among state trading organizations, establishment of multinational enterprises, 
strengthening of existing regional and sub-regional groups like the Latin American Economic System 
(SELA), technology sharing, and more. 
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possibly support. But like many bold proposals associated with the NIEO, its logic 
becomes clearer in light of developed country resistance to more moderate trade reforms 
within the existing system. A good example is the Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP), a plan to grant poorer countries special, non-reciprocal trade concessions with the 
North that would otherwise violate GATT rules. First proposed in 1964 by UNCTAD 
founding Secretary-General Raúl Prebisch, the GSP was affirmed by both sides at 
UNCTAD II in 1968 and once again at GATT negotiations in 1971. However, Northern 
countries demanded their own concessions in return, including “the right not only to 
decide the products to which to extend GSP but also to withdraw the preference if 
domestic problems required it,” thereby nullifying the GSP’s full power.575 
Further, as Chapter 5 shows, efforts at Southern regional and sub-regional 
organization required only the support of interested states. In response to the 1974 U.S. 
Trade Act, which removed special preferences for Venezuela because of its OPEC 
membership (despite not participating in OPEC’s anti-U.S. boycott), Latin American 
states formed their own regional trade pact excluding the U.S. and oriented toward 
Europe.576 Either way, the Arusha Programme demonstrated the G-77’s profound 
frustration with the course of the dialogue, following Kissinger’s laundry list of promises 
in 1975-76 and the Carter Administration’s inability (or as many in the South saw it, 
unwillingness) to follow through on its own renewed pledges to increase Official 
Development Aid, open U.S. markets to Southern competition, and provide financing and 
                                                     
575 I. S. Gulati, "UNCTAD Yes, Structural Reform No." Economic and Political Weekly 14, no. 36 (1979): 
1547. 
576 In a 1985 interview, Raul Prebisch, the “father” of UNCTAD, summarized the results of Latin American 
regional economic integration with characteristic ambivalence and wit: “It was not a failure. It was not a 
success. It was a mediocrity. A typical Latin American mediocrity.” (Raul Prebisch interview with David 
Pollock, http://www.cepal.org/publicaciones/xml/7/20097/lcg2150i_Pollock.pdf).  
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loans on better terms.577 “The phase of petition is over,” the G-77 ministers reiterated in 
their joint statement. “That of organized practical action must begin.”578  
 
The North Prepares for UNCTAD V 
 
In its own preparations, the Carter Administration effectively declared the 
negotiations over before they began. “We believe that by UNCTAD V, if agreement on 
the Common Fund can be reached, commodity and debt issues will move off center 
stage,” the State Department predicted in late 1978. “New issues, however, will emerge 
to fill the agenda. We want to be in a position to guide the selection of issues and shape 
the way in which they are addressed.”579  
In the meantime, U.S. officials developed a list of “alternative” proposals for a 
post-UNCTAD North-South agenda. The objective was to move the dialogue beyond the 
South’s persistent emphasis on changing international economic structures and resources 
transfers—basically, what Northern states could do for Southern states—and towards 
“the alleviation of the worst physical aspects of poverty [and] the promotion of self-
sustaining growth with equity”—what Southern states, with Northern states’ targeted 
assistance, could do for their citizens. For the State Department, the South’s adherence to 
the NIEO’s structural agenda and unenthusiastic reception of basic needs was the 
dialogue’s “central irony… that while it ostensibly centers on development, development 
per se is almost never discussed.” More important, a basic needs or development-focused 
                                                     
577 Commonwealth Secretary-General Shridath S. Ramphal said at Arusha, “We had high hopes when [U.S. 
Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs] Dick Cooper joined the administration, but nothing changed. 
What happens to people when they get into office?” (Olson, U.S. Foreign Policy, 34).    
578 Olson, U.S. Foreign Policy, 33. 




approach to the dialogue would be “politically appealing, economically sound and 
domestically supportable,” in a way that the previous strategy of limited concessions to 
G-77 institutional demands—e.g., the Common Fund—had not been.580 
Vance introduced the new U.S. policy in a March 1979 address titled “America’s 
Commitment to Third World Development.” The speech contained the usual nods to the 
necessity of international cooperation in an interdependent world, the U.S.’ commitment 
to working together with developing countries towards a more “just” economic order, and 
so on. Vance also listed several accomplishments of the first two Carter years, including 
expansion of the IMF’s lending capacities, new individual commodity agreements for 
coffee, tin, and sugar, easing of the debt burdens of some least developed countries 
(LLDCs), and Carter’s proposed International Development Cooperation 
Administration,581 intended to streamline the administration of U.S. foreign assistance. 
However, two features stood out. First, Vance made clear that the U.S. would no 
longer pretend to accept the New International Economic Order’s premises, dismissing 
“alterations in the international system and resource transfers among nations [as] ends in 
themselves.” In other words, the U.S. would not affix its name to any more new 
institutions controlled by the South than it already had. Second, Vance indicated that the 
                                                     
580 FRUS, Ibid.  
581 Carter himself submitted IDCA’s plans to Congress, which approved the new agency in July 1979. The 
idea initially came from Senator Hubert Humphrey, and the idea was to “depoliticize” foreign aid by 
removing USAID from the State Department and placing it under IDCA’s control. Guy Erb, an Overseas 
Development Council Senior Fellow and NSC North-South cluster member, was its first Deputy Director. 
However, according to one scholar, “President Carter did not support IDCA… [and] USAID programs 
were not immediately transferred from the State Department to IDCA. The end result was that the State 
Department co-opted IDCA.” Regardless, the Reagan Administration quickly brought IDCA, and with it 
USAID, back under State Department control, and, with no permanent staff or clear purpose, it was finally 
disbanded in 1998. (Rachel M. McCleary, Global Compassion: Private Voluntary Organizations and U.S. 
Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 130.) 
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U.S. would bring to UNCTAD V an agenda that was just as unilaterally determined as 
the Arusha Programme: 
Our progress in North-South negotiations—our progress toward a more 
equitable and healthy new international economic order—will turn on our 
common ability to avoid endless debates on sterile texts and to focus 
instead on concrete development problems which we can tackle together 
and which directly affect people’s lives. 
Only by focusing on practical ways to meet human needs can we remain 
clear about our goals and clear in explaining them to our peoples. I know 
that the American people will never be convinced that there is an inherent 
value only in resource flows among nations. They want to know, and have 
a right to know, how their taxes are being used to better the lives of people 
abroad. 
 
In terms of resource transfers, Vance was saying, this—basic needs and technology 
transfer—was the only new thing on the table: “Thus while we will continue to work with 
the developing countries in addressing the future of the international political and 
economic system, we intend increasingly to concentrate on specific development goals: 
energy, food, health, and increasing the capacity of the developing countries to obtain and 
apply the knowledge and technology they need.”582 
 
Stalemate and Division at UNCTAD V 
 
One month after Vance’s speech, 5,000 delegates and officials from over 200 
states and international organizations met in the brand new Philippine International 
Convention Center in Manila for UNCTAD V. The Manila program (adapted from 
Arusha) was complex, even by UNCTAD standards. The conference agenda listed over a 
dozen categories including interdependence, trade, monetary and financial issues, 
technology transfer, Economic Cooperation Among Developing Countries (ECDC), and 
                                                     




measures for “least developed countries” (LLDCs), with numerous subcategories for 
each. 
At UNCTAD IV Kissinger had made a major policy reversal and endorsed the G-
77’s Integrated Programme for Commodities, establishing a path towards the Common 
Fund. The developed countries would drag their feet in subsequent negotiations—which 
developing countries did not hesitate in pointing out—but at least in theory, the G-77 had 
made real progress toward its longstanding goal of giving UNCTAD an actual mandate in 
international economic policy.583  
The South’s hope for Manila was to extend this mandate into other areas 
controlled by developed countries, to bring about structural change from trade and 
finance to food and technology. This was the reason for the proliferation of agenda items, 
UNCTAD’s Secretary-General Gamani Corea explained: “In fact, structural change was 
not only the theme of each agenda item: it was also the subject of a separate agenda item 
which was intended to provide a conceptual frame for the Conference and in the context 
of which the international community was invited to confirm its conviction that structural 
changes were needed and to set up a mechanism for keeping issues in this field under 
review, particularly issues arising out of the interdependence of problems in the field of 
                                                     
583 Gamani Corea described UNCTAD’s conundrum: 
On the one hand, you have UNCTAD as an organization which takes various strong 
positions on various issues but is really a debating house in which certain views are 
expressed and goals are defined. It passes resolutions, but does not get on to implement 
them. You then have an institution which serves a purpose but after a while but then 
begins to lose credibility because then the countries, including developing countries, will 
say that UNCTAD does not produce results. A point can be reached where developing 
countries themselves feel that it is not UNCTAD where they can do business. Thus 
UNCTAD should be not only a generator of new ideas but should also supplement this 
role by becoming a place where you can do business. (“Interview with Gamini 
Corea." Third World Quarterly 1, no. 3 (1979): 10) 
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trade, money, and development.”584 This affirmed the UNCTAD leadership’s 
commitment to the NIEO’s most basic objective: the redistribution of political power in 
international economic relations. 
Per Vance’s speech, U.S. negotiators pursued the opposite. A State Department 
official involved in the negotiations summarized: “The specifics varied from issue to 
issue, but the policy remained the same: no funds, no institutions, no expansion of 
UNCTAD, no change in the present system, no impairment of U.S. autonomy, no 
increased international management, no invasion of the private sector.” On 
commodities—which accounted for over 80 percent of developing countries’ exports (95 
percent for LLDCs)—the U.S. rejected G-77 proposals for new “comprehensive 
frameworks” for marketing and distribution (though true to Vance’s promise it remained 
committed to completing Common Fund negotiations). On debt, the U.S. rejected G-77 
proposals for a separate commission that included creditors, still insisting that there was 
“no generalized debt problem” among developing countries (though it did agree to 
Retroactive Terms Adjustment (RTA) measures for seriously indebted countries). Where 
they could, U.S. negotiators stressed Washington’s hope that “the North-South dialogue 
would address the real issues of development [i.e., basic needs] rather than engage in 
sterile rhetoric.” Thus, the U.S. supported the Comprehensive New Program of Action for 
LLDCs, or “least developed countries,” based on the mutual recognition that most of the 
development programs of the 1960s had neither grown their economies nor improved 
living standards. The final resolution matched U.S. commitments to double its Official 
Development Assistance levels in three years (the same proposal Vance gave at the 
                                                     
584 Gamani Corea, Need For Change: Towards the New International Economic Order (London: 
Pergamon, 1980), 28.  
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CIEC) with a pledge for aid to meet “social objectives,” apparently a reference to basic 
needs.585 
Considering both sides’ expectations for conflict, the State Department equated 
stalemate with success. “Sweeping resolutions demanding major restructuring of the 
world’s economy went nowhere,” one official reported to Vance, and the conference 
“ended on a quiet note with no strong recriminations on the part of the G-77.”586 
However, this had less to do with Southern satisfaction with the conference’s results, than 
with Southern disunity over the topic of energy.  
Oil prices had been a source of tension within the Southern coalition since 1974, 
and both the Ford and Carter administrations had repeatedly pointed out that OPEC’s 
actions hurt rich and poor countries alike (and the poorest, the most). Energy was so 
controversial that, despite its obvious importance for global development, it appeared 
nowhere in UNCTAD V’s official agenda. However, UN Secretary-General Kurt 
Waldheim made the energy-development link in his plenary address. A few days later, 
U.S. Ambassador Andrew Young also argued that “global development had been 
seriously retarded” by high energy prices, and noted the “cruel irony” for “the most 
underdeveloped countries who are least able to bear it.”587  
Meanwhile, oil-importing developing countries were losing patience. In 1975 the 
Tanzanian Minister of Commerce accused OPEC of “appearing to turn their backs on the 
developing countries, particularly the least developed,” after another 10% price increase. 
OPEC had promised hundreds of millions in aid through several new multilateral 
                                                     
585 Olson, U.S. Foreign Policy, 47, 65, 71. 
586 FRUS, 1977-1980, Vol. 3, Foreign Economic Policy, doc. 330 
(https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v03/d330).  
587 Olson, U.S. Foreign Policy, 74-75. 
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agencies, but these were only beginning to function. Further, there was a hierarchy: the 
first round of aid went almost exclusively to countries with Muslim majorities, while the 
rest had to wait for a second wave of funds.588 This explained in part other UN activities 
such as the infamous November 1975 General Assembly resolution equating Zionism 
with racism: African states with a large Islamic population voted for the resolution, and 
most without abstained, were absent, or voted against. The State Department wrote at the 
time: “The Africans had been led to believe that they would receive far more aid than 
they actually have from the Arabs, in return for breaking relations with Israel and voting 
sympathetically on Arab causes. In fact, the Arabs have done very little at all in the area 
of aid to Africa, and that has not been lost on the Africans. 589  
The first Southern delegation to bring up energy at UNCTAD V was from Latin 
America. At the plenary session of the Interdependence Commission, the head of the 
Colombian delegation insisted that energy too be brought under UNCTAD’s mandate. 
Other Latin American delegates soon joined in, placing Venezuela, which had positioned 
itself as a leader of both OPEC and the G-77, in the uncomfortable role of mediator. The 
resolution was squashed, as Venezuela promised to discuss the energy-development 
relationship at OPEC’s next meeting (which it did), but this crack in the Southern front 
was visible and undeniable.590 Indeed, two months after UNCTAD V, the Organization of 
African Unity expressed its frustration with OPEC by refusing to condemn Egypt’s 
rapprochement with Israel and giving Anwar Sadat a standing ovation.591 “Manila may 
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mark the end of discussing this issue [energy] in North-South fora,” the State Department 
noted hopefully, “although industrial countries will have to approach this issue with great 
caution.”592 
In the Carter Administration’s defense, their open rejection of further structural 
reforms through UNCTAD was more honest than Kissinger, who had announced dozens 
of initiatives without the political capital, time, or interest to back them up. But 
UNCTAD V was the first of several important conferences that summer, and these would 
determine which direction the dialogue would take in the future. The State Department 
believed that this would largely depend on how well the U.S. delivered in the areas it did 
promise new things.593 At a minimum, State explained, this meant “[d]oing everything 
possible within the Executive Branch and on the Hill to keep development assistance and 
food aid at respectable levels, to fight trade protectionism, and to secure legislation 
implementing commodity agreements.”594 
It also meant a strong U.S. performance in August at the UN Conference on 
Science and Technology for Development—the second half of Cooper and Vance’s 
strategy for “sustaining broad-based support for foreign assistance with the American 
public.”595 
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593 “The dialogue could go in one of two directions in the aftermath of UNCTAD V,” the State Department 
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LDCs will depend on tackling specific issues.  
594 Ibid.  




UNCSTD, 1979: A Case Study 
 
UNCSTD: The Argument for Action 
 
UNCSTD was not the most important gathering of the North-South dialogue, but 
its status as the last large global conference of the 1970s—and there had been many—
conferred on it a special significance. “Like the Vienna Salt II summit,” explained one 
writer in Science News, “UNCSTD… culminates years of planning and many rounds of 
preliminary discussions between the nations involved. And like SALT, issues for the 
UNCSTD summit have been brought into focus only after years of growingly contentious 
rhetoric—much of it with little common ground in sight.”596 
In spite of the North’s conference fatigue and the South’s past disappointments, 
there were good reasons to see promise for UNCSTD. For one—and this is easily 
overlooked in the battles over the Common Fund, debt, and energy—technology was the 
first point listed in the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic 
Order: “The benefits of technological progress are not shared equitably by all members of 
the international community. The developing countries, which constitute 70 per cent of 
the world's population, account for only 30 per cent of the world’s income.” The South’s 
paucity of qualified scientists and engineers and dependence on multinational 
corporations was explicitly linked in that first full paragraph to colonial and post-colonial 
underdevelopment. In fact, as one recent study on the history of sustainable development 
argues, in the 1960s “the power of large-scale technologies to increase productivity, 
generate wealth, and overcome persistent material scarcity” was one of the few postwar 
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development “faiths” Western and Third World leaders shared.597 Thus, the NIEO called 
for “Giving to the developing countries access to the achievements of modern science 
and technology, and promoting the transfer of technology and the creation of indigenous 
technology for the benefit of the developing countries.”598  
Two, U.S. officials had been telling the Third World for years that concrete 
actions on “specialized” economic topics (including technology transfer) were best left to 
small and focused gatherings, instead of UNCTAD and General Assembly meetings 
purporting to cover a dozen or more issues simultaneously. While UNCSTD would be a 
“political” conference in the sense that the developing countries did see it as part of the 
NIEO (it had its origins in the 1975 UN Seventh Special Session, which was meant as a 
follow-up to the 1974 Sixth Session at which the NIEO was announced), the focus on 
technology and support of the scientific community suggested that grandstanding might 
be kept to a minimum. Nor would there be the intractable issue of energy, which had so 
divided North and South at the 1974 World Food Conference and the 1975-77 
Conference on International Economic Cooperation, and the South itself at UNCTAD V. 
Three, the idea of sharing scientific ideas with developing countries—as opposed 
to merely sending more U.S. taxpayer dollars—was arguably the most domestically 
attractive North-South policy Carter could have. It fit neatly with one of his favorite lines 
about development from the campaign trail, “I don’t think it’s right to tax the poor people 
in our rich country and give the money to the rich people in the poor countries.” It had a 
long presidential pedigree, beginning with Democrat Harry Truman, who, the State 
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Department noted approvingly, “is the President [that] he [Carter] admires most.”599 And 
given the economic climate—UNCSTD would convene just a few weeks after Carter’s 
“Crisis of Confidence” speech and in the midst of, once again, soaring domestic energy 
costs and inflation—it was probably the only foreign assistance measure that could gain 
some bipartisan support from Congress. 
Finally, technology transfer had long been a priority for the politically influential, 
but diplomatically elusive, set of Southern countries the Carter Administration referred to 
as “regional influentials.” Also called the “advanced developing countries,” these were 
“those countries who were expected to play key roles in leading the other 100 or so Third 
World nations to a fuller, more just, and more cooperative membership in the much-
discussed interdependent world.”600 Integrating (or co-opting) this group through granting 
them a more prominent position in the existing international order was an important part 
of North-South strategy as outlined in PRM-8601, and in September 1977 Carter made a 
much-publicized tour of Brazil, Nigeria, India, Iran, and Venezuela—the original 
“reginfs”—to signal this priority.  
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While Carter’s actions on the Panama Canal, Middle East peace, and apartheid 
helped, the U.S. had less to offer these countries on the economic side. “These are 
countries which do not need our financial assistance and for which we find it increasingly 
difficult to justify financial assistance,” the State Department explained. “We can, 
nonetheless, emphasize our willingness to engage in technological collaboration, to help 
train people, and to help establish applied research facilities in those countries, provided 
they are willing to bear much of the cost. At the same time, this approach complements 
well our emphasis on basic human needs—food, health, education—in our foreign 
assistance programs.”602 
 
Basic Needs, Appropriate Technology, and the Overseas Development Council 
 
The Carter Administration had a strong scientific bent, and some of its most 
important members sought to link science and technology to foreign policy in new ways. 
It began with the President himself, a trained nuclear engineer who believed nuclear 
weapons were the greatest threat to world peace. Carter tasked Gerard Smith, his Chief 
Delegate to the SALT talks, with “finding a way of using the U.S. hegemony in nuclear 
technology to impose conditions on the use of this technology by other countries.” Harold 
Brown had been a government research scientist and President of Cal Tech, and as 
Carter’s Defense Secretary he led a massive increase in the Pentagon’s funding for 
research in microelectronics, computers, and jet engines to modernize the U.S. 
military.603  
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Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter’s most trusted foreign policy adviser, had earlier 
envisioned a new “technetronic era” in which intergovernmental collaboration on science 
and technology would strengthen ties among advanced capitalist nations and with 
influential members of the developing world.604 In fact, technology played an important 
role in the establishment of official diplomatic relations between the U.S. and China. 
After visiting Beijing in May 1978, Brzezinski was convinced that the sale of advanced 
technology could break the negotiations’ logjam, and a number of visits by leading 
American scientists soon followed. On January 31, 1979—30 days after the U.S. 
officially recognized China, and 7 months before UNCSTD—the two countries signed a 
major science and technology agreement that paved the way for China’s rapid industrial 
takeoff and global economic integration.605 
One of the Americans who visited Beijing for Brezezinski was not a scientist, but 
a Catholic priest. In addition to serving as President (1952-87) of Notre Dame University, 
Father Theodore Hesburgh had been a highly active member of the American liberal 
establishment for decades. Director of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Chairman of 
the Rockefeller Foundation, and a Director of the Council on Foreign Relations and 
Chase Manhattan Bank were just a few of his roles and titles.  
In 1977, Carter asked Hesburgh to lead the U.S. delegation to UNCSTD. 
Hesburgh had shown a longstanding interest in science and foreign policy, as the 
Vatican’s permanent representative (1957-70) to the International Atomic Energy 
Agency and as a board member (1954-66) of the National Science Foundation. However, 
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in the 1970s, the activity that took up most of Hesburgh’s time outside of South Bend—
and one which he managed well as a highly organized workaholic—was Chairman of the 
Overseas Development Council. 
The ODC was the most prominent and visible proponent in the U.S. of basic 
needs.606 “A major rethinking of development concepts is taking place,” ODC President 
James Grant explained in 1971, two years after the group’s founding, “compelled by a 
single fact: the unparalled growth rates achieved by most developing countries during the 
1960’s had little or no effect on most of the world’s people, who continue to live in 
desperate poverty.” By favoring large landowners, civil servants, and skilled industrial 
workers, he argued, the development process empowered interests with a disincentive for 
large-scale redistribution, while countries that had introduced massive welfare programs 
could no longer pay for them. A “new development strategy,” Grant insisted, would 
increase the poorest half of the population’s position in the development process, by 
supporting small farmers and entrepreneurs, making best use of scarce capital and 
technology, and ensuring the availability of basic education and health care.607 
Grant’s observations matched those of other development experts, such as the 
British economist Barbara Ward, who championed “participatory development” from the 
International Institute for Environment and Development in London, and the Pakistani 
economist Mahbub Ul-Haq, a Senior Advisor at the World Bank who was selling basic 
needs to the Bank’s president, Robert McNamara. (The ODC engineered collaborations 
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with both scholars.608) Their ideas received a major public relations boost from the 1973 
international bestseller Small is Beautiful, by British economist E. F. Schumacher. His 
argument that the one-size-fits-all development model of the 1960s had major social and 
ecological consequences found a wide following among the nascent environmental 
movement, which applauded his call for “intermediate” (or “appropriate”) technology 
that was localized, participatory, and environmentally sustainable. 
Hesburgh’s job was to make the case for new development assistance to the 
American public, whose support for foreign aid had been in steady decline since the 
Johnson Administration’s escalation of the Vietnam War. “You are probably the most 
influential Churchman on the American scene at the present time,” ODC Director Martin 
Bordelon wrote to Hesburgh in May 1971, when he replaced the ODC’s first Chairman, 
the relatively orthodox former World Bank President Eugene Black. (Hesburgh himself 
was succeeded in 1980 by Robert McNamara.) “Given your base, and your performance, 
you are one of the most influential citizens of the U.S.” There was another way in which 
Hesburgh could help the ODC’s cause: the decision to decline government funding meant 
that it was heavily dependent on corporate contributions, from Bank of America and 
Bechtel to United Fruit and Xerox. “ODC has too much of the image and identification 
with American big business,” Bordelon explained, “and you would help give it a different 
orientation.”609  
Hesburgh did just that, appearing frequently on television news and radio 
programs, authoring op-eds, and staging high profile media events around the ODC’s 
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“Agenda for Action” releases.610 He testified to Congress in support of the 1973 “New 
Directions” legislation, a bill introduced by Minnesota Congressman Donald Fraser that 
introduced a “Basic Human Needs Mandate” to foreign aid appropriations.611 A few 
weeks after the NIEO’s announcement in May 1974, Hesburgh appeared on the “Today 
Show” with Pakistan’s Ambassador to the UN, during which he informed Barbara 
Walters of the “fourth world of about a billion people… who are going to starve to death 
if we don’t do something about it.”612 When the World Food Conference convened that 
November, Hesburgh and Grant organized their own (press) conference with 
representatives from religious and food advocacy groups to call the Ford 
Administration’s proposals inadequate. After Congress agreed to publish Hesburgh’s 
correspondence with Ford and Walter Cronkite devoted the last six minutes of his 
newscast to the Hesburgh/ODC conference, the two were as much of a household name 
as a development NGO and a Catholic priest could be.613 
The ODC and the Carter Administration were a natural fit. Their official 
collaboration began in 1976, when James Grant began working with Brzezinski and 
Richard Gardner to write Carter’s critical remarks on Ford’s approach to food aid for 
their foreign policy debates in October. After Carter’s election, ODC Senior Fellows 
Roger Hansen and Guy Erb joined the National Security Council’s new North-South 
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cluster, while several others members of the Administration, including Brzezinki, 
Gardner, Richard Cooper, and Samuel Huntington had attended the ODC’s ongoing 
series of development seminars, for “selected individuals who are not development 
specialists.”614  
The ODC’s impact was particularly visible during the reorganization of U.S. 
North-South strategy through 1977. In fact, Roger Hansen was the first in the 
Administration to argue that basic needs “should become the centerpiece of our [the 
Administration’s] North-South strategy,” and should “not only be a natural complement 
but also an integral part of a global stress on human rights.” He wrote in a memorandum 
to Brzezinski in July: 
North and South have long feuded over the divergent emphases in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights: the North emphasizing personal, 
civil and political rights; the developing countries, basic economic rights 
(needs). The US can take a major step toward closing this ‘values gap’ by 
embracing jointly the concepts of human rights and basic human needs, 
and by proposing a major development program to see that the fulfillment 
of basic human needs is achieved throughout the world by the end of the 
century.615 
 
This concept was endorsed by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance at the next meeting of the 
inter-agency North-South Policy Review Committee, which concluded, “The fulfillment 
of basic human needs should be considered as an integral element of the fulfillment of 
human rights. The two closely related concepts can and should form a central core of US 
foreign policy.”616 It made sense that Carter chose the University of Notre Dame’s spring 
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1977 commencement to give the first major outline of his foreign policy, with human 
rights and development as central themes.  
Hesburgh offered the same utility to Carter as he did to the ODC: he was 
America’s most prominent clergyman, with the connections, charisma, intellect, and 
moral authority to give complicated development issues the clarity and urgency necessary 
for Americans to feel compelled to care. Both State and the NSC had been arguing for 
Carter to take his foreign aid agenda to the American people—the same mission that the 
ODC had been engaged in since 1969. “The Overseas Development Council and others 
are working on ‘basic human needs’ approaches to foreign assistance which could call for 
very large increases of aid from the industrial world, targeted for nations that agreed to 
concentrate efforts against hunger, local endemic diseases, lack of housing, etc.,” the 
State Department explained in an early PRM-8 meeting, around the time Hesburgh was 
chosen for UNCSTD. “The emphasis on serving the poor could help sell the increases in 
spending necessary to have the kinds of effects that the new Club of Rome report and the 
World Bank claim are possible.”617 If Hesburgh could not help Carter sell his vision of 
development—to Americans and to the G-77—could anyone? 
 
The Path to Vienna 
 
Accounts of the U.S. performance at UNCSTD vary widely. Robert Olson, a 
former State Department official who attended UNCTAD IV, writes that the Carter 
Administration “quite possibly provided more support to the Vienna [UNCSTD] 
conference than to any of the other UN megaconferences.” Though the U.S. opposed 
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most LDC demands, Olson says its own proposals demonstrated a genuine effort to 
respond to the needs of both poor and middle-income countries and to improve the North-
South dialogue in a meaningful way.618 In contrast, David Dickson argues that Hesburgh 
delivered a “corporate sermon [at UNCSTD] that directly reflected the corporate 
community’s input into the State Department’s preparations,” and, as at UNCTAD V, the 
primary U.S. goal was to contain the South’s demands for structural reform and political 
redistribution.619 In Stephen Macekura’s account, the U.S. delegation quickly 
downplayed its focus on basic needs and alternative technology (AT) when the G-77, 
fearing the loss of technology transfers for industrial capacity-building, reacted 
negatively: “AT became only a small part of the conference, with few policy makers 
believing that it was a silver bullet capable of reinventing the development process… It 
ended up as just another method to draw upon from the ever-growing pool of 
development approaches.”620 
A closer look into the preparations—based on the newly accessible Hesburgh 
papers621—reveals more complicated interactions: between development and AT, 
between the U.S. and the G-77, and between Hesburgh and Carter. 
U.S. planning began early, in October 1977. A first issue of contention was 
location. Mexico wanted to have the conference in a developing country, for which, 
according to UN Ambassador Andrew Young, they received little support. “Delegates of 
developing countries who want our candidacy to succeed… have told us—straight out—
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that this Mexican effort can be headed off,” he wrote to Vance. “They believe that even 
the Latin American Group, theoretically committed to Mexico, contains many lukewarm 
supporters who are interested in hearing from us.”622 
Initial conversations between the U.S. delegation and the White House were also 
encouraging. After meeting with Dr. Peter Bourne, the new head of Carter’s ill-fated 
World Hunger Working Group, U.S. delegation Coordinator Jean Wilkowski gushed to 
ODC President James Grant “there is now less question in my mind regarding whether 
B[asic] H[uman] N[eed]s and the subject matter of this Conference will ‘soar’ under this 
Administration. The evidence of ODC influence and talent were strong.”623  
Grant was more skeptical, writing to Wilkowski that Carter had yet to “pursue 
aggressively the address of basic needs.” However, Grant believed that Carter had a 
unique opportunity to connect with Americans on the issue. In 1977 E. F. Schumacher 
embarked on an American tour for his bestselling book, and Carter received him at the 
White House for a well-publicized visit. “’Small is Beautiful’ was written originally to 
meet the needs of poor people in developing countries, but obviously has touched a 
major-felt need in this country,” Grant explained. “[T]here is something potentially very 
exciting here. It was this ‘nerve’ that Schumacher touched.”624 
Still, at that time few developing country leaders had openly embraced the U.S.’ 
AT efforts. Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere, who saw a common focus on community-building 
between AT and his own struggling Ujamaa plan, was an exception. Their skepticism 
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was not unwarranted: by 1980, USAID’s AT efforts in Tanzania—contracted out to a 
private firm called Development Alternatives, Inc (DAI), over which it exercised little 
oversight—had run into major problems, from excessive billing and internal 
compensation to flat-out inattention to AT’s sustainability mandate.625  
The complicated relationship between the U.S., AT, and the South was illustrated 
well in a December 1977 exchange in Washington between State Department officials 
and Third World scientists. “With only a little prompting,” the report described, scientists 
from Afghanistan to Zaire set forth their views on technology transfer, AT, and UNCSTD 
for four and a half hours.  
Scientists from poorer developing countries endorsed AT, but their overwhelming 
focus was on attaining better training and administration. “Technology transfer without 
competence is useless,” explained an engineer from Kabul University. “If the developed 
countries really want to help us, they should raise our technical competence.” Yet 
sending citizens to study in U.S. universities was not enough. “We have trained many 
countrymen in S&T in the United States, but they bring back knowledge that cannot be 
applied in our undeveloped state,” a scientist from Ghana noted. There were also 
problems with U.S. projects on the ground; an Indonesian professor criticized the makeup 
of USAID project budgets as “70% administration.” Nor were AT project managers as 
attentive to local knowledge and needs as they purported to be. The Trinidadian director 
of the Caribbean Industrial Research Institute explained how USAID workers had 
recently installed rural power systems for farmers who could not afford the electricity 
costs; in another instance, they built a highway on a rain-swept mountain slope that was 
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washed away three times. “In the future,” said the head of Zaire’s Ministry of Planning, 
“the U.S. should not spend 80% of its training money in the U.S. It should spend some 
money for training in third countries. We could learn a lot in some middle income 
countries.”  
As expected, scientists from richer developing countries emphasized technology 
transfer for industrial development. “Although we are still very much a developing 
country,” an Indian scientist explained, “we have the third largest body of trained 
scientists in the world. We can put the imported technology to work.” Perhaps less 
expected was an emphasis on sustainable growth, which conventional wisdom said 
industrializing Third World states opposed or were uninterested in. “U.S. science and 
technology is losing its position as the leader to be followed,” said a South Korean 
engineer, “because U.S. science and technology is used to support an economy which 
wastes resources. Developing countries need S&T that can be applied to conserve 
resources needed to produce for export.”626 
Their criticisms of actual U.S. policies notwithstanding, the scientists’ comments 
revealed several areas of practical compromise. More effective aid administration, better 
technical training, and encouraging local participation and self-ownership—all were 
important elements of AT that the U.S. had officially endorsed since the 1973 Foreign 
Assistance Act. However, the U.S. would be negotiating with G-77 diplomats, not 
scientists, and its own strategic efforts were off to a dismal start. 
Carter had muddied the waters with a new organization he championed, the 
Institute for Scientific and Technical Cooperation (ISTC). The seeds for such an initiative 
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were planted before Carter; Kissinger had proposed a U.S.-funded International 
Industrialization Institute (III) at the 1975 Seventh Special Session. However, there were 
two important differences. First, Carter’s ISTC would focus on transferring alternative 
technology and knowledge, instead of the more conventional technology transfers 
Kissinger (and the wealthier G-77 leadership) had in mind. (Kissinger’s III also pledged 
to address the “brain drain” resulting from U.S. education exchanges, a concern of 
developing countries regardless of income.)627 Second, instead of an independent body 
open to “all interested countries,” the ISTC would exist as a semi-autonomous agency 
within USAID, still struggling with its own Carter-induced reorganization pains.628  
It was never really clear where the ISTC fit. The Administration’s intense 
courting of private sector support worried AID workers, who feared they would lose 
control of the ISTC’s funding and purpose; at the same time, many corporation heads 
remained skeptical of backing yet another new government program for the Third World. 
The scientific community distrusted both the State Department and the private sector, 
believing that any new organization should be as autonomous as possible from politics 
and profit. Still, in the summer of 1979, shortly before UNCSTD, the U.S. Congress 
passed legislation approving the new institute. Importantly, no decision was made on its 
funding.629 
While the Administration promoted the ISTC to Congress, planning for UNCSTD 
suffered. The official Policy Review Memorandum on the subject was not launched until 
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February 1978; in July, James Grant called it a “roof without a house.” PRM-33 made the 
ISTC—a program based in and controlled by Washington—the only new card in the U.S. 
delegation’s hand. While the ISTC could be useful, Grant explained, the current U.S. 
proposal “provides no sense of urgency” for what was supposed to be the most 
compelling social objective of Carter’s approach to the South: the elimination of absolute 
poverty by the end of the century. Nor did it address the concerns of the influential 
middle-income countries at the conference, whose own proposals for industrial 
technology transfer the U.S. could not simply ignore. Gone, too, was any talk of 
interdependence, or Northern countries’ responsibility to avoid protectionism and pursue 
growth amid the global economic slowdown.630 “There is general USG consensus that the 
Conference contains several very contentious issues which are not and would not be 
sufficiently responded to by the US if we only presented the ISTC and the ongoing 
programs,” the NSC’s Guy Erb warned Henry Owen on July 20, less than two months 
before Vienna. “If the Conference is to avoid a total collapse the US must be prepared to 
respond to the contentious issues in a moderate fashion.”631  
The most contentious issue was the G-77’s proposal for a $2-4 billion632 UN 
Science and Technology fund. This was not an insignificant sum, but the effect would 
have been to raise the Third World’s share of the global R&D budget from just 5% to 
7%.633 However, the G-77 insisted that its fund be governed by a Committee of the 
Whole, which would operate on the “one country, one vote” rule. Against the advice of 
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the Treasury Department and Office of Management and Budget (who favored no fund at 
all), on August 3, less than three weeks before UNCSTD convened, Vance and Owen 
suggested a modest counter: U.S. funding of $25 million annually, or 20%, of a two-year, 
$250 million fund administered through the UN Development Program (UNDP), where 
the U.S. had greater say.634 However, before Hesburgh could sell this package to the G-
77 at UNCSTD, he first had to sell it to the rest of Carter’s cabinet. 
Enthusiasm was in short supply. “It will not embarrass the Administration,” Owen 
assured Hesburgh when he questioned him on PRM-33’s lack of concrete North-South 
goals. “[I]ts weaknesses as a North-South political document are its strengths in avoiding 
domestic controversy.”635 A meeting with Brzezinski was more encouraging, but 
noncommittal on anything more from the White House. Hesburgh’s discussion with 
Treasury Secretary Blumenthal went nowhere, though it may have been the most honest. 
“In a nutshell,” the Secretary said bluntly, “the President [is] ‘broke.’”636  
Hesburgh had been put in an awkward position. Brought on for his ability to sell 
the greater good to the self-interested, he now faced being sent to the conference armed 
with little more than a homily. In July 1979, Carter went on national television to address 
the energy crisis, inflation, unemployment, and what he called America’s “crisis of 
confidence.” That same month, White House staff scrubbed Carter’s proposed address for 
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UNCSTD, replacing strong language on North-South relations and global poverty with, 
in Hesburgh’s description, “banalities.”637 
On August 14, Hesburgh met with Vance to make one final plea for Carter’s 
support. He began by recalling Vance’s North-South address in March, in which the 
Secretary had committed the U.S. to focusing on “concrete development problems which 
we can tackle together and which directly affect people’s lives.” The North-South 
dialogue was “prickly,” Hesburgh conceded, but he warned against “wishing the subject 
would go away by trying to avoid references to [it].” This was why in addition to the 
“limited [and] bilateral” ISTC the U.S. needed to fully support the UNDP plan. Not only 
was it “ammunition” for the conference, Hesburgh explained. It also “would allow us to 
do things that could not be done through bilateral assistance alone,” such as the UN-
funded census project Hesburgh witnessed while in China for Brzezinski. 
Vance was sympathetic, agreeing with Hesburgh on the need for “real leadership” 
and promising “that during the next year he intended to devote much more time to North-
South issues, which he felt he had been forced to ignore because of higher priority 
subjects.”638 It was a fair enough answer. While Carter and Brzezinski wooed the 
People’s Republic of China with promises of Western technology and investment, Vance 
spent the first half of 1979 struggling to conclude the difficult and unpopular SALT II 
negotiations with his Soviet counterpart. In December, the Soviets shocked the West with 
their brazen invasion of Afghanistan. For Brzezinski, “a major watershed had been 
reached in the American-Soviet relationship.” He told Carter that the invasion was “the 
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most direct case of Soviet military aggression since 1945, and that we needed to mount a 
broader strategic response.” Carter agreed, and he and Brzezinski quickly redirected NSC 
resources towards the development of a new “Carter Doctrine” that promised to do for 
America’s autocratic allies in the Middle East what the eponymous doctrine of Harry 
Truman, Carter’s favorite president, once did for anti-communist allies in Greece and 
Turkey.639  
As détente continued to deteriorate, the decline in Iran’s oil output during the 
course of the Shah’s abdication had set off a panic in oil markets. Starting in April the 
price of global crude entered a steady increase for the next 12 months, until it hit an 
unprecedented $42 per barrel. Nor was trilateralism faring any better. In Tokyo, G-7 
leaders blamed each other for failing to reduce energy consumption and OPEC for 
‘severely increas[ing] the problems facing developing countries without oil resources as 
well as the difficulties for developed countries in helping them.’640 This proved a 
valuable lesson for the North-South dialogue: even when the oil question was not 
immediately present, it was never far away. 
 
UNCSTD: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back 
 
The last UN megaconference of the 1970s—and, as it turned out, the last new 
negotiating conference of the North-South dialogue—proceeded like so many others 
before it. On August 20, 4,000 delegates from 150 countries convened in Vienna for a 
fourteen-day conference on global poverty, at a total cost of $50 million. Hesburgh 
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deployed his moral argument for action on technology for development, asking at the 
conference’s opening if ‘we can really call ourselves a civilization when one-fourth of 
this earth’s population lives in abject poverty, starving, idle, and numbed by ignorance.’ 
No one disagreed. 
A familiar pattern followed. The G-77 presented its main, NIEO-centric proposals 
for structural change: an international code of conduct for technology transfer; a 
“universal S&T information system” within the UN; and the $2 billion research fund. The 
U.S. swatted them down, and the Europeans followed suit. The U.S. did agree to an 
enlargement of the UN Economic and Social Council’s Committee on Science and 
Technology for Development into a Committee of the Whole. This gave the South equal 
representation on the UN’s primary S&T advisory committee, but to what end was 
unclear in the absence of a new fund.641 
Predictably, the G-77 kept discussion on the issue of its $2 billion fund, giving the 
U.S. little space to argue the ISTC’s merits. The G-77 accused the U.S. of not wanting 
any new fund, and the U.S., not denying the charge, complained to the press that “the 
developing countries had been slow in making their own preparations for the 
conference.”642 Days later, Sweden proposed the UNDP fund as a compromise, and the 
U.S. delegation “clarified” its position in support. However, it rejected the G-77’s call 
(backed by some European countries) that the newly enlarged ECOSOC committee have 
a role in the UNDP fund’s administration. This was important, as the UNDP did not 
operate as a committee of the whole and thus was weighted toward the developed 
                                                     
641 Dickson, New Science, 199.  
642 UNDA, CPHS 108/10 - Folder - UNCSTD - Correspondence – 1979, article, Anne C. Roark, “To 
Many, the United States Was the Biggest Culprit at the U.N.’s Conference on Science and Technology,” 
Chronicle of Higher Education, September 10, 1979. 
297 
 
countries. In other words, the G-77 was granted a voice—the enlarged ECOSOC 
committee—with no money, and some money—the UNDP fund—with no greater voice. 
The G-77 decried the “serious blow” to the conference dealt by “one major power,” but 
on August 29, two days before the conference ended, it accepted the proposal, as is, as 
the best it could get.643 Once again, the U.S. appeared in the North-South dialogue as the 
rich countries’ lowest common denominator, forced into offering only qualified support 
for what was supposed to be the conference’s main achievement.  
The U.S. delegation did not “exercise real leadership” at UNCSTD, as Hesburgh 
had hoped, but they were hardly equipped to. For two years the White House’s main offer 
had been the ISTC, which Congress approved in July but for which they refused to 
provide any funding. In a final options paper sent to Carter on August 2, Vance promised 
a new Presidential Directive (PD) for him to sign that “could be cited by our delegation at 
the Vienna Conference as further evidence of our commitment to doing more for the 
developing countries in this area.” Either Vance never sent the PD, or the President never 
signed it. Carter did approve the reiteration of calls made at the Tokyo summit for an 
increase in bilateral aid to assist in energy production and “expanded bilateral and 
multilateral aid” for agricultural research, but with no specific budget commitments. 
Vance also relayed Hesburgh’s concerns about the UNDP and cited the recommendation 
of Representative Clement Zablocki, a key Congressional ally for Carter’s foreign aid 
proposals, that the U.S. begin immediately consultations with the House appropriations 
committee. Carter left that line of the options paper blank.644  
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This too was a mistake. The UNDP fund actually had many supporters on Capitol 
Hill. Nearly two-dozen U.S. senators and representatives, including Adlai Stevenson, 
traveled to Vienna as part of the American delegation, far more than to the 1974 World 
Food Conference. The UNDP’s Administrator, Bradford Morse, was a former liberal 
Republican congressman from Massachusetts and UN Under Secretary-General. The U.S. 
should be doing more than “just reacting,” lamented one congressman on the House 
Science Committee on the eve of the delegation’s departure. “We should be bold. We 
should be leading the way.”645 But the White House was never really behind the UNDP 
fund, even with the provision limiting the Third World’s expanded committee to an 
advisory role. Thus, it was no surprise when Congress rejected the (even lower) $15 
million Carter asked for in his 1981 budget request.646 With the ISTC’s funding still held 
up in Congress (it never came, and the project languished inside USAID until it officially 
folded in the early 1990s), the U.S. spent more on its delegation’s travel and lodging for 




The importance the Carter Administration placed on North-South relations, 
particularly in its first two years, was part of an attempt to transcend the postwar, Cold 
War framework for American foreign policy. “The U.S. has to help in the shaping of a 
new international system that cannot be confined to the developed countries but must 
involve increasingly the entire international community of more than 150 nation states,” 
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Brzezinski informed Carter in April 1977.647 “We can no longer have a policy solely for 
the industrial nations as the foundation of global stability, but we must respond to the 
new reality of a politically awakening world,” Carter repeated in his famous Notre Dame 
speech a few weeks later. “It is a new world, and we should help to shape it. It is a new 
world that calls for a new American foreign policy—a policy based on constant decency 
in its values and on optimism in our historical vision.”648 
There were several notable successes. Carter earned the support of many Latin 
American democrats by concluding the Panama Canal treaties and shaming human rights 
abusers; he brokered a peace between Egypt and Israel that continues to hold, nearly forty 
years later; and he enabled China’s global economic integration through official 
diplomatic recognition and a major economic treaty. There were glaring inconsistencies, 
too—Carter was silent on human rights abuses in Iran, South Korea, and China, and his 
Administration repeatedly intervened when Congressional restrictions on loans and arms 
sales threatened important bilateral objectives.649 Still, that Carter looked to the Third 
World as more than a staging ground for Cold War proxy battles was a qualitative change 
from his postwar predecessors.  
Carter Administration officials expected that this reformed approach to the Third 
World would also improve the North-South dialogue. It did not. “Unfortunately,” the 
National Security Council admitted in October 1978, “there is very little feedback among 
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these realms, except to the extent that the broad atmosphere of trust and confidence has 
probably reduced somewhat the bitterness our economic ‘shortcomings’ would otherwise 
have evoked.”650 In fact, in some important cases, the pursuit of “global” North-South 
objectives like human rights and nuclear non-proliferation worsened bilateral ties with 
“regional influentials” like India and Brazil.651 
The Administration’s flagship North-South economic initiatives fared even worse. 
Expectations were already high when Carter entered office, evidenced by the fact that in 
mid-1976 developing countries had delayed the conclusion of the Conference on 
International Cooperation until after January 1977. But there was a flipside to the Carter 
team’s mock-superhero pledge to “make the world safe for interdependence,” and it 
involved changing the terms of the North-South dialogue itself. “The CIEC is an early 
phase of our attempt to refashion the North-South dialogue along our preferred lines,” the 
State Department explained in February 1977. “Our long-term objective is to modify the 
North-South dialogue and move it away from [an] emphasis on restructuring the 
international economic system to a pragmatic search for ways to improve it.”652  
In the lull between the end of the CIEC in June 1977 and the opening of 
UNCTAD V in May 1979, “pragmatic” came to mean basic needs-oriented development 
assistance. “Far from being a moralistic glint in campaigner Jimmy Carter’s eye,” 
proclaimed the Washington Post, “the idea has progressed to becoming routine rhetoric 
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in his administration’s pronouncements on foreign aid.”653 Carter drew from a well of 
support for basic needs in the U.S. Congress and the development and scientific 
communities. He made intentional gestures to influential advocates like E. F. Schumacher 
and Mahbub Ul-Haq, and the Administration’s “North-South cluster” incorporated both 
ideas and personnel from the Overseas Development Council, the U.S.’ leading basic 
needs-focused think tank. In meetings with influential G-77 leaders like Venezuela’s 
Carlos Andres Pérez and Jamaica’s Michael Manley, he emphasized basic needs as a 
common goal in the North-South dialogue. To underline his commitment, Carter also 
announced a sweeping reorganization of U.S. aid efforts.  
The problems with this new strategy began at home. The International 
Development Cooperation Authority (IDCA), Carter’s flagship proposal to reorient 
foreign aid around long-term and shared objectives, was as ambitious as it was unpopular 
with the 31 agencies scrambling to retain influence over their respective areas of U.S. aid 
policy. “The president’s recent proposal to reorganize U.S. foreign assistance is weak as a 
result of bureaucratic distrust and ‘turf protection’ and requires strengthening if U.S. 
efforts to combat hunger and poverty are to be taken seriously,” complained the head of 
the President’s Commission on World Hunger (PCWH), a separate initiative launched 
around the same time.654  
The two soon found themselves working at cross-purposes. When the PCWH 
recommended to Carter in December 1979 that he “make the elimination of hunger the 
primary focus of its [the U.S.’] relationships with the developing countries” and ask 
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Congress for an increase in aid for “the economic and technical aspects of development 
assistance and not on security assistance,” Carter was telling Vance to do the opposite.655 
“Working closely with Henry Owen and AID,” Vance reported to his boss triumphantly, 
“we have succeeded in getting Congress to eliminate outright or ease a number of 
constraints on our use of development and security assistance in areas where Soviet and 
Cuban activity is growing.”656 
More fundamental problems awaited in the dialogue itself. It was not that there 
was no support for basic needs in the South. Most Southern scientists backed the 
approach, as did an increasing number of Southern economists in the UN. In fact, as 
Samuel Moyn explains, in the years 1975-77 basic needs “took the United Nations 
system by storm.” This was particularly true in the International Labor Organization, 
whose “move to basic needs occurred out of the recognition that it made little sense to 
adapt a strategy devised for northern industrial conflicts without recognizing the entirely 
different organization of labor and production.”657  
Even the G-77 leadership was not immune, as its own Arusha Programme for 
UNCTAD V endorsed the analogous concept of “appropriate technology for 
development” for the numerically superior “least developed” countries (LLDCs).658 The 
primary area of disagreement—and it was a fundamental one—concerned governance: 
Should new anti-poverty efforts proceed through the same methods as did past 
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development assistance—that is, bilaterally through USAID and, to a lesser degree, 
through multilateral institutions like the World Bank and certain UN agencies where U.S. 
influence was greatest? Or should new UN agencies be formed that, by operating as 
“committees of the whole,” would enable the South to set its own priorities and 
determine its own needs? To put it simply: How much say should poor states that receive 
basic needs assistance have in its distribution? 
Not much, Carter answered. This was consistent with his campaign line about not 
taking from poor folks in the rich United States to give to rich folks in poor countries, and 
it aligned with the conservative objectives of the Treasury Department and Office of 
Management and Budget. It also reflected the influence of an anti-UN and anti-Third 
World attitude in the United States that had been growing since the first oil crisis but that 
reached its crescendo with the infamous 1975 General Assembly resolution equating 
Zionism with racism. Americans had overwhelmingly endorsed UN Ambassador Daniel 
Patrick Moynihan’s naming and shaming of Third World dictators there, and they 
supported President Ford and Congress’ threats to withdraw from the UN’s “politicized” 
sub-organizations. 
Part choice and part political necessity, the Carter Administration’s basic needs 
package did not respond to the South’s alienation from the governance of development. 
This was important beyond the North-South dialogue, for it reinforced the worst 
assumptions about the fundamental character of both U.S. foreign aid and its role in 
fostering North-South cooperation. Not only did it affirm the South’s status as beggars 
and recipients of charity rather than as genuine partners in a common project, as Vance 
and Carter had once insisted. The argument that only the U.S. government (and, 
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increasingly, its private sector counterparts) could responsibly determine the distribution 
of aid was at odds with elementary basic needs objectives like self-sufficiency, shared 
project accountability, and local participation and ownership. 
Further, basic needs was never a sufficient strategy on its own for negotiations 
with the diverse G-77 coalition. “There are plenty of poor people in regionally influential 
countries,” one official explained, “[but] by definition, most of them have relatively large 
economies so that even very generous US aid programs make only a marginal impact of 
them—politically or economically.”659 Lacking some commitment to revising the 
institutional arrangements that affected those countries most—in the Carter years, trade 
and debt660—even the most generous basic needs proposals would be treated with 
skepticism at best. “I have emphasized to State that the initiatives in support of internal 
LDC development—useful as they might be—do not respond adequately to the political 
dimension of the North-South dialogue,” Guy Erb, the former ODC official in the NSC, 
told Brzezinski before UNCTAD V. “We believe that U.S. policy must also include a 
response to the international reforms that LDCs call for if we are to have a significant 
impact.”661 Or as the President of (heavily indebted) Venezuela told Carter on his March 
1978 visit to Caracas: “Concern over the poor is understood, but poverty is a symptom 
not a cause.”662 
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Instead, U.S. policy moved in the opposite direction. Separate UNCTAD 
negotiations that year to improve the ad-hoc “Paris Club” arrangements for handling 
sovereign debt broke down over the G-77’s insistence on the establishment of “an 
independent forum—which does not consist only of creditors—[that] could be given 
responsibility for supervising the negotiations.”663 At its core, the dispute over advanced 
developing countries’ debt servicing was the same as the one regarding LLDCs’ basic 
needs: Should developing countries have a greater say in matters of international 
economic governance that affect them most? 
Again, the answer was no. At UNCTAD V, the U.S. rejected every G-77 proposal 
for new institutions or rulemaking powers for developing countries. Instead of offering a 
counter to the G-77’s proposal for an International Debt Commission (consisting of both 
debtors and creditors), the U.S. delegation was instructed “not [to] accept any effort to 
study further individual proposals on debt issues (e.g., the debt commission, moratorium, 
indexation).”664 By mid-1979, even the suggestion of institutional change had become 
controversial, as Hesburgh learned when he discovered the White House’s last-minute 
revisions to Carter’s UNCSTD address. “He [Hesburgh] would like to see included the 
Secretary’s ideas on the North-South dialogue as expressed in his Seattle and Chicago 
speeches. Rather than disputing with the LDC’s the issue of change in the international 
system, we should agree—as the Secretary [Vance] had done in his landmark speeches—
that the system needed changing and then get on with how North and South could 
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collaborate in bringing this about. He [Hesburgh] recalled that Henry Kissinger had also 
de-fanged this issue [at UNCTAD IV] in Nairobi.”665 
The reference to Kissinger is instructive. The irony is that while Kissinger may 
have been far less sincere about the South’s plight, he was much more willing to meet 
them on their own terms in the dialogue. This mattered. In his 1976 trip to Africa, where 
he addressed UNCTAD IV—the first and last U.S. cabinet member to do so—Kissinger 
spoke not of the social and economic rights African governments owed to their citizens, 
but of the right of “the independent nations of Africa” to “the economic progress which 
will give meaning to their political independence and dignity to their struggle for 
equality.”666 Indeed, the reason why Ford Administration neoliberals so opposed 
Kissinger’s flagship counter-initiatives—the International Fund for Agriculture 
Development and the International Resources Bank—was that they appeared to 
legitimize the New International Economic Order’s claim that it was the global market 
system, and not developing countries themselves, that needed changing. His political 
commitment to these initiatives was doubtful, and promising things the U.S. could not 
deliver was certainly a poor long-term strategy. Still, frustrated Carter Administration 
officials admitted in 1978, Kissinger’s offers had “ended the rhetorical fireworks at the 
UN, led to the creation of CIEC, and, in effect, bought nearly three years for the 
beleaguered OECD countries.”667  
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The North-South dialogue limped on in the UN for another year after UNCTAD 
V and UNCSTD. Functional negotiations on a number of topics—the Common Fund, 
shipping, the Law of the Sea—continued in smaller forums, stalled by the same 
disagreements as before. Undeterred, the G-77 pushed ahead for a new round of “action 
oriented” and “global and sustained” negotiations to be launched at the Eleventh Special 
Session of the UN General Assembly in August 1980.668  
Neither side budged, and on December 16, 1980, the negotiations were finally 
suspended “without agreement.”669 As Carter had already lost the presidential election in 
November, it was time for the Administration to admit defeat: the South had not been 
persuaded that poverty within nations was more important than poverty between, and the 
American public remained without a convincing rationale for increased foreign aid in the 
post-Vietnam, anti-United Nations era. “In policy terms,” the NSC concluded in a 
lengthy and disappointed review of the Administration’s actions in those areas, “there is 
not much left beyond handling North-South issues on a case-by-case basis. This is of 
course how the Carter Administration—and Kissinger before then—handled them.”670  
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Epilogue: The Reagan Revolution and the End of the North-South Dialogue, 1981-
84 
 
National Security, Human Rights, and Free Markets 
 
During the 1980 presidential campaign, Ronald Reagan and the Republicans 
characterized Jimmy Carter as a naïve do-gooder, handing out foreign aid to unfriendly 
left wing governments while punishing reliable anti-communist allies in Latin America 
and elsewhere. According to the 1980 Republican Party platform, Carter’s blind faith in 
détente had led him to dangerously underestimate the “scope and magnitude of the 
growth of Soviet military power [that] threatens American interest at every level.” 
Instead, Reagan and the Republicans promised “peace through strength” by rearming 
America and its Third World allies while also instituting a “bold program of tax rate 
reductions, spending restraints, and regulatory reforms that will inject new life into the 
economic bloodstream of this country.”671 
The elevation of the Soviet threat instantly transformed the South’s position in 
U.S. foreign policy. In a May 1981 commencement speech at Connecticut’s Fairfield 
University, Secretary of State Al Haig condemned the “recent American policy [under 
Carter]” that “economic and humanitarian assistance” is enough to promote Third World 
development. Instead, “peaceful development” there required “security” against the 
constant threat of “illegal Soviet intervention”; in this way, American interventionism 
and support for authoritarian governments was both “a task of humanitarian concern” and 
a precondition for economic growth.672 To that end, the Administration immediately 
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began lobbying Congress to turn back Carter-era restrictions on military assistance to 
regimes in Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, and Uruguay, and instructed U.S. 
representatives to multilateral development banks to approve new loans to right-wing 
governments in Latin America, South Korea, and the Philippines.673 
Linking human rights and economic development in the South with hardline anti-
communism was representative of a larger co-option of human rights language by the 
Administration, particularly after the appointment of Elliott Abrams as Assistant 
Secretary of State for Human Rights in December 1981. Americans disapproved of 
Carter’s handling of the Iran crisis and its economic fallout, but concern for human rights 
remained high. According to one poll, in 1978, 79 percent of respondents called human 
rights somewhat or very important; in 1982, that number had climbed to 85 percent.674 
Abrams was well aware of these attitudes: before coming to the Reagan Administration, 
he served as chief of staff to “new conservative” Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan. Like 
Moynihan, Abrams had deep ties to anti-Carter neoconservatives, having also worked on 
Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson’s unsuccessful campaign for the 1976 Democratic 
presidential ticket, and in 1980 he married Rachel Decter, daughter of neoconservative 
writer Midge Decter and stepdaughter of Commentary editor Norman Podhoretz.675 As 
explained in Chapter 3, Moynihan’s bombastic, moralizing attacks on the human rights 
records of the U.S.’s Third World critics, at the height of North-South conflict over the 
New International Economic Order, proved enormously popular with Americans across 
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the political spectrum. Reagan officials too recognized human rights’ political utility for 
broader foreign policy goals. “We will never maintain wide public support for our foreign 
policy unless we can relate it to American ideals and to the defense of freedom,” read a 
State Department memo on human rights, written one week before Abrams’ 
appointment.676 
What was essentially a return to Eisenhower-era rollback in the Third World was 
therefore presented as a human rights campaign in support of “pro-democracy” forces 
opposed to the establishment of “totalitarian” Marxist regimes. As Abrams explained to 
the Council on Foreign Relations, “To prevent any country from being taken over by a 
communist regime is in our view a very real victory for the cause of human rights.”677 In 
practice, the Administration’s approach would continue to follow the blueprint laid out 
by its chief neoconservative intellectual: Reagan’s 1980 campaign foreign policy advisor 
and subsequent UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick. Her influential 1979 Commentary 
article “Dictatorships and Double Standards” justified support for right-wing 
authoritarian governments on the basis that they could be “reformed,” while Marxist or 
totalitarian ones could not. 
Kirkpatrick’s was not a popular view. In fact, the reason Abrams was nominated 
for his post was because the Administration’s first choice, the “ultraconservative” Ernest 
Lefever, repeated Kirkpatrick’s argument verbatim to the Senate Foreign Affairs 
Committee, resulting in his rejection.678 Abrams, on the other hand, was confirmed 
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unanimously after a generous statement of support from Moynihan and Abrams’ promise 
that “our foreign policy in general has human rights at its core.”679 While the 
Administration won some converts for its protests of political repression in Cuba, the 
Soviet Union, and the Eastern Bloc, its policies in the Third World were vehemently 
opposed by human rights groups in the U.S. and Europe. Ultimately, Abrams spent his 
tenure fighting off criticism from Freedom House (a longtime Moynihan ally) and other 
organizations for the Administration’s actions in Latin America. Abrams avoided 
prosecution during the Iran-Contra scandal by cooperating with federal prosecutors and 
eventually pleaded guilty to two charges of withholding information, though he would 
later play a starring role in the 2003 Iraq War as a special assistant to President George 
W. Bush and Senior Director for Democracy, Human Rights, and International 
Operations in the National Security Council.680 
The Reagan Administration’s economic policies toward the South, on the other 
hand, were informed less by foreign policy concerns and more by a deep faith in the 
virtues of its domestic economic program. That program’s policies—cutting taxes and 
spending, attacking inflation, and removing government regulations—were clearly, 
publicly, and often stated by the President, and were epitomized in memorable quips like 
“the eight most terrifying words in the English language” (“I’m from the government, 
and I’m here to help”) and “government is not the solution, government is the problem.” 
David Stockman, in charge of the Office of Management and Budget from 1981-85, was 
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a charismatic, if controversial, media figure who made “supply-side economics” a 
household name during debates over the signature 1981 Kemp-Roth tax cuts and Gramm-
Latta spending bill.681 Important work was also done by Nobel Prize-winning economist 
Milton Friedman, whose 1980 bestseller Free to Choose was turned into a popular 
television series with Friedman and his wife Rose, as well as conservative “policy 
entrepreneurs” such as Arthur Laffer (author of the supply-side theory), Wall Street 
Journal columnist Jude Wanninski, and various individuals employed by the Heritage 
Foundation and other well-funded conservative think tanks.682  
The Administration’s campaign against Keynesian economics at home led some 
critics to allege that, in one Reagan official’s characterization, “it has no international 
economic policy save for carrying out its domestic program.” The Reagan administration 
had “relegated international economics to a lower priority than any administration in the 
postwar period,” determined political scientist Benjamin Cohen in 1983.683 According to 
Paul Krugman, who served on Reagan’s Council of Economic Advisors, top Reagan 
Treasury officials were notorious for their lack of expertise on international economic 
issues and were looked down upon by their better-informed colleagues in the Federal 
Reserve.684 These impressions were strengthened by Reagan’s controversial—and to 
some, hypocritical—endorsement of import quotas on sugar, steel, and cars, as well as a 
reliance on foreign borrowing to pay for new military expenditures. 
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This is missing the point. Reagan’s team may have had less experience or 
academic credentials—the relative lack of PhDs was a striking contrast to the ultra-brainy 
Carter Administration—but their philosophy toward international economic relations 
possessed a clear logic. Henry R. Nau, in charge of international economic affairs in the 
National Security Council from 1981-83 and professor of political science at George 
Washington University, defended that philosophy as “domesticism,” or “the simple 
proposition that the world economy is only as good as the national economies that 
compose it.”685 
According to Nau, the domesticist outlook stood in contrast to the “globalists” of 
both parties who in the 1970s traced “global economic problems… largely to the 
malfunctioning of the international economic system itself.” Globalists’ belief that 
external and inevitable structural factors—namely, the rise in prosperity and assertiveness 
of other nations in the 1950s and 60s— were to blame for declining U.S. hegemony had 
led the Nixon, Ford, and (especially) Carter administrations to look for solutions in new 
international economic arrangements, from the Group of 7 summits to the North-South 
dialogue. For the domesticists, however, the culprit was unsound U.S. fiscal and 
monetary policies in the late 1960s, which lead to inflation that was first exported by 
increased borrowing and then compounded by the 1973 and 1979 oil shocks. In this sense 
the U.S. was only as weak globally as it wanted to be: “Re-establishing sound U.S. 
domestic policies was the fulcrum for restoring the proper emphasis on price stability and 
market incentives in the world economy as a whole. Rather than ignoring the effects of 
                                                     
685 Nau, “Where Reaganomics Works,” 14. 
314 
 
U.S. policy changes in the world economy, domesticism stressed their global 
importance.”686 
For Reagan’s economic officials, that importance extended to the developing 
world—and back. As Nau explained it, “Progress toward domestic stability and freer 
trade” in the South would “rejuvenate international financial flows” and give Northern 
investors “more predictable access to foreign markets.” The expected result was the 
beginning of a virtuous circle of private investment and trade based on “real transfers of 
goods and services to be redeemed.” Equally important, as direct investment and 
commercial bank lending to poor countries increased, concessional lending from 
multilateral development banks “could then supplement these commercial flows rather 
than substitute for them.” In this way, market reforms in the South would achieve two 
related goals: they would strengthen the legitimacy of international capital markets by 
making poor countries safe for foreign investment, and reduce outlays of U.S. 
government funds to “globalist” mechanisms of North-South wealth transfer that 
encouraged fiscal irresponsibility and rent-seeking, not unlike welfare payments to 
individuals.687  
This is precisely the message Reagan delivered to the boards of governors of the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund in September 1981. The speech is mostly 
remembered for Reagan’s insistence that what “[unites] societies which have achieved 
the most spectacular broad based economic progress… is their willingness to believe in 
the magic of the marketplace.” The “magic” line is a trademark Reaganism, but the 
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President also discussed several other policies with specific implications for North-South 
relations.  
First, Reagan asserted that both development and “political freedoms”—or human 
rights—were impossible without first establishing “economic freedom.”: “Those 
[societies] which put [economic] freedom as the first priority find they have also 
provided security and economic progress.” This was a complete reversal of the Carter 
Administration’s formulation of “basic human needs” as economic rights: here, economic 
rights were reconfigured negatively as the ability to make business decisions free from 
government involvement, rather than the positive, Carter formulation of the right to 
adequate housing, education, health care, and food. Poverty was no longer an offense to 
human rights, if it occurred in the context of a “free” economy, nor was political 
repression, if it guaranteed “security” against the threat of those who might impose 
restrictions on economic activity.  
Second, Reagan argued that “the most important contribution any country can 
make to world development is to pursue sound economic policies at home.”688 This was a 
responsibility toward developing countries that the U.S.—“overspent, overtaxed, and 
overregulated, with the result being slow growth and soaring inflation”—had abnegated. 
The idea that a healthy North meant a healthy South was not new, having been endorsed 
by the developed countries since the first G-7 summit in 1975. Both the Ford and Carter 
administrations had advocated for some mixture of fiscal stimulus in “strong” economies, 
namely the U.S. and Germany, and reform in “weak” or underperforming ones, like Italy 
and Britain. But rapid adjustment across the North—led by the U.S.—prepared the way 
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for disaster in the South. From 1979-81, the U.S. Federal Reserve issued several interest 
rate increases (dubbed the “Volcker shocks,” after Fed chief Paul Volcker) that added in 
one estimate an additional $41 billion to the debts of already indebted developing 
countries.689 In 1981 the governments of Britain and Germany followed up with their 
own anti-inflation drives, further damaging the South’s terms of trade. Starting in 1980, 
developing countries’ exports as a share of world trade entered a steep decline (after a 
decade-long relative rise), while commodity prices—a core NIEO concern throughout the 
1970s—fell “’to a level not experienced since at least the 1930s.’”690  
Third, Reagan dismissed the value of concessional aid to all but the poorest 
countries, holding that “Unless a nation puts its own financial and economic house in 
order, no amount of aid will produce progress.” This meant that while Reagan recognized 
that the U.S. had a responsibility for development through sound macroeconomic 
policies, it viewed foreign aid in the same way it viewed welfare programs at home: they 
only encouraged dependency and stagnation. Again, the best “American contribution” to 
development was to ensure a “growing, prosperous United States economy” that could 
buy, sell, and invest overseas. To further deemphasize aid’s importance relative to private 
capital, Reagan added that “the financial flows generated by trade investment and growth 
capital flows [sic] far exceed official development assistance funds provided to 
developing countries.”  
Fourth, Reagan reversed his Administration’s initial hostility toward (some) 
multilateral institutions, specifically the World Bank and IMF. This was not out of a 
                                                     
689 Vassilis K. Fouskas, The Politics of International Political Economy (Routledge, 2013), 153. 
690 Steven G. Livingston, “The Politics of International Agenda-Setting: Reagan and North-South 
Relations, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Sept. 1992), 322. 
317 
 
newfound sympathy for their missions. Rather, the idea was to use American influence in 
those institutions to turn them into vehicles for market reform. Thus, Reagan declared a 
“special responsibility to provide constructive suggestions to make [them] more 
effective,” for example, “enhancing” the role of private capital in Bank projects and 
encouraging “deficit countries” to reach agreements with the IMF on “sound, 
comprehensive stabilization program[s]” that would “signal private markets of [their] 
intent to solve [their] own economic problems.” 
In another sign of things to come, Reagan avoided direct mention of North-South 
dialogue negotiations in the United Nations, which had been suspended one year prior 
due to both sides’ inability to agree on an agenda. Instead, Reagan concluded his speech 
by calling for an “end to the divisive rhetoric of ‘us versus them,’ ‘North versus South.’ 
Instead, let us decide what all of us, both developed and developing countries, can 
accomplish together.”691 
 
Foreign Aid and Human Rights: Successes and Setbacks 
 
The Administration initiated several efforts in its first year to realign U.S. 
development policy with its pro-corporate, “domesticist” agenda. Some activities were 
expanded. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), a U.S. government-
owned corporation with the role of facilitating private investment in the Third World, was 
granted the authority to issue insurance to private corporations against “foreign strife,” 
and was instructed to reject projects that would “substantially reduce the positive trade 
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benefits likely to accrue to the United States from the investment.”692 At the Agency for 
International Development (USAID), Reagan officials created a “Bureau for Private 
Enterprise” to promote lending to small- and medium-sized Third World businesses; Mrs. 
Elise Dupont, wife of the governor of Delaware, was selected to lead the new agency, 
despite having no foreign affairs experience.693 A more consequential Reagan program 
was the Caribbean Basin Initiative, which offered economic and military assistance to 
countries of Central America and the Caribbean that did not “expropriate without 
compensation” and which took into account those countries’ “attitude towards foreign 
investment and policies employed to promote their own development.”694 
Major cuts were proposed to traditional development aid, on which David 
Stockman’s Office of Management and Budget led the charge. Stockman truly wanted to 
reduce the size of government in all sectors, and he attacked the foreign aid budget with 
the same zeal he took toward domestic outlays. He later stated: 
I believed that the organs of international aid and so-called Third World 
development—the UN, the multilateral banks, and the U.S. Agency for 
International Development—were infested with socialist error. The 
international aid bureaucracy was turning Third World countries into 
quagmires of self-imposed inefficiency and burying them beneath 
mountainous external debts they would never be able to repay. 
 
To that end, in early 1981 Stockman worked out a budget plan with Republican senator 
Phil Gramm that would have cut U.S. multilateral and bilateral aid by 45 percent, 
cancelled Carter’s $3.2 billion pledge to the World Bank’s International Development 
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Association (IDA), frozen all U.S. contributions to the other regional multilateral banks 
and UN agencies, and phased out America’s PL 480 or “Food for Peace” program.695 
Stockman’s campaign against foreign aid quickly ran up against the 
Administration’s national security strategy, exposing the limits of Reaganism’s 
commitment to cutting spending. According to Stockman, Secretary of State Al Haig 
leaked the Gramm-Stockman budget to the press, sparking angry phone calls from 
Capitol Hill and formal protests from the EEC, OECD, and Australia.696 While the OMB 
held that “Every major program should take some reduction,” it too had to accept a 
hierarchy: “Bilateral aid has priority over multilateral aid programs, [and] security 
assistance has priority over development assistance.” The result was a compromise 
budget that pledged to reduce overall aid by 20 percent, cut but did not cancel U.S. 
contributions to the IDA, and deferred new aid obligations.697 
In practice, aid was no so much reduced as redirected towards nations that fit into 
the Administration’s national security strategy. In fact, from 1981-86, traditional 
development aid rose by 22 percent, from $4.9 billion to $6 billion, while security 
assistance rose by over 100 percent.698 Aid distribution also changed, as AID redirected 
funds toward those governments deemed “friendly” or under threat, such as El Salvador, 
Honduras, Sudan, and Pakistan, and away from “unfriendly governments” such as 
Nicaragua and Tanzania.699 The jettisoning of human rights in aid determination was a 
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foregone conclusion, but even the Administration’s pro-market requirements could be put 
aside in service of other foreign policy goals. According to a 1985 report by the Overseas 
Development Council, recipients of large aid programs were rejecting AID 
conditionalities “with the knowledge that their bureaucratic and congressional allies in 
Washington would block a cutoff of funds.”700 
 
From Ottawa to Cancún: Reagan, Thatcher, and the Brandt Commission 
 
While the Administration struggled in its first year to balance its commitments to 
reforming Third World markets and supporting anti-communist allies, it still had no 
explicit policy toward North-South negotiations, which had been stalled in the United 
Nations since the end of the Carter Administration. At the June 1980 G-7 summit in 
Venice, the developed countries agreed “to approach in a positive spirit the prospect of 
global negotiations in the framework of the United Nations,” scheduled for January 1981, 
but gave no further elaboration. In effect, G-7 leaders kicked the can down the road until 
the outcome of the U.S. presidential election in November.701 
Reagan officials opposed global negotiations in both form and spirit. “Ultimately, 
the South wants our money,” complained a Treasury official. “It’s a scam. Our problem 
is that the whole mindset of the dialogue is objectionable. It’s unreal.”702 However, 
ignoring the dialogue was not an option. One reason was the insistence of Canada’s 
Pierre Trudeau, who had been trying to push U.S. North-South policy in a more 
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progressive direction for several years.703 Canada was hosting the June 1981 G-7 summit 
in Ottawa, and Trudeau was one of the few Western leaders left still committed to large 
resource transfers and institutional change. According to Trudeau’s foreign minister 
Mark MacGuigan, the Prime Minister was “totally consumed by the issue” and “filled 
with youthful vigor and idealism.” “Power sharing is at the heart of the North-South 
dialogue,” Trudeau explained to MacGuigan and Larry Smith, assistant undersecretary 
responsible for North-South affairs, “and [Western] politicians should be able to 
understand this readily and recognize that it is better to share power now than in the 
future, even though it may be easier the other way round.”704 
Trudeau also supported the activities of the Independent Commission on 
International Development Issues. The Commission was the initiative of World Bank 
president Robert McNamara, who announced the idea in a speech to the Bank’s Board of 
Governors in September, 1977.705 McNamara was inspired by a 1976 joint report from 
the Club of Rome and the Dutch Ministry for Development Cooperation which, among 
other things, supported the South’s calls for democratizing international institutions and 
criticized World Bank policies for ignoring poverty. While the Dutch report garnered 
little attention in the North, it was well received in the South and made a strong 
impression on McNamara. In early 1977 he proposed to Willy Brandt, leader of the 
German Social Democratic Party and former Chancellor, that they convene their own 
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commission, this time consisting of former heads of state from both North and South, that 
would “determine the necessary volume of aid, especially for the poorest countries, and 
the required changes in the policies of developed countries, as well as discuss the 
structural modification of the international economy.”706 As discussed in Chapter 4, 
McNamara launched a similar initiative at the outset of the 1970s “development crisis”—
a 1969 Bank-funded project headed by former Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson—
that was criticized for its lack of new ideas and quickly forgotten. This time, the 
Commission would be funded independently from the Bank, and a majority of its 21 
members hailed from developing countries.707 
The Commission published its first report in February 1980. Subtitled “A 
Programme for Survival,” the “Brandt Report,” as it became known, called global 
inequality the leading threat to world peace, and also explored development’s relationship 
to the global arms trade, nuclear disarmament, and the environment.708 For Northern 
politicians, the report’s specific policy recommendations were bold—among other things, 
it endorsed the Common Fund, called for larger and automatic transfers of wealth from 
North to South, and proposed a World Development Fund with a fully international 
membership. The report was popular among developing countries at the United Nations, 
where delegates gave supportive speeches in the General Assembly, and in Europe. In 
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Britain alone 68,000 copies were sold, and 10,000 people showed up to Parliament when 
MPs were scheduled to discuss it.709 
Looking back, little in the Brandt Report was new. Most of the policies had been 
called for by the South within the dialogue for years, and the connection between global 
economic cooperation and world peace had a history going back at least to the founding 
of the UN and Bretton Woods institutions. Unfortunately, its main pitch to the developed 
countries—to fund a “Marshall Plan for the South” that would also stimulate the 
economies of the North—could not have come at a worse time. Western governments 
were terrified of inflation following the 1979 oil crisis and mired in recession; one after 
another, they hiked interest rates and cut spending. One leader particularly opposed to the 
report’s brand of “global Keynesianism” was Margaret Thatcher, who was even more 
determined than Reagan to reverse the macroeconomic consensus in her country. 
Nevertheless, given the report’s popularity in Europe and the South, even the Thatcher 
government took a conciliatory stance. “Nowhere can the Brandt report be read with 
greater interest than in Britain,” Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington insisted during a visit 
to Caracas. “It has been the publishing success of the year, and at the last count has sold 
ten times as many copies as in the United States… We also know that, as a leading 
British newspaper put it yesterday, soft words are not enough… Above all, we believe it 
is not rhetoric which is required, but action.”710 
That action would take the form of a high-profile North-South summit in October 
1981 at the Mexican resort of Cancún. Brandt had discussed the idea of a summit with 
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UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim in 1979, before the report’s publication, but 
Brandt and Austrian chancellor Bruno Kreisky wanted a smaller group of leaders in the 
model of the 1975-77 Conference on International Economic Cooperation instead of a 
large international gathering. The G-77 preferred an open forum, but Mexican president 
José López Portillo agreed to host the summit, with Austria as a co-sponsor, as a way to 
restart North-South negotiations.711  
According to her memoirs, Thatcher persuaded Reagan to attend the Cancún 
summit during her visit to Washington in February. Although Thatcher dismissed “the 
whole concept of ‘North-South’ dialogue, which the Brandt Commission had made the 
fashionable talk of the international community,” she “felt that, whatever our misgivings 
about the occasion, we should be present, both to argue for our positions and to forestall 
criticism that we were uninterested in the developing world.”712 This may have been true, 
but it was not the only reason for Reagan’s attendance. At the Ottawa summit in July, 
Trudeau and French President Francois Mitterand “were laying in wait to attack the 
United States for its inaction on Third World issues,” particularly Reagan’s promise 
earlier that year to cut U.S. contributions to the IDA.713 To Reagan’s frustration, they 
refused to even discuss East-West issues until the U.S. agreed to a more forthcoming 
position on global negotiations, and North-South relations became the longest section of 
the customary joint communique.714 In the words of an American participant, the 
differences between Reagan and his counterparts on North-South relations were 
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“enormous,” and the U.S. was “the skunk at the party.”715 Yet the Reagan Administration 
had to choose between isolating its allies and leaving the door open to global 
negotiations, and in the end it chose the latter. “There is now a disposition on the part of 
all summit countries to pursue any opportunity for meaningful progress [in the North-
South dialogue], including what are known as global negotiations,” Trudeau declared at 
the summit’s end. “That openness to the process of global negotiations represents a 
consensus which did not exist before our summit and seemed very remote not too many 
months ago.”716 
The Cancún summit on October 23, 1981 was attended by twenty-two heads of 
state, “representing two-thirds of the world’s population and controlling three-fourths of 
the world’s wealth.”717 Despite the hype and international visibility, the summit was yet 
another North-South anticlimax. As in his speech to the World Bank a month before, 
Reagan preached the virtues of market reforms and projected a shower of private 
investment in the South once the U.S. put its own house in order. The U.S. was alone in 
opposing the creation of an energy affiliate for least developed countries, or LLCDs, 
inside the World Bank, though Britain joined the U.S. in rejecting the Brandt report’s 
proposal for an independent World Development Fund.718 Thatcher recalled telling her 
European and Third World counterparts, “[T]here was no way in which I was going to 
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put British deposits into a bank which was totally run by those on overdraft.”719 As 
participants had agreed not to produce a joint statement in the interests of a “free 
exchange of ideas,” it was left to López Portillo and Trudeau to put a positive spin on this 
grim non-conclusion. One reporter described the scene: “[Few] among the approximately 
3,000 journalists and staff present failed to note the decidedly opposite mood of the two 
men. López Portillo was cautiously optimistic; Trudeau was dejected. Cynics in 
attendance claimed López Portillo had no option but to act in this fashion, as the host of 
the conference. It was Trudeau… who accurately reflected the results of the 
conference.”720 
 
Conclusion: The 1982 Debt Crisis and Reaganism’s Triumph 
 
Despite two follow-up attempts by the Brandt Commission, in 1983 and 1988, the 
Cancún summit marked the effective end of the North-South dialogue. This appears 
obvious in retrospect. As Margaret Thatcher recalled in her memoirs: 
The summit was a success—though not really for any of the reasons 
publicly given. At its conclusions there was, of course, the expected 
general—and largely meaningless—talk about ‘global negotiations on 
North-South issues… But what mattered to me was that the independence 
of the IMF and World Bank were maintained. Equally valuable, this was 
the last of such gatherings. The intractable problems of Third World 
poverty, hunger, and debt would not be solved by misdirected 
international intervention, but rather by liberating enterprise, promoting 
trade—and defeating socialism in all its forms.721 
 
In its own preparations for the summit, the U.S. State Department also believed the 
dialogue’s days were numbered: “The October summit could mark the end, for the 
foreseeable future, of serious attempts to negotiate global economic bargains between 
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North and South. It may be the last gasp of a decade-long effort at multilateral 
diplomacy.”722 
The State Department was correct, but such optimism had been proven wrong 
before. In fact, U.S. officials had been predicting the dialogue’s end since late 1974, 
when Henry Kissinger began his strategy of splitting the “unholy alliance” of OPEC and 
the oil-importing developing countries by making strategic concessions to the New 
International Economic Order program. Pro-market ideologues like Treasury Secretary 
William Simon and Alan Greenspan charged Kissinger with abandoning America’s 
commitment to free markets abroad and putting in danger their own reform efforts at 
home, but this “economic theology,” as Kissinger put it, was overruled by the pragmatic 
Gerald Ford. At the same time, a growing number of “new conservatives,” then outside 
of government and in between parties, organized around their opposition to what Daniel 
Patrick Moynihan called, in a lengthy essay in Commentary, Kissinger’s “appeasement” 
of the G-77’s economic and moral claims. Instead, Moynihan had argued, the U.S. must 
“go into opposition” at the UN by using the Third World’s human rights record to 
delegitimize its criticisms of the U.S.-led liberal world order.723  This was also tried for a 
time—eight months, actually—until Moynihan, too, found himself isolated from both the 
Europeans and the consensus-driven Ford, and was forced to resign. 
The Carter Administration placed the North-South dialogue at the top of its 
international agenda, and, for the first time since Kissinger’s 1975 speech at the Seventh 
Special Session, the outlook was genuinely hopeful. Carter was serious about responding 
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to the South’s problems, and sought to turn his signature foreign policy initiative—
human rights—into a global campaign to meet “basic human needs” in poor countries. 
This was an important distinction: while Kissinger wanted to water the NIEO down, and 
Simon and Moynihan wanted to reject it in both form and spirit, Carter and Secretary of 
State Cyrus Vance wanted to transform it. This, too, failed, for reasons made plain to 
Carter in conversations with G-77 leaders like Venezuelan president Carlos Andrés 
Pérez. The Third World (correctly) suspected that Carter’s focus on attacking poverty 
within countries was intended to end discussion of global structural reform, however 
sincere Carter was about the former. 
From 1974-1982, the North-South dialogue transformed U.S. foreign policy, but 
U.S. foreign policy did not transform the North-South dialogue. The G-77’s solidarity 
and power had been diminished by many things—OPEC’s halfhearted aid efforts in the 
wake of the first oil crisis, the North’s coming together in the G-7 summits, the return to 
recession and austerity in the North, the abrupt end to détente provided by the Soviet 
Union’s invasion of Afghanistan—but its agenda remained the same: the redistribution of 
both resources and power from North to South through comprehensive global 
negotiations. Kissinger had entertained the possibility of some redistribution of resources 
and power; Carter was willing to commit more resources, but only to U.S.-dominated 
institutions. Neoconservatives and neoliberals had rejected both throughout the 1970s, 
and with Reagan’s election, were in the position to put those beliefs into practice. It was a 
testament to the remarkable impact the NIEO and North-South dialogue had on 
international politics in the 1970s that, long after the threat of serious economic 
retaliation had passed, the Reagan Administration was still unable to kill, or even opt out 
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of, global negotiations. Diplomatic norms, European concern, and Southern solidarity all 
continued to mandate U.S. participation.724 Shortly after Cancún, the Administration 
announced its support for a new round of global negotiations, on the condition that they 
“deal with specific, identifiable obstacles to development,” “focus on international 
growth and development,” and “[do] not create new institutions or weaken the power 
of…the IMF and World Bank.”725 Minus Carter’s basic needs proposals—which, though 
significant, came to naught through the dialogue—this was effectively the U.S. position 
four years back. 
Those global negotiations would not take place. On the evening of August 12, 
1982, Mexico’s finance minister flew to Washington to deliver grim news: his country 
was no longer able to service its debts.726 Shortly after, Mexico announced a unilateral 
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debt moratorium of 90 days and requested a renegotiated payments schedule and 
additional loans to meet past obligations. Washington and London arranged a temporary 
loan as well as consultations between the banks and Mexican officials, but President 
Lóp z Portillo balked on the banks’ insistence that he accept an IMF-designed austerity 
program in exchange for new loans. Instead, López Portillo nationalized banks, imposed 
import controls, and condemned the IMF as “witch doctors” whose treatment plan was to 
“deprive the patient of food and subject him to compulsory rest.”727 
Within three months López Portillo was out of power. In November a new 
government accepted the IMF’s package, but by then the crisis had spread to Argentina 
and Brazil. Reagan and Thatcher’s cuts to official development aid compounded the 
problem, as did Reagan’s own borrowing, which drove up interest rates, and Thatcher’s 
austerity, which decreased demand.728 The South’s “lost decade of development” had 
begun. While the largest debtors were located in Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia 
(the Philippines), and North Africa (Morocco), the crisis hit smaller debtors in sub-
Saharan Africa especially hard due to their relative impoverishment.729 By the end of 
1984, at least thirty “structural adjustment” loans had been negotiated in Latin America 
and other developing countries, in which the banks provided the capital and the IMF 
enforced the terms.730 This “new diplomatic constellation, with the IMF and the U.S. 
taking on key brokerage roles between banks and debtor states,” virtually ensured that the 
burden of adjustment would fall overwhelmingly on the citizens of indebted countries 
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and hardly at all on foreign investors.731 “The principal—although largely undeclared—
objective of the Western world’s debt strategy, ably coordinated by the IMF, was to buy 
time,” explained Nigel Lawson, Britain’s chancellor of the exchequer during the crisis. 
“Time was needed not only to enable to debtor countries to put sensible economic 
policies in place but also for the Western banks to rebuild their shattered balance 
sheets.”732  
Those “sensible economic policies”—including privatization of government 
services and industry, deregulation of labor and capital markets, removal of price 
controls, and spending cuts—became part of a one-size-fits-all reform prescription 
known as the “Washington Consensus.”733 Early in the crisis, there was some fear in the 
North of debtors forming a “debtpec” to argue collectively for better terms, but the 
“South” as a diplomatic unit had vanished: “Debtor states abandoned the mores of North-
South negotiations, preferring more efficacious bilateral ties with creditors and altering 
global communications channels as a result. LDC interests were badly divided. Some 
were unaffected; others held mostly official debt, were meeting payments and wanted the 
issue depoliticized, or preferred continuing radical demands. This reduced coalitional 
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opportunities. Nor was the issue suitable to bloc politics. Even the large debtors, because 
of the continuing need for credit and their different positions in the business cycle, have 
been unable to create a unified position.”734 The eight-year effort towards a New 
International Economic Order was over, and the new neoliberal order had arrived. 
The developed countries were stunned by the “historic” and “unprecedented” debt 
crisis.735 US officials initially argued that it was a “temporary problem of liquidity” 
brought on by unsound domestic policies that could be contained by a bit of cash and 
structural reforms.736 Debt relief was dismissed as encouraging moral hazard.737 Instead, 
the expectation was that once reforms were in place, private capital would have the 
confidence to return. The World Bank too was caught off guard; as late as 1981, 
researchers were “optimistic…about the future availability of private capital flows to 
already-indebted developing countries” and believed the debt problem was “manageable 
and would not obstruct economic growth.” There was a reason for this: “From the late 
1960s onward, the industrial countries made substantial investments in economic 
research on developing countries through organizations that they controlled, such as the 
OECD and the World Bank.”738  
As the North-South dialogue dragged on, the self-serving conclusion in the North 
was that the biggest obstacle to development was not a lack of money, rich country 
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protectionism, or global rules, but developing countries themselves. The Bank issued its 
first structural adjustment loan in 1980, one year after Robert McNamara introduced the 
concept in a high-profile speech at UNCTAD V. Under McNamara’s successor A. W. 
Clausen, a former Bank of America CEO, by the mid-1980s structural adjustment loans 
climbed to one-third of the Bank’s new lending. Dissenters within the Bank and other 
international financial institutions were either silent or ignored, as Stanley Fischer, the 
Bank’s chief economist, explained: “It was clear…at the beginning of 1989, as it had 
been clear to many much earlier, that growth in the debtor countries would not return 
without debt relief. But the official agencies operate on the basis of an agreed upon 
strategy, and none of them could openly confront the existing strategy without having an 
alternative to put in place. And to propose such an alternative would have required 
agreement among the major shareholders of the institutions. So long as the United States 
was not willing to move, the IFI’s were not free to speak.”739 
Fischer’s explanation reveals the most damaging legacy of US policy toward the 
New International Economic Order and North-South dialogue. American officials’ focus 
on defeating the South’s proposals for global reform left them blind to the global crisis 
brewing right in front of them. At UNCTAD IV in 1976, Secretary-General Gamani 
Corea warned of an impending debt problem in the South; a year later, CIEC co-
chairman Manuel Pérez-Guerrero insisted on behalf of the “Group of 19” developing 
countries that the CIEC discuss the debt problem and reach agreement on a new 
framework for debt renegotiation and rescheduling.740 The Carter Administration agreed 
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to some debt relief for “least developed countries” on a “case-by-case” basis, but as late 
as 1979, where at UNCTAD V debt resurfaced once again, U.S. officials believed 
“official debt… [is] of political importance to LDCs frequently out of proportion to [its] 
economic significance.”741 By the time the debt crisis hit, the consensus on markets, the 
state, and development in the U.S., IMF, and World Bank had moved decisively in favor 
of the NIEO’s greatest critics: the neoliberals and neoconservatives who began the 1970s 
on the fringes of the foreign policy establishment and came to dominate it in the 1980s 
and beyond.  
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